


START OF REEL

JOB NO. H-108
AR-181-76



OPERATOR C. MILLER

DATE 1/2/76

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HISTORY OF USS HAWKBILL (SS 366)

USS HAWKBILL (SS 366) was born land-locked, hundreds of miles from salt water, at Manitowoc, Wisconsin.

Built by the Manitowoc Shipbuilding Company, she was launched January 9, 1944 and was commissioned May 17. HAWKBILL's sponsor was Mrs. F.W. Scanland, Jr., wife of the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander F.W. Scanland, Jr., USN, who commanded her through her five war patrols.

Four days after commissioning, with stores loaded and the new crew aboard, HAWKBILL went to "sea" for the first time on the bitterly cold waters of Lake Michigan. Her first dive, made as a routine trim dive, was no more eventful than hundreds of others that were to follow.

The following two weeks were repetitions of the first day's exercises. Trim dives, drills, and various exercises worked constantly toward perfecting the precision that later was to receive its reward in battle.

Part of the training consisted of a two-day visit to the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, Great Lakes, Illinois. Here the ship was opened for inspection and several thousand visitors, among them Rear Admiral A.S. Carpenter, USN, passed through the shiny new boat.

On June 1, 1944, HAWKBILL's first training period came to an end. Three days later she began her long trek to New Orleans and the sea. Steaming out of Manitowoc breakwater into a dense fog, HAWKBILL drove at high speed to Chicago. Thence down the Chicago Sanitary Canal--with a tug ahead and one astern--to Lockport, Illinois, to be cradled in a huge pontoon drydock for passage down the river.

Pushed by the powerful towboat SS MINNESOTA, of the Federal barge line, HAWKBILL and her crew enjoyed a tranquil six-day holiday gliding between green banks of the Illinois River, past the Mississippi bluffs, levees and flats. On June 10 HAWKBILL arrived in New Orleans and six days later, loaded with torpedoes, ammunition and provisions, departed the United States.

Enroute to the Canal Zone, HAWKBILL received her baptism of fire. While attempting to pass clear of a friendly merchantman and yet remain in the assigned lane, the merchantman became jittery over the proximity of a submarine and opened fire with her deck gun. Five rounds--all short--were fired before HAWKBILL's captain signalled over the curt message "Stop it". He stopped.

The remainder of the Caribbean cruise was uneventful. The boat transited the Panama Canal and arrived at Submarine Base, Balboa, on June 21. After three days rest an intensive training period was begun.

HAWKBILL here began to make a name for herself. Of nine exercises torpedoes fired, seven were hits. Out of a total of 69 practice submerged approaches, the periscope was sighted only once. HAWKBILL's training period--most of which took place in the vicinity of Las Perlas Islands--was reduced four days below the period usually allotted for submarines, but in that time accomplished approximately the same amount of work as the others.

During the period July 13 to July 28 HAWKBILL was enroute to Pearl Harbor, T.H. There the third and final training period put the finishing touches on operating and battle efficiency of the crew.

The First War Patrol began on August 23 when HAWKBILL placed Pearl Harbor astern and took departure in company with USS BAYA and USS BECUNA. Destination was Saipan, newly wrested from the Japanese. Passing north of Anathan Island, she wheeled around on September 4 was escorted into Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, to moor alongside USS HOLLAND for fuel and minor repairs.

On September 6 HAWKBILL continued westward to join a number of other submarines in an offensive reconnaissance group of San Bernardino Strait, Philippine Islands. Many aircraft--many of them enemy--were sighted both enroute to and while patrolling this area.

On September 21 patrol area was changed to a reconnaissance line south of Sakishima Gunto for three days, but contacts were still limited to enemy aircraft which appeared regularly on their morning searches.

HAWKBILL left this area on September 23 for a new spot west of Formosa. After transiting Bashi Channel, she suddenly and unexpectedly lost her innocence by being forced down and bombed by a Jap plane. The war was on.

A large enemy ship with one escort provided HAWKBILL with her first red letter day and first opportunity to fire torpedoes in anger early in the night of October 7, while patrolling independently in the middle of South China Sea. The first attack on this fast target was unsuccessful, but in the second this Nip was fired with two hits out of three torpedoes at 2,000 yards range. Bursting pyrotechnics floated from the Jap into the black sky. Within seconds this doomed aircraft tender exploded with a roar, reaching mighty fingers of fire and debris to the heavens.

This light provided a timely source of illumination for the escort which immediately took HAWKBILL under fire. Tracers streaked overhead and whistled past the periscope shears to explode in the water nearby. But the captain asked for a little speed and shortly left the angry sub chaser to report his chagrin to the emperor.

Thus began the close-packed series of actions that was to atone for some 45 days of monotony. Two short hours had passed after scratching the first target when another target group--an aircraft carrier escorted by two destroyers--loomed in the distance. In the bright moonlight he could be clearly seen at 11,000 yards. The carrier was making 17 knots and HAWKBILL was pressed to keep up with him.

The chase ended abruptly, however, when one of the destroyers suddenly was detached from the group and closed rapidly. HAWKBILL dove fast, just in time to receive a well-placed rapid fire salvo of 19 depth charges released in less than 30 seconds. Twenty more depth charges were dropped later, but none caused more than minor damage.

At daybreak HAWKBILL surfaced, still in the vicinity of the carrier group. But efforts to close were fruitless and finally it was necessary to give up the chase.

On October 9 HAWKBILL departed the area for Mindoro Strait. A contact report from USS BECUNA that afternoon resulted in a course change to intercept a new convoy. Within less than an hour the convoy was sighted and HAWKBILL commenced another submerged daylight approach.

Just before reaching the firing point, all hell broke loose in the convoy. BECUNA was in there pitching from the other side. Torpedo explosions blended with the concussion from dozens of depth charges dropped by escorts. Ships turned madly in all directions. With six torpedoes HAWKBILL sank one medium freighter and damaged another. Then, shaken by a heavy explosion close by, she sought safety in depth, there to receive 96 depth charges from the racks of the furious escorts.

After dark, HAWKBILL surfaced and commenced an end around play for a second attack. Nine ships were now left in the convoy. Visibility was so good that a night surface attack proved extremely difficult. But with her last three torpedoes forward HAWKBILL managed one hit in the stern of a large passenger freighter, and left her shrouded in a large cloud of black smoke. The skipper called it a day and headed again for Mindoro.

Early next morning--the tenth--brought still another enemy contact, consisting of two freighters, one large tanker and escorts, headed north across the Strait.

After an hour and a half of hot chase, attempting to gain firing position ahead of the convoy, success seemed certain. But at the critical moment an enemy plane with a bomb forced HAWKBILL out of the picture, letting the ships slip by unmolested.

Then began an 81 hour passage of the close, enemy-controlled waters of Sulu Sea, Sibutu Pass, Makassar Strait and Lombok Strait without a single dive. Aircraft were sighted and frequently land was only a stone's throw away. But HAWKBILL stayed on the surface and even initiated some 60 pollywogs into the Ancient Order of the Deep as Neptunus Rex came aboard through the forward torpedo room hatch.

HAWKBILL passed through the narrow waters between Lombok and Bali Islands on October 14, took a deep breath, charged South over the Indian Ocean and on the 17th tied up in Fremantle Harbor, West Australia. Her first war patrol was over.

In company with BECUNA and USS FLASHER, HAWKBILL departed Fremantle on her second war patrol after normal refit and training. After a short stop for fuel at Darwin, the route followed East of Timor, through the Tiger Islands and North of Kalao Island. On one of the many small native craft sighted, one passenger made frantic motions with a piece of paper. Its poignancy certainly makes it worthy of a place in this account. Written in Malay, the translated text follows:

"To His Excellency the General,
At present with the Americans.

"I, the undersigned, H. Haling bin Kama Soekhoe, from "Afdeeling" Mandar Celebes, "landschap" Pembaoeang, district Bonde, kampong Baboeboelo, butat present living on the island Kaloe Kaloe Koeang, Makassar, herewith inform your Excellency that the Japanese do not like the Islamites.

"If this war will continue much longer, we, Islamites, shall not be able to live very long, as the Japanese have taken all our possessions, like food and clothing. In the end, if we can not bear this any longer, we will have to give in to the Japanese.

"At present, only the God Almighty knows how hard life is for us.

"I am hoping to see your Excellency back in the Netherlands East Indies as soon as possible. All your news pamphlets have been carefully kept and have been read with much interest and therefore the undersigned is still waiting for your return.

"After your Excellency has landed safely will you please look up the undersigned.

"Your humble servant,

Haling."

The passage of Makassar Strait and Mindoro Strait was again uneventful. On December 4 HAWKBILL sighted smoke on the horizon and started an end around. But a contact report to FLASHER and BECUNA found the former in perfect position for attack. FLASHER added another tanker to her already impressive list and HAWKBILL was ignominiously chased away from the show by an escort making liberal use of its three-inch gun.

A large hospital ship was sighted on the night of the tenth in heavy seas. HAWKBILL, three days later with the assistance of a search plane, made contact with six destroyers and two transports. The subsequent night surface attacks were at once successful and heart-breaking. On the first attack, six torpedoes sank one and damaged another of the MATSU class destroyers. Three more attacks, during which ten more torpedoes were expended, were made on the dipple without success. No explanation can readily be made for the misses. After one attack HAWKBILL passed so close that men were discernible on the destroyer's deck. But apparently this fellow with the charmed life also had bad eyes for HAWKBILL finally gave up and departed the area without having been sighted,

Before dawn the next morning--the sixteenth--two more destroyers of fleet type were picked up. To HAWKBILL it was a race for time. Making a surface approach, she fired four torpedoes at 2,400 yards just as dawn broke. It was unbelievable that the destroyers were still ignorant of HAWKBILL's presence. But as the torpedoes were in the water, the leading target swung over hard and headed in. HAWKBILL submerged--driving down fast--in anticipation of a severe counter attack which never came. One block-buster depth charge was the only indication that the Japs were at all mad.

Remainder of the time on this station yielded no further contacts other than hospital ships. On Christmas day--celebrated aboard complete with Saint Nick, gift exchange and luxurious chow--HAWKBILL departed the area once more for Fremantle.

The passage of treacherous Karimata Strait was made uneventfully with the HAWKBILL being forced to pass by a tug with two barges in tow--a nice gun target anywhere--because of no-shooting restrictions in the area.

Next night, however, a 300-ton sea truck was sighted near Bawean Islands and sent to the bottom with the five inch gun.

New Year's Eve was observed appropriately with adequate fireworks and a follow-the-leader chase that proved one of the most exciting of HAWKBILL's experience.

At the northern entrance to Lombok Strait a patrol boat sighted HAWKBILL and commenced firing with heavy automatic weapons. Evading at 20 knots to the westward, two more subchasers were plucked up and found to be closing rapidly on either bow. In the bright moonlight the situation became tense.

Then, miraculously, a fortuitous rain squall, just large enough to screen HAWKBILL's movements for a few moments--came along and allowed her to pull clear of the pursuers.

The last Nip was 7,000 yards astern and the captain was again breaching easily when a shore battery on Lombok Island opened fire and illuminated with a large arc searchlight. The first salvo landed 200 yards over, the second 200 yards short, both right on in deflection. The third salvo landed directly in HAWKBILL's wake, about 50 yards astern. That was the convincer. With the fourth salvo in the air, HAWKBILL dove and the shells were heard to explode as she passed under. The Nips ceased fire but continued to search with the light for several minutes. Probably thought he's scratched a sub.

All hands welcomed the early morning sighting of Rottneest Island Light, of Fremantle, on 5 January. And shortly thereafter, the band played "Roll Out the Barrel" as HAWKBILL tied up, ending her second patrol.

A month and a refit later, crew and ship in top condition and training again headed north. Exmouth Gulf saw HAWKBILL drop in for fuel, and on 5 February again entered Lombok Strait to perform a special mission. Revenge was sweet during the next six harrowing days. It was a case of the hunted gunning for the hunter. Two small freighters, one PC boat and two landing craft--the latter each carrying a shiny new Chevrolet truck--went down under HAWKBILL'S assault. One prisoner, a scared Jap GI, was salvaged.

Having cleared Lombok Strait, transited Java Sea and Karimata Strait again, HAWKBILL sighted four freighters and two escorts on the morning of 20 February. Shallow water precluded the possibility of a submerged approach and a bright moon early in the evening delayed the surface approach until three o'clock the next morning.

The first try was thwarted when one of the escorts detected HAWKBILL and drove her off with gunfire. But on the second attack, after beating this escort back to his position in the convoy, six torpedoes were fired at the two largest ships and resulted in six beautiful hits sinking one 7,500 ton and one 4,000 ton AK (cargo ships). The escort again charged in but never got close. He turned on a red light as some sort of signal and dropped depth charges at random.

A third approach, on one of the smaller freighters, was unsuccessful because phosphorescent water permitted the target to spot torpedo wakes promptly. He turned away, neatly avoiding the last four torpedoes. Approaching dawn, shallow water and proximity to Singapore discouraged further attacks. HAWKBILL then proceeded to Subic Bay, Luzon, P.I., to reload and refuel, after stopping briefly off Singapore and the entrance to the Gulf of Siam.

On 6 March HAWKBILL departed Subic Bay for resumption of patrol. Nothing of interest occurred except for the boarding of a large junk off Cape Varella, Indo-China. He was empty except for sand ballast and was accordingly sent on his way.

Departed the area off Singapore on 30 March, completing the uneventful trip back to base in Fremantle on 6 April. The third run was at an end.

After a month, receiving a refit and training a partially new crew, HAWKBILL shoved off on her fourth patrol. The war started early this time for just south of Lombok Strait a plane drove her down and dropped two bombs, neither close. The boat spent the night of 10 May combing the Strait in search of more patrol boats, but finding none, reluctantly continued on the way to assume lifeguard duty for a B-24 strike on the Kangean Islands, north of Bali.

All during the day of the 11th, while submerged off Saubi Island in the Kangean Group, numerous enemy float planes were observed. HAWKBILL surfaced after dark in time to see a string of bombs from the last of our raiders hit the near island. The show was over.

Continued westward and at 2 o'clock in the morning of 16 May, commenced patrolling in shallow water seven miles off the Malay Coast, just north of Pulo Tenggara, Malay scene of much of HAWKBILL's later actions.

Within two hours after arrival on station, and two hours before dawn HAWKBILL contacted an unidentified target running south along the coast. Within an hour after contact, after closing to get at the target before he could enter a mined area behind Pulo Tenggara, HAWKBILL had fired six torpedoes from the forward nest for two hits. Range was 2,800 yards. Target stopped and opened up with a barrage of four-inch and automatic weapons fire which lasted off and on until 7 o'clock in the morning. The target was obviously hurt, but still afloat, and his gunfire held HAWKBILL off during darkness.

Pulling clear until dawn, HAWKBILL submerged and started back in, closing sufficiently to identify the target as a sleek, fast mine layer of the HATSUTAKA Class. She was being towed slowly toward the beach, stern first, by a small sea truck of about 400 tons.

At extreme range of 4,650 yards, HAWKBILL fired a second salvo of three torpedoes at this target. Sighting the wakes, HATSUTAKA opened fire with everything he had in an effort to detonate the torpedoes. To no avail, however, for one broke him in two with a terrific explosion amidships. HAWKBILL surfaced and for an hour cruised around among swimming Nippos a thousand yards offshore looking for a life buoy off the prize. Found one and cleared the area.

The Gulf of Siam was the scene of operations beginning May 18.

All hands were startled two days after arrival when radical maneuvers were necessary to avoid a torpedo fired at HAWKBILL by an enemy submarine. On the night of 29 May, contacted a small 400 ton steamer, sinking it with the five inch gun.

HAWKBILL spent several fruitless days and nights thereafter searching for targets in shallow water along the Malay coast. On 3 June set course for Mangki Island in the Anambas Island group northeast of Singapore, for continuation of the patrol. On 15 June departed the area, arriving in Subic Bay on 18 June for refit.

After refit and training HAWKBILL departed on her fifth and last patrol on 12 July 1945. On the 17th, once again in the vicinity of Pulo Tenggara, she settled down for patrol. Numerous junks, heavily laden with rice for Singapore, were sent to the bottom with gunfire after seeing their crews safely on the way to shore.

Next day came the longest, most exciting and breath-taking hours HAWKBILL had ever endured. Shortly after 6 o'clock in the evening, while submerged, enemy planes were sighted and directly under them appeared the masts and stacks of a ship. HAWKBILL closed, and with four fathoms of water under her keel, made her attack with six torpedoes on the leading ship of the convoy, a fleet type destroyer. His radical zigs enabled him to avoid the torpedoes, and the noise of firing alerted him to HAWKBILL's presence.

Feeling the prospect of a further attack without profit, HAWKBILL commenced inching out into deeper water. But an hour after the first firing, the destroyer apparently had his attacker definitely located. He came in fast, avoided three torpedoes fired at close range, and laid a perfect pattern of depth charges that blew HAWKBILL to the surface with a 20 degree up angle, exposing 60 feet of the forecastle and putting the bow 20 feet in the air.

A great deal of damage was done, but by hugging the bottom with all noise-making machinery secured, the enemy was successfully deceived and by midnight HAWKBILL surfaced. Emergency repairs were made to the damaged equipment and by 10 o'clock on the 19th, HAWKBILL was again closing the convoy for a second try. Submerged and went to battle stations but to no avail. The convoy managed to get away unscathed.

On the succeeding day, more junks were sent to the bottom and on 21 July set course under orders for Subic Bay to effect repairs. Arrived four days later.

Again ready for sea, HAWKBILL departed Subic on 28 July for continuation of patrol. Several days were spent off the entrance to Tourane Bay, Indo China, without event. On 5 August, while enroute to new station, orders were received to proceed to Brunei Bay, Borneo, and accordingly arrived there next day, the first United States submarine to put into Brunei since before the war.

The next few days were spirited and interesting. With a group of five Australian army officers aboard, HAWKBILL was assigned to a reconnaissance mission covering a group of Islands between Borneo and Singapore. During three action-packed days, HAWKBILL destroyed two radio stations with her deck guns, landed a party at Terampah, capital of the Anambas Islands, where the rapidly vacated Japanese garrison was virtually destroyed, 300 drums of gasoline were fired and great quantities of documents, equipment and souvenirs were confiscated. The colors were raised over the Japanese compound, much to the pleasure of a large group of native lookers-on.

Mission completed, HAWKBILL returned to Bruenei Bay on 13 August. Two days later came word of the enemy's capitulation. On the 16th HAWKBILL departed for Subic Bay, arriving 19 August and undergoing a normal refit.

In company with USS GILMORE and 17 other submarines, HAWKBILL departed Subic Bay on 30 August for Pearl Harbor, arriving there 14 September and departing for San Francisco 22 September, thus marking the end of a war career that resulted in five successive successful patrols and the sinking of 28,400 tons of enemy shipping. In addition 12,500 tons were damaged and no end of consternation was caused Japs ashore by bombardment and landings.

The following awards were made to the officers and men of HAWKBILL for their performance during her first four war patrols:

- One Legion of Merit
- One Silver Star Medal
- One Gold Star in lieu of second Silver Star Medal
- Six Bronze Star Medals
- One Gold Star in lieu of second Bronze Star Medal
- Fourteen letters of Commendation and Ribbons.

(History of USS HAWKBILL (SS 366) submitted by Commanding Officer 22 September 1945)

Stencilled 4/29/46

NOTE: Commander Francis W. Scanlan, Jr., USN, commanded HAWKBILL throughout her war career from commissioning until November 1945

U.S.S. HARBILL (SS366)

SS366/A16-3
Serial (021)
DECLASSIFIED

C/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
18 October 1944.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division 261.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 26.
(3) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
(4) The Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL (SS366), Report of War Patrol **12 0668**
Number One.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart. (To ComTaskFor 71 only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the first war patrol of this ship conducted in the Philippine - South China Sea area during the period 23 August 1944 to 18 October 1944, is forwarded herewith.

F. W. Scotland, Jr.
F. W. SCOTLAND.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
BY OP-0989C DATE 5/30/72

DECLASSIFIED

95578

Subject: U.S.S. HARKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE

U.S.S. HARKBILL was placed in commission at MENITOWOC, WISCONSIN on 17 May 1944. Between 17 May 1944 and 4 June 1944 conducted trials, trained crew at ship handling and diving. 4 June 1944 Commenced transit to NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA via ILLINOIS and MISSISSIPPI RIVERS. 10 June 1944 arrived NEW ORLEANS, LA. Received ammunition, torpedoes, stores and deperming. 16 June 1944 Departed N.O.L.A. for BALBOA, C.Z., arriving 21 June. During period 23 June 1944 to 12 July 1944 conducted period of intensive training in FRENCH ISLANDS area, fired contract torpedo trials, docked ship at BALBOA for work on torpedo tubes, and made miscellaneous voyage repairs. 13 July 1944 Departed Balboa, C.Z. for PEARL HARBOR, T.H. Arrived P.H. 28 July 1944 and remained at Base until 2 August 1944 for minor repairs, at which time commenced period of intensive training. The following were conducted during training period: (1) Three day convoy exercise (2) day and night radar approaches (3) Zed approaches, fired six torpedoes, and received sound test.

The following major work was accomplished at SUBMARINE BASE, PEARL HARBOR:

- (a) Installed 40 m.m. gun and ammunition stowage.
- (b) Installed 20 m.m. gun and ammunition stowage on forecastle and .50 cal. machine guns and stowages on deck.
- (c) Installed AFR radar detector, variable-speed control for SJ mast, VHF transceiver, replaced RAL with RBH receiver.
- (d) Installed DRT.
- (e) Painted ship modified grey

19 August 1944 completed training. Loaded stores and 24 Mark 18-1 torpedoes.

(B) NARRATIVE

12 0668

23 August 1944

1330(VW) Departed Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.
1430(VW) Set clocks back one hour and a half to (K) time zone.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

1330(X) Joined up with U.S.S. BAYA and BECUMA, forming wolf pack; PC 455 as escort.

1335(X) Made trim dive. Surfaced. Set course for SAIPAN, M.I. in column with U.S.S. BECUMA and BAYA.

1900(X) Escort dismissed; opened distance between submarines in column to 16,000 yards.

24 August to 2 September 1944

Enroute Pearl Harbor to Saipan uneventful, except for possible sighting of four aircraft (aircraft contact #1). This contact credited as doubtful, since only one man saw them. Made daily dives, held drills and school of the boat.

3 September 1944

0834(K) SD Radar contact at 12 miles. (Aircraft contact No. 2) IFF Showed friendly plane.

0837(K) Sighted FBM. Plane crossed astern and proceeded on his mission.

4 September 1944

0309(K) Passed ANATEAN ISLAND, MARSHES Group, abeam to port, distance 9 miles.

0500(K) Sighted escort, U.S.S. ELLET (DD398).

0529(K) Joined escort and proceeded to TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN.

1130(I) Moored alongside U.S.S. HOLLAND for fuel and minor repairs.

6 September 1944

0800(I) Departed TANAPAG HARBOR, SAIPAN for area in company with U.S.S. BAYA, BECUMA, and escort U.S.S. HEED (AM100).

1630(I) Escort departed for return to TANAPAG HARBOR. Set course for waiting area east of SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT, P.I.

7 September 1944

0620(I) SD Radar contact at 17 miles. Not sighted (aircraft contact #3).

0714(I) SD Radar contact at 12 miles. Sighted B-24. (Aircraft contact #4)

Subject: U.S. HARKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

0724(I) Sighted aircraft. (Aircraft contact #5).

8 September 1944

1540(I) SD Radar contact at 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #6)

1600(I) Submerged when radar range to plane closed to 7 miles.

1627(I) Surfaced and proceeded enroute area.

9 September 1944

1401(I) Sighted KATE at range seven miles, closing fast.
(Aircraft contact #7) Submerged.

1420(I) Surfaced.

10 September 1944

1732(I) Entered patrol area and commenced patrolling on north-south line.

11 September 1944

Uneventful.

12 September 1944

0705(I) Sighted BETTY, range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #8)
He apparently did not sight us.

0829(I) Sighted two KATES, range 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #9).
They apparently did not sight us.

1329(I) Sighted NELL, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #10)
He apparently did not sight us.

1504(I) Upon receipt of orders from Commander Submarine Force,
Pacific Fleet changing position of offensive reconnaissance group,
altered course to conform.

1601(I) Commenced patrolling twenty mile line on courses
055°T and 235°T about 60 miles east of SAN BERNADINO STRAIT

13 September 1944

0645(I) Sighted DAVE, range 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #11)
He apparently did not sight us.

0721(I) Sighted unidentified type plane, range 11 miles.
(Aircraft contact #12) He apparently did not sight us.

Subject: U.S.S. HARKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

- 0732(I) Sighted NELL, range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #13)
He apparently did not sight us.
- 0736(I) Sighted 2 OSCARS, range 5 miles, closing low and fast.
(Aircraft contact #14) Submerged in a hurry. This
pair apparently strafed SEGUNDO shortly after passing
us.
- 0807(I) Surfaced and resumed patrol.
- 0850(I) Turned on SD radar just to see if it was working,
and received I.F.F. signal, range 18 miles. (Aircraft
contact #15). Range closed to 4 miles before we sight-
ed a WILDCAT and an AVENGER coming out of clouds.
Planes circled us twice and went their way.

14 September 1944.

Uneventful.

15 September 1944.

- 0640(I) While making daily dawn trim dive sighted RUFÉ
through periscope at range of 7 miles. (Aircraft
contact #16).
- 0651(I) Surfaced.
- 0845(I) Made SD radar contact on aircraft at range $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles
and closing. (Aircraft contact #17) Submerged with
alacrity.
- 0909(I) Surfaced.

16 September 1944

Uneventful.

17 September 1944

- 0731(I) SD Radar contact on aircraft at range $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles closing
to 5 miles. (Aircraft contact #18)
- 0732(I) Submerged.
- 0819(I) Surfaced.

18 September 1944

- 0730(I) SD Radar contact on aircraft at range $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles closing
to 5 miles. (Aircraft contact #19)
- 0731(I) Submerged.

Subject: U.S. HAWKILL - Report of First War Patrol.

For the past six days we have been using the SD radar in the detection of aircraft by keying it for 5-7 seconds once each 1-2 minute period, the interval between keying varying continuously. On three occasions recently it has saved us from possible embarrassment, and we now feel that its careful use is of sufficient value to outweigh its defect as a DF target. We are, however, ready to admit that conditions and circumstances as to weather, visibility, primary mission, and proximity of land based radar detection apparatus may vary our decision.

- 0828(I) Surfaced.
- 1309(I) Changed course and speed to head for new position of offensive reconnaissance group.
- 1613(I) Sighted unidentified type aircraft at range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #20) He went on his way.

19 September 1944

Uneventful.

20 September 1944

- 0532(I) Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with friendly submarine. Did not see him.
- 0800(I) Submerged for patrol as directed by pack commander.
- 1653(I) Surfaced and proceeded towards reconnaissance line.

21 September 1944

- 0400(I) Commenced patrolling assigned station in reconnaissance line south of SAKISHIMA GUNPO.
- 0844(I) SD Radar contact range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #21)
- 0845(I) Sighted BETTY.
- 0846(I) Submerged as range closed to 5 miles.
- 0919(I) Surfaced and resumed patrol.

22 September 1944

- 0827(I) Sighted BETTY range 5 miles. Submerged. (Aircraft contact #22).
- 0919(I) Surfaced.

Subject: U.S.S. **BILL** - Report of First War **trol.**

1453(I) SD Radar contact range 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #23)

1454(I) Sighted BETTY range 6 miles. Submerged.

1545(I) Surfaced.

23 September 1944

0900(I) SD Radar and visual contact on BETTY, range six miles.
(Aircraft contact #24)

0901(I) Submerged.

0920(I) Surfaced.

0935(I) Departed reconnaissance line for patrol area west of Formosa on despatch orders of Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet and pack commander.

1935(I) Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with friendly submarine. Did not sight him.

24 September 1944

0800(I) Made transit of BASHI CHANNEL.

0903(I) Sighted small fishing boat. Because of mountainous seas (we are in a small typhoon) we let him go. Perhaps it was just as well, for at

0934(I) Made SD radar contact, range 8 miles and closing.
(Aircraft contact #25)

0935(I) Range closed to 6 miles. Submerged.

1032(I) Surfaced.

25 September 1944.

0400(I) Arrived at 100 fathom curve west of FORMOSA.

0803(I) Set course for southern tip of FORMOSA.

1550(I) SD Radar contact, range 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #26)

26 September 1944

0735(I) Sighted friendly submarine bearing 325°T, range 16,000 yards.

1000(I) SD Radar contact, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #27)

1001(I) Sighted two SALLYS. From a contact report later

Subject: U.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

received from POMFRET we determined that had these SALLYS driven us down, two battleships would have passed over us at noon. What rotten luck!

- 1247(I) Sighted what appeared to be shears of friendly submarine bearing 232°T, range 16,000 yards.
- 1256(I) SD Radar contact, range 7 miles, closing fast. (Aircraft contact #28).
- 1257(I) Submerged.
- 1302(I) Received one depth bomb from plane. No damage. Estimate he missed by about 200 yards.
- 1355(I) Surfaced.
- 1356(I) SD Radar contact, range 4½ miles. (Aircraft contact #29) Submerged.
- 1450(I) While at 45 feet preparing to surface, made SD radar contact, range 2 miles. (Aircraft contact #30) Returned to a safer depth. This fellow seems to have considerably more persistence than those we have previously encountered.
- 1844(I) Surfaced.

27 September 1944

- 0900(I) Passed to operational control of Commander Task Force Seventy One at position 18° 30' N. 116° 30' E in accordance with despatch orders from Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. Fully expected to meet BAYA and BECUNA here, but no sign of them. Waited one hour for them to show up, and then proceeded to patrol assigned area in SOUTH CHINA SEA. Will continue to patrol independently until some word is received from pack commander.

28 September to 2 October 1944

Uneventful. Patrolling southern end of assigned area.

3 October 1944

- 0700(I) Transmitted Hawkbill serial ONE to Commander Task Force Seventy One, reporting lack of contacts and asking for rendezvous with BAYA and BECUNA to form coordinated attack group.

4 October 1944

- 0630(I) Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with BAYA.

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0721(I) Sighted BAYA, distance 7 miles. Received information from BAYA concerning actual coverage of assigned area. We apparently missed group commander's message giving this information on 27 September.

5 October 1944

Uneventful.

6 October 1944

2015(I) Received group commander's serial five relaying WHALE'S contact report on convoy headed south.

2032(I) Set course to intercept convoy.

7 October 1944

1900(I) Picked up large AK with escort in high periscope. (Ship contact #1) Commenced approach for position after darkness.

2147(I) Fired four (4) Mark XVIII torpedoes forward. All missed unaccountably. Swung hard right to bring stern tubes to bear, and at

2149(I) Fired two (2) Mark XVIII torpedoes aft. These also missed. We could not understand these misses, because our data and position were good, although the target had commenced a big zig away by the time our fifth torpedo was fired, but there was no time to think about it for at

2150(I) The escort headed for us. At full speed we gradually opened out on him. In the meantime the target altered course radically and headed northwest at 15 knots.

2200(I) Started over again, determined that this, our first target after forty-five days at sea, would not escape.

2224(I) With a 2000 yard torpedo run and 90° port track, fired three Mark XVIII torpedoes forward. At

2225(I) The fireworks began. The first torpedo hit the after hold, which was in flames by the time the second torpedo hit 10 seconds later in the forward hold. The entire ship burst into an inferno of flames and minor explosions, and at

2227(I) A catastrophic explosion lit the entire area. This explosion was an awe-inspiring sight. A mushroom of white and yellow flame rose hundreds of feet into the air; tracers, rockets, and pieces of flaming debris

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filled the sky. This ship literally disintegrated. A ludicrous sight at this time was the escort firing his green rocket submarine warning signal, but not so ludicrous were the 20 m.m. tracers he started firing. With bullets whizzing past the bridge and periscope shears, and exploding in the water all about the ship, we asked maneuvering for a little speed. The range slowly opened, and by

2330(I) We had lost him on radar.

8 October 1944

- 0032(I) SJ Radar contact, range 30,000 yards (Ship contact #2). Commenced tracking and set course and speed to attain position ahead. At range of 11,000 yards determined target to be aircraft carrier with two DD escorts, making seventeen knots. The moon at this time was bright, visibility good, sea fairly rough. At full power we could just keep up with him. When first contacted, the target was making good a northerly course, and an urgent contact report to this effect was sent to Task Force Commander. With the range about 9000 yards target apparently picked us up by radar, for he changed course to the northwest and ran for over an hour, keeping us always on his beam. About this time we were beginning to wonder who was going to give up first, because we were both headed for Macclesfield Reef at 17 knots, and the situation would become involved in about two hours. At
- 0215(I) found one of the destroyer escorts had closed from 11,000 yards to 6,000 yards while we were busy tracking the carrier and was headed for us at high speed.
- 0219(I) Submerged to 400 feet and rigged for depth charge.
- 0235(I) Received a well placed and rapid salvo of nineteen depth charges. These must have been released from every D.C. rack and thrower he had, for they all went off in less than 30 seconds.
- 0236(I) Eased down to 500 feet.
- 0244(I) Another salvo of nineteen depth charges, considerably off.
- 0255(I) One depth charge. This fellow hung around all the rest of the night, alternately pinging and listening, remaining in our immediate vicinity, but dropping no more charges.
- 0545(I) A leaky sea valve on #1 sanitary tank caused the tank

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to flood; the relief valve lifted, overflowing the officers' quarters, and filling the boat with a most disagreeable odor, to say the least. This, coupled with the absence of ping from the DD for some time, brought us to periscope depth. Dawn was just breaking; and the DD was sighted at a range of about 6,000 yards, angle on the bow 90°. Went to battle stations and made three tubes ready, but the destroyer apparently gave up the hunt with daybreak, for he presented us with a 180° angle and headed north.

0856(I)

Surfaced.

0902(I)

Sighted our friend the aircraft carrier, range about 14,000 yards. Submerged and commenced closing at standard speed. This was a heart breaking approach. The target was without escort, the destroyers apparently being off on a hunt somewhere. Planes were in the air covering the carrier. We did our best to close this target, for it was certainly the opportunity of a lifetime, but he failed to cooperate. Making 17 knots he never came closer than 8,000 yards and eventually passed out of visual range.

1138(I)

Just as the carrier went hull down out of sight to the southward, picked up masts of ship to northeastward. Went to battle stations and commenced approach on CHIDORI class torpedo boat, apparently one of the carrier's escorts. This too was a disappointing approach, as his original angle on the bow of 50°S gradually increased to 90° and finally to 170° as he headed for the carrier to the southward at high speed. Our closest range was 6700 yards.

All hands now having been at battle stations, without sleep or rest, for 18 hours, decided to spend the remainder of the afternoon submerged at periscope depth. The crew literally lay down in their tracks and went to sleep.

1747(I)

Surfaced. Attempted to inflate some false radar targets in case the carrier returned, but dampness has apparently spoiled the balloons, for they would not stand the pressure of inflation. We are now reasonably certain, after correlating all the evidence, that this CVE and her escorts were an anti-submarine group. Further comments are contained under section J of this report.

9 October 1944

0721(I)

Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with BECUNA. Altered course to close BECUNA.

Subject: U.S. HARBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

- 0800(I) Maneuvered alongside BECUNA and discussed the current news and future plans with CAPTAIN STURR. We decided to leave the area a few hours early in order to transit MINDORO STRAIT during darkness, BECUNA leading by an hour or so. We then parted company.
- 1600(I) Departed area enroute MINDORO STRAIT.
- 1601(I) Received contact report of convoy to north of us from BECUNA. Altered course to north to intercept.
- 1622(I) Sighted many ships through high periscope. Commenced tracking. (Ship contact #3)
- 1642(I) Submerged and commenced approach.
- 1745(I) Definitely established convoy to consist of twelve assorted AK's, AO's, and AP's, with three PC 40-44 class escorts. One escort patrolling back and forth across the front of the convoy, and one patrolling each flank. Convoy zigging about every four minutes.
- 1809(I) Heard torpedo hits and assumed BECUNA was in there pitching, apparently from the same flank as ourselves. All hell broke loose in the convoy, ships turning this way and that, the escorts dropping charges like mad, and some minor confusion in the conning tower of the HARBILL.
- 1812(I) Commenced firing four (4) Mk. XVIII torpedoes forward at medium AK, 110°P track, 2500 yards torpedo run, zero gyro angles. Looked around and saw BECUNA's tanker sinking.
- 1813(I) Picked out another medium AK, and commenced firing two (2) Mk. XVIII torpedoes forward, 100°P track, 2000 yards torpedo run, 30° left gyro angles.
- 1814(I) Another look around. The leading escort was turning left to head back into the convoy, and the port flank escort had a zero angle on the bow. Saw two hits in our first AK.
- 1815(I) Saw one hit go into our second AK. About this time a heavy explosion shook the boat considerably. People in the forward torpedo room had to brace themselves to keep their feet, and the gyro angle regulator operator got knocked off his stool, but climbed back aboard and went to work. The only damage we took was a shattered searchlight lens we later discovered. Took a quick and final look at our first AK, and could only see his bow, sticking straight up in the air. Headed for security at 500 feet. We counted 96 depth charges.

Subject: U.S.S. HULL - Report of First Watch Patrol.

The escorts, either one or two of them, hung around for a couple of hours. We waited for darkness, and at

1958(I) Surfaced to commence end around and night surface approach on convoy, now at about 15,000 yards. Worked up port flank of convoy with intention of crossing ahead and attacking from starboard bow, as escorts were determined to be on port flank and ahead. There were now definitely nine ships, exclusive of escorts, remaining in convoy, with one of the nine tagging along about 1,000 yards astern.

2202(I) In position ahead and to starboard of convoy, started in for attack.

2204(I) Escort ahead of convoy headed for us, range closing rapidly. Withdrew to convoy's starboard. We now discovered an escort on the starboard quarter of the convoy, so decided the port escort had shifted over, and changed our plan of attack to round the stern of the convoy and come in from the port flank. At about

2300(I) Discovered there were the original three escorts. As the fellow on the port flank was still there. Came in across his stern, and at

2308(I) Fired last three (3) Mk. XVIII torpedoes forward at a large passenger-freighter, 140° track, 2300 yards torpedo run, zero gyro angle.

2310-40(I) Lookout saw, we heard, one hit. Cloud of heavy black smoke covered ship, but she did not sink as far as we could tell.

We were now in considerable doubt as to our position except that we knew the convoy was headed for shallow water at the entrance to PALMAN PASSAGE and that we were approaching dangerous water, we had CAVALLA's SJ interference near the convoy and felt he was going in to the attack soon, we were out of torpedoes forward, and all hands were exhausted. So at

2325(I) Headed for MINDORO STRAIT.

10 October 1944

0616(I) Sighted BUSUANGA ISLAND, P.I.

0640(I) Sighted masts of several ships bearing 115°T, through high periscope. (Ship contact #4) Commenced tracking and end around to north. This is going to be touch and go as to whether we get to CAFE CALAVITE first

Subject: U.S. HAWKILL - Report of First War Patrol.

or the convoy does, since here we will be blocked by
LUBANG and GOLO ISLANDS.

- 0647(I) Convoy identified as consisting of 2 AK's, 1 large
AO, plus escorts.
We were almost sure of making it ahead of them all
right in about twenty more minutes when at
- 0810(I) Made SD radar contact on plane at 8 miles. (Aircraft
contact #31) Submerged.
- 0813(I) Received one depth bomb, fairly close. No damage.
There go our chances of closing this convoy. The
escorts came over, but didn't locate us.
- 1237(I) Sighted RUFÉ through periscope. (Aircraft contact #32)
- 1705(I) Surfaced and headed for MINDORO STRAIT.
- 1737(I) Sighted plane, range 15 miles. Picked up plane on
SJ radar. Submerged.
- 1856(I) Surfaced and commenced transit of APO WEST PASS.

11 October 1944

Made north-south transit of SULU SEA.

12 October 1944

- Made transit of SIBUTU PASS and MAKASSAR STRAIT.
- 0935(I) Sighted sailing boat.
- 1015(I) Stopped alongside 30 foot lugger containing six Mal-
ayans, scared to death. Threw them a pack of Chester-
fields and continued on our way.
- 1506(I) Sighted aircraft at range 14 miles. (Aircraft contact
#34) Plane looked like B-24, so remained on surface.
He crossed ahead at 4 miles, and continued eastward.
- 1545(I) SD Radar contact on plane at 10 miles. (Aircraft con-
tact #35). Sighted RUFÉ. He crossed astern at 7
miles, headed eastward.

13 October 1944

- 0448(I) SJ Radar contact on what appeared to be a patrol boat
in middle of channel off CAPE WILLIAM, CELEBES. Range
7,500. Went around him to westward, minimum range
6,000 yards. Height of pip indicated a craft about
the size of a PC boat.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKINS Report on First War Patrol.

- 1042(I) SD Radar contact, range 22 miles. (Aircraft contact No. 36)
- 1123(I) SD Radar contact, range 7 miles. (Aircraft contact No. 37)
- 1435(I) Commenced initiation of some sixty pollywogs into the Ancient Order of the deep as NEPTUNUS REX came aboard through the forward torpedo room hatch.
- 1453(I) SD Radar contact, range 8 miles. (Aircraft contact No. 38)
- 1540(I) Passed friendly submarine on opposite course.

14 October 1944.

- 0400(I) Completed transit of LOMBOK STRAIT, entered INDIAN OCEAN. We feel as though we must have set some sort of a record. Just 81 hours after entering the western end of MINDORO STRAIT we came through the southern end of LOMBOK STRAIT, without having to submerge once the entire way.
- 1117(I) Exchanged visual calls and pleasantries with GUITARRO.
- 2104(I) Exchanged recognition with friendly submarine by SJ radar.

15 October 1944.

- 0120(I) Exchanged recognition with GURNARD by SJ radar.

16 October 1944.

Uneventful.

17 October 1944.

- 1530(I) Passed H.M.S. TANTALUS and exchanged signals.

18 October 1944.

- 1000(I) Made rendezvous with escort, and proceeded to PERTH, AUSTRALIA.
- 1220(I) Moored alongside U.S.S. EURYALE, at PERTH.

Subject: S.S. HAMILTON - Report of Post War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER.

Two typhoons were encountered, the first one starting on the 22nd of September and while we were south of the Nansei Shoto and lasting until the 26th when we were southwest of Formosa. The second one was encountered in the South China sea from 4 through 7 October. We were able to avoid the worst of this one by heading south and letting the storm center pass to the east of us.

Otherwise the weather was clear with calm seas.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION.

There was a tidal current sixty miles east of San Bernadino Strait that corresponded to the tide table for that locality with velocities as high as a knot and a half.

The current north of Dangerous Ground in the South China Sea at longitude 117 E was setting 170° at about a knot. The current in the area to the south and east of Macclesfield Bank set $300^{\circ}(T)$ at about a half a knot.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

None of the lighthouses on the trip through HINDORO STRAIT, SIBUTU PASS, LAKASSAR STRAIT and LOIBOR STRAIT were observed to be lighted.

Subject: U.S.S. FAIRBILL - Report of First War Patrol
 (F) SHIP CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Types	Initial Range	Estimated Course & Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1.	7 October 1900 (I)	14° 53' N 116° 28' E	Large AK	23,000 yards	190°T 14 kts.	High Periscope	Ammunition Ship Destroyed. A/S Group of CVE and two DD.
2.	8 October 0032 (I)	14° 13' N 115° 28' E	CVE	34,000 yards	000°T 17 kts.	SJ Radar.	Attack thwarted by DD A/S measures.
3.	9 October 1622 (I)	12° 44' N 118° 03' E	AK, AO, AF	24,000 yards	180°T 7.5 kts.	High Periscope	Sank one AK, damaged one AK, one large AK or AF.
4.	10 October 0640 (I)	12° 45' N 119° 39' E	AK, AO	20,000 yards	030°T 7 kts.	High Periscope	Attack thwarted by air cover.

Subject: U.S. **FAWKBILL** - Report of First War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	1	2	3	4
S Date	8-29-44	9-3-44	9-7-44	9-7-44
U Time (Zone)	1250(L)	0834(K)	0620(I)	0714(I)
B Position: Lat.	20-50 N	17-27 N	16-06 N	15-11 N
R Long.	175-41 E	150-03 E	142-47 E	141-37 E
I Speed	14 kts.	17 kts.	13 kts.	13 kts.
E Course	268°T	260°T	296°T	296°T
Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	1.0	0	0	0
Number	4	1	1	1
Type	Unk.	PBI	Unk.	B-24
Probable Mission	Unk.	Fat.	Unk.	Pat.
A How Contacted	Visual	SD	SD	SD
I Initial Range	20 miles	12 miles	17 miles	12 miles
R Elevation Angle	1°	4°	-	6°
A Range & Relative Bearing of Plane when it Detected S/I	Did not detect S/I	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.
C Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel))	2 315°	1 -	1 -	1 165°
N Visibility (Miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.
I Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))	4000 ft. 10%	5000 ft. 70%	4000 ft. 80%	5000 ft. 70%
O Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Type of S/I Camouflage on this patrol 32/3SS-B.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	5	6	7	8	
Date	9-7-44	9-8-44	9-9-44	9-12-44	
S U B M A R I N E A I R C R A F T	Time (Zone)	0724(I)	1540(I)	1405(I)	0705(I)
Position: Lat.	15-14 N	16-09 N		12-105 N	
Long.	141-30 E	135-54 E		126-06 E	
Speed	13 kts.	12 kts.	12 kts.	11.5 kts.	
Course	296°T	258°T	255°T	358°T	
Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface	
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	Contin.	0	
Number	1	Unk.	1	1	
Type	Unk.	Unk	KATE	BETTY	
Probable Mission	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	Pat.	
How Contacted	Visual	SD	Visual	Visual	
Initial Range	20 miles	22 miles	5 miles	12 miles.	
Elevation Angle	6°	-	1°	8°	
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When It Detected S/M	Unk.	Unk.	5 miles 000°	Did not detect S/L	
Sea: (State (Beau- fort) (Direction (Rel))	1 -	1 -	2 090°	1 -	
Visibility (Miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	
Clouds: (Height in Ft.)	5000 ft.	3000 ft.	3000 ft.	3000 ft.	
(Percent Overcast)	60%	70%	60%	90%	
(Bearing (Rel))	-	-	-	-	
Moon: (angle)	-	-	-	-	
(Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-	

Subject: S.S. HAWKILL - Report of 1st War Patrol.

(C) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	9	10	11	12
Date	9-12-44	9-12-44	9-13-44	9-13-44
Time (Zone)	0829(I)	1329(I)	6645(I)	0721(I)
Position: Lat.	12-21-30 N	13-00-00 N	13-17.9 N.	13-14 N
Long.	126-21-30 E	125-36-05 E	125-37.61 E.	125-32 E
Speed	11.5 kts.	11.5 kts	11.5 kts.	11.5 kts.
Course	358°T	311°T	233°T	233°T
Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Number	2	1	1	1
Type	KATE	WELL	DAVE	Unk.
Probable Mission	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.
How Contacted	Visual	Visual	Visual	Visual
Initial Range	9 miles	10 miles	9 miles	11 miles
Elevation Angle	3°	3°	2°	2°
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	Did not detect S/M	?	Did not detect S/M	Did not detect S/M
Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel))	1 -	1 -	1 030°	1 100°
Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.
Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))	3000 ft. 90%	2000 ft. 90% 270°	3000 ft. 90%	3000 ft. 90%
Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	13	14	15	16
Date	9-13-44	9-13-44	9-13-44	9-15-44
S Time (Zone)	0732(I)	0736(I)	0850(I)	0640(I)
U Position: Lat.	13-13 N	13-13 N	13-22.5 N	13-18 N
M Long.	125-31 E	125-27 E	125-39 E	125-57 E
A Speed	11.5 kts.	11.5 kts.	15 kts.	2 kts.
R Course	233 ^o T	133 ^o T	053 ^o T	228 ^o T
I Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Per.
N Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	0	0
E Number	1	2	2	1
Type	NELL	OSCARS	F4F SB2C	RUFF
A Probable Mission	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.
I How Contacted	Visual	Visual	SD	Visual
R Initial Range	12 miles	5 miles	18 miles	7 miles
C Elevation Angle	2 ^o	2 ^o	20 ^o	6 ^o
A Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/R	Did not	7 miles 045 ^o	Unk.	Did not
C Sea: (State (Beaufort))	1	1	1	1
O (Direction (Rel))	060 ^o	-	-	-
N Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.
I (Height in Ft. 3000 ft.)		3000 ft.	3000 ft	4000 ft.
T Clouds: (Percent)				
O (Overcast)	90%	90%	90%	70%
N (Bearing (Rel))	-	-	-	-
S Moon: (Angle)	-	-	-	-
(Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	17	18	19	20
Date	9-15-44	9-17-44	9-18-44	9-18-44
Time (Zone)	0845(I)	0731(I)	0730(I)	1614(I)
Position: Lat.	13-05.5 N.	13-07.5 N	13-11.5 N	14-27 N
Long.	125-32 E	125-36 E	125-37 E	125-10 E
Speed	10 kts.	14 kts.	15 kts.	15 kts.
Course	030°T	231°T	233°T	358°T
Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	0	0
Number	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	1
Type	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.
Probable Mission	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	Pat.
How Contacted	SD	SD	SD	Visual
Initial Range	5 miles	6½ miles	6½ miles	12 miles
Elevation Angle	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	1°
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.
Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel))	1 -	2 -	2 -	2 -
Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	10 miles	Unlim.	Unlim.
Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))	4000 ft. 70%	500 ft 10%	2000 ft 40%	3000 ft. 90%
Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S.S. HEBBELL - Report of First War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	21	22	23	24
Date	9-21-44	9-22-44	9-22-44	9-23-44
S Time (Zone)	0844(I)	0827(I)	1453(I)	0900(I)
U Position: Lat.	23-22.5 N	23-24-10 N	23-27.5 N	23-28.5 N
B Long.	125-03 E	123-59-05 E	124-04.5 E	124-04 E
M Speed	12 kts.	11 kts.	11 kts.	4 kts.
A Course	045°T	248.5°T	248.5°T	120°T
R Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
I Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	0	0
E Number	1	1	1	1
Type	SALLY	BETTY	BETTY	BETTY
A Probable Mission	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.
I How Contacted	SD	Visual	Radar Visual	Radar Visual
R Initial Range	10 miles	5 miles	8 miles	6 miles
C Elevation Angle	10°	5°	4°	4°
R Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	Unk.	Did not	320°	Did not
A Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel))	3	2	2	4
D Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	3 miles.
I Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))	3500 ft. 85%	4000 ft. 70%	2500 ft. 70%	3000 ft. 10%
N Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S.S. MARKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	25	26	27	28
Date	9-24-44	9-25-44	9-26-44	9-26-44
S Time (Zone)	0934(I)	1550(I)	1000(T)	1256(I)
U Position: Lat.	21-18-10 N	21-20 N	20-57 N	20-55.5 N.
M Long.	121-45-05 E	120-05 E	119-04 E	118-27 E
A Speed	12 kts	12 kts	15 kts	15 kts.
R Course	260°T	136°T	268°T	268°T
I Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
E Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	1.0	0
Number	1	1	2	1
Type	Unk.	Unk.	SALLY	Unk.
A Probable Mission	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.
I How Contacted	Radar	SD	SD	SD
R Initial Range	8 miles	22 miles	10 miles	7 miles
A Elevation Angle	Unk.	-	10°	?
F Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	Unk.	Unk.	Did not	?
T				
C Sea: (State(Beaufort) (Direction(Rel))	5 -	5 -	1 -	1 -
O Visibility (miles)	6 miles	5 miles	Unlim.	Unlim.
N Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing(Rel))	3500 ft. 9% -	2000 ft. 80% -	4000 ft. 80% -	3000 ft. 10% -
I Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-
O				
S				

Subject: U.S.S. ANKBILL - Report of First Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	29	30	31	32
Date	9-26-44	9-26-44	10-10-44	10-10-44
S U B M A R I N E Time (Zone)	1356(I)	1450(I)	0810(I)	1237(I)
Position: Lat.	20-54-40 N	20-54 N	13-00 N	13-00.5 N
Long.	118-21-33 E	118-22 E	119-53.5 E	119-56.5 E
Speed	15 kts.	3 kts.	17 kts.	1/3
Course	268°T	160°T	070°T	118°T
Trim	Surface	Sub-60	Surface	Surface
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0.0	50 min.	1.0 min.	0.0

Number	1	1	1	1
Type	Unk.	Unk.	-	RUFE
A I R C R A F T Probable Mission	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.	Pat.
How Contacted	SD	SD	SD	Visual
Initial Range	4½ miles	2 miles	8 miles	4 miles
Elevation Angle	Unk.	Unk.	Unk.	7°
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	-	Did not	-	Zero ¼ miles.

C O N D I T I O N S Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel))	1 -	1 -	1 -	- -
Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.
Clouds: (Height in Ft. 3000 ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))	10% -	20% -	80% -	30% -
Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.)	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	33	34	35	36
Date	10-10-44	10-12-44	10-12-44	10-13-44
S U B M A R I N E Time (Zone)	1737(I)	1506(I)	1545(I)	1043(I)
Position:	Lat. 12-40.6 N	00-52 N	00-55 N	04-11 S
	Long. 120--14.4 E	119-22 E	119-38 E	117-52 E
Speed	18 kts.	17 kts.	17 kts.	17.4 kts.
Course	135°T	185°T	185°T	208°T
Trim	Surface	Surface	Surface	Surface
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	0	0	0	1 min.
Number	1	1	1	1
Type	-	B-24	RUFE	Unk.
A I R C R A F T Probable Mission	Pat.	Reconn	Pat.	Unk.
How Contacted	Visual	Visual	SD	SD
Initial Range	36 miles	14 miles	10 miles	20 miles
Elevation Angle	1°	6°	8°	Unk.
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	-	-	-	-
C O N D I T I O N S Sea: (State (Beaufort) (Direction (Rel)))	1	0	0	3
Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.	Unlim.
Clouds: (Height in Ft. (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel))))	3000 ft. 20%	2500 ft. 20%	2000 ft. 20%	- 2%
Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.))	-	-	-	-

Subject: U.S.S. **WILL** - Report of First Watch Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

CONTACT NUMBER	37	38	
Date	10-13-44	10-13-44	
S U B M A R I N E A I R C R A F T C O N D I T I O N S	Time (Zone)	1123(I)	1453(I)
Position: Lat.	04-25 S	05-07 S	
Long.	117-45 E	117-36 E	
Speed	17.5 kts.	18 kts.	
Course	208°T	219°T	
Trim	Surface	Surface	
Minutes Since Last SD Radar Search	1 min.	0.0	
Number	1	1	
Type	Unk.	Unk.	
Probable Mission	Unk.	Unk.	
How Contacted	SD	SD	
Initial Range	7 miles	8 miles	
Elevation Angle	Unk.	Unk.	
Range & Relative Bearing of Plane When it Detected S/M	None	-	
Sea: (State (Beau- fort) (Direction (Rel)	2	3 270°	
Visibility (miles)	Unlim.	Unlim.	
Clouds: (Height in Ft. - (Percent (Overcast (Bearing (Rel)	1%	10%	
Moon: (Angle (Percent Illum.	-	-	

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL -- Report of Night War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1

TIME: 2147(I) Date: 10-7-44 Lat. $14^{\circ}20.5'N$. Long. $115^{\circ}55.3'E$.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: Target was a large AK of MKPM type, deep laden with ammunition and explosives. She was tracked at an average speed of 14.5 knots. Escort was not identified, but could make 17 knots.

TARGET DATA

DRAFT: 27 feet; course $220^{\circ}T$; speed 14.5 knots; range 2900;
Torpedo run 3200.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 4 knots. Course: $330^{\circ}T$. Depth: Surface. Angle: -

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Night surface attack using new Mk VIII T.B.T. It is a fine instrument.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1

	3	4	5	6	7	8
Tubes Fired	3	4	5	6	7	8
Track Angle	69 P	69 P	72 P	72 P	175 P	175 P
Gyro Angle	311	311	314	315	192	191
Depth Set	8	8	8	8	8	8
Power	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
MK. Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	54843	55314	54781	56415	54879	55141
MK. Explosive	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5
Serial No.	8948	8616	8015	8900	9678	8695
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	-	-	-	-	-	-
MK. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	2705	2596	2523	2560	3019	2080
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Intervals	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent					
Sea Conditions	Moderate					
Overhaul Activity	Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.					

Remarks: Target zigged away approximately two minutes after commenced firing torpedoes. Zig assumed to account for misses.

Subject: U.S.S. HANKBILL - Report of War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2

TIME: 2224(I) Date: 10-7-44 Lat. 14°21.5'N. Long. 115°46.3'E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

DESCRIPTION: Target was a large AK of LKFIH type, deep laden with ammunition and explosives. She was tracked at an average speed of 14.5 knots. Escort was not identified, but could make 17 knots.

SHIP SUNK: One large AK(EU).

TARGET DATA

DRAFT: 27 feet. COURSE: 255°T. SPEED: 14.5 RANGE: 2520.
TORPEDO RUN: 2000.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 10 knots. Course: 010°T. Depth: Surface. Angle: -

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Night surface attack.

Subject: U.S.S. HEBBILL - Report of First Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2

Tubes Fired	1	2	6
Track Angle	66 P	66 P	66 F
Gyro Angle	346	347	344
Depth Set	6	6	6
Power	-	-	-
Hit or Miss	Hit	Hit	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
MK. Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	54607	56243	55184
MK. Exploder	8-5	8-5	8-5
Serial No.	-	9560	9475
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	Contact	Contact	-
MK. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	2537	2604	2128
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Intervals	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent		
Sea Conditions	Moderate		
Overhaul Activity	Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.		
Remarks:	One hit in after hold, one in forward hold.		

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3

TIME: 1812(I) Date: 10-9-44 Lat. 12°46'N. Long. 118°02'E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

DESCRIPTION: Convoy consisted of twelve assorted AK's, AO's, and AP's, with three class PC 40-44 escorts. Our two targets were two almost identical MFN medium AK's.

SHIP SUNK: One medium AK(EU).

SHIP DAMAGED: One medium AK(EU).

TARGET DATA

Draft: 24 feet Course: 190°T. Speed: 8 Knots. Range 2400.
Torpedo Run: 2500.

Draft: 24 feet Course: 180°T. Speed: 8 Knots. Range 1750.
Torpedo Run: 2000.

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 3 knots. Course: 261°T. Depth: 67 feet. Angle: $\frac{1}{2}$ Down.

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Submerged daylight periscope attack. Attack by another submarine just before reaching our attack position caused us to use hurried set-ups and snap decisions.

Subject: U.S.S. **REBELL** - Report of First War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3

Tubes Fired	1	2	3	4	5	6
Track Angle	109 F	109 F	109 P	109 P	98 P	98 P
Gyro Angle	001.5	359	001.5	357	333	331
Depth Set	6	6	6	6	6	6
Power	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hit or Miss	Three hits out of six torpedoes.					
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
MK. Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	55136	54808	55695	55203	56413	56484
MK. Exploder	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5	8-5
Serial No.	9006	9217	9057	8838	8779	8792
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	See remarks					
MK Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	2186	2071	2146	2496	1649	2121
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Intervals	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent					
Sea Conditions	Moderate					
Overhaul Activity	Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.					

Remarks: Numerous explosions in area prevented timing hits. Assume two hits out of first four torpedoes; target sank. Assume second target damaged with one of last two torpedoes.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(E) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4

TIME: 2309(I) Date: 10-9-44 Lat. $12^{\circ}21.3'N$. Long $118^{\circ}13.7'E$.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

DESCRIPTION: Convoy was same as attack No. 3, now containing only nine ships plus escorts. Target was large LST passenger freighter.

Ship Probably Damaged: Large AK(EU)

TARGET DATA

Draft: 27 feet. Course: $130^{\circ}T$. Speed: 7 knots. Range: 1920.
Torpedo run 2300.

OUR SHIP DATA

Speed: 10 knots. Course: $165^{\circ}T$. Depth: Surface. Angle: -

FINE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Night surface attack.

Subject: U.S.S. **IRVING** - Report of First War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 4

	1	2	3
Tubes Fired			
Track Angle	144 P	144 P	144 P
Gyro Angle	000	357	000.5
Depth Set	6	6	6
Power	-	-	-
Hit or Miss	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
MK. Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	56231	55284	56356
MK. Exploder	8-5	8-5	8-5
Serial No.	9181	8840	9465
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	Contact	-	-
MK. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	2477	2086	3265
Explosive	Torpex	Torpex	Torpex
Firing Intervals	10 sec.	10 sec.	10 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent		
Sea Conditions	Calm		
Overhaul Activity	Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.		
Remarks:	One hit seen and heard on time for #1 torpedo.		

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(I) MINES.

None sighted.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

The customary air cover was given the two battleships known to be in our vicinity on 26 September 1944, and they succeeded in driving us down with the expenditure of one depth bomb. It was noted that two SALLYs clearly in view on the same morning did not drive us down, and it was later determined that had they done so, the battleships would have passed right over us.

The PC boat escorting the AK sunk on 7 October 1944 tried hard, but he wasn't very effective. He pinged very infrequently. He was equipped with radar, as indicated by interference on our SJ scope, but was apparently inefficient, as he did not detect us at a 2000 yard range.

The CVE and two DD's, contacted the same night as the AK, was determined to be an A/S group. The reasons for this conclusion are:

(1) The carrier was equipped with a massive bed spring radar antenna. At least one of the escorts, a CHIDORI, carried a very large radar antenna on her foremast. This latter was so big that at 8000 yards we thought it was aired bunting.

(2) This group appeared in an area, devoid of shipping for two weeks, simultaneously with the appearance in the area of three convoys.

(3) The carrier's escort which drove us down stayed with us for four hours, instead of sticking with the carrier as might be expected.

(4) The CVE remained in the area, with her planes air born, for about 12 hours, at least half of this time without any surface escort within sight. They were apparently off on the hunt.

(5) After about 12 hours in the general vicinity, the group headed off to the south from whence they had come.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

1. HULL

None.

2. TORPEDOES AND GUNNERY.

(a) After torpedo attack No. 1 on 7 October, it was discovered that the firing valves on tubes three and four were cocked, making it impossible to build up impulse pressure. The condition was remedied by ship's force, although not in time to permit firing of these tubes on attack No. 2.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First Patrol.

(b) During the reload after torpedo attack No. 1, the hydrogen burner tail wire on tube five reload torpedo became entangled in the rack and pulled away from the lugs. Because time did not permit a full investigation of the extent of the casualty, tube five was not loaded for attack No. 2.

(c) All torpedoes in tubes were habitually charged by withdrawal from the tube to number three handhole cover and securing in place with straps installed on the mine rollers. This method is considered most efficient. Big disadvantage, however, is that reload torpedo for the tube under charge must be moved to and secured in transverse rails in the middle of the room. In heavy weather, this procedure becomes extremely difficult.

(d) There was no opportunity to fire either the new 40 m.m., Mk. 1, Mod. 1, or the 5" 25 caliber Mk. 40 guns. Both presented only small upkeep problems and appear to be in good material condition.

3. MACHINERY AND ELECTRICAL

(a) Upon arrival at Saipan on 4 September it was discovered that the two after holding down studs on number 3 and 4 main engines and the after inboard holding down stud on #2 main engine had sheared off at the level of the engine bed plate. Due to the inaccessibility of the studs it was quite difficult to get at them to remove the broken pieces. The HOLLAND sent men aboard and worked for about 18 hours, assisted by ship's force.

At the end of this time three of the studs had been drilled with 7/8 inch holes, and two with 1/2 inch holes. Five large C-clamps had been drawn from the HOLLAND in the event that the broken studs could not be removed and 5 new studs had been manufactured by HOLLAND.

Upon departure from SAIPAN none of the studs had been removed. The ship's force, working with easy-outs, and chisels removed three of the broken studs during the next twenty-four hour period, and installed the spare studs. The large C-clamps were installed at the other two broken studs. Although the engines were run at full power on numerous occasions, no further difficulty from this source was experienced.

(b) On 3 October the lubricating oil cooler on number 4 main engine became air bound. It was vented off, and subsequently for the next four days would become air-bound at irregular intervals, with no explanation. A careful examination of liners, piping, was made and the fresh water pump was repacked, to no avail.

On the night of 7 October the cause became apparent when combustion gases were observed blowing between the head and liner of number 2 unit. The head was pulled, the copper gasket renewed, and no further trouble experienced.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

(c) On the 17 October an air box explosion occurred on number 1 main engine. The explosion was of sufficient force to blow off and bend most of the air box hand hold covers, including the four covers equipped with explosion plates.

The engine was just being started, preparatory to being placed on a battery charge and was still warm having been secured two hours previously.

The cause of the explosion was the ignition of an accumulation of lubricating oil fumes in the air box. At the time of explosion the engine had run 1531 hours without overhaul and the oil rings were badly worn causing excessive leakage of oil into the air box. The reason for the fumes igniting however, has not yet been determined. Among the possible causes are: a stuck open exhaust valve, or badly worn rings allowing flame to blow by into the air box.

The air-box header plates that could be straightened, were straightened and put back in place and spare plates were put on the remaining hand holds. The engine was back in commission three hours after the explosion had occurred.

The throttlemans and oiler suffered slight burns about the hands and arms.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of First Patrol.

(L) RADIO

Ship - Shore Traffic.

Four messages were originated by the HAWKBILL during the patrol. All were addressed to Commander Task Force SEVENTY ONE.

Serial one was sent on October second. Trouble developed in the transmitter keying relay after opening up, and approximately one hour was spent checking the transmitter. The keying difficulty which was thought to be caused by dirt in a contact, was eliminated. After calling on 8074 KCS, 12795 KCS, and 16940 KCS, communication was established with VIXO on 4235 KCS. Time of the first call up was 2005. The time of receipt was 2226.

Serial two was sent on October 7. The message was delivered to VIXO without difficulty using 8470 KCS. The time of the first call up was 1650. The time of receipt was 1715.

Serial three was sent during the day of October 9. Once again the transmitter seemed to be working improperly, and after failing to establish communication on 8470 and 4235 KCS the transmitter was again checked. Nothing could be found wrong and 16940 KCS was tried. After calling several times VHC answered and the message was delivered to VHC. The time of the first call up was 0245. The time of receipt was 0551.

Serial four was sent during the night of October 9. Communication was immediately established with VHM. After a half hour delay for higher precedence traffic, the message was taken. The time of the first call up was 1455. The time of receipt was 1555.

Fox Schedules.

Radio Haiku was copied from the time we left Pearl Harbor until 0000 September 27. No difficulty was encountered from Pearl Harbor to Saipan, and 9090 KCS was used day and night. After leaving Saipan the following frequencies and time were adhered to in copying the schedule.

Darkness to midnight 9090 KCS.
Midnight to morning 6380 KCS and 4525 KCS.
Daylight hours 14390 KCS and 17370 KCS.

The only trouble experienced was from 0330 until 0530 GCT when bad fading and interference made copying most difficult. This condition began at Saipan and continued until September 27.

Radio Perth bakers were copied from 0000 September 27 throughout the remainder of the patrol. On September 27 and 28 the only usable frequency was 12,630 KCS. Interference and what seemed to be transmitter keying irregularity made copying difficult on both days. Reception on all VIXO frequencies

Subject: U. S. EMBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

improved starting September 29, and remained good for the remainder of the patrol with the exception of 0200 to 0800 October 11, when interference and apparent transmitter trouble made it impossible to copy.

The Chungking broadcast was copied on the nights of September 24 through September 26. Reception was excellent on 4155 KCS.

No serial messages were missed during the Patrol.

Pack Communications.

Pack communications were on the whole satisfactory. Four frequencies were used: 2006, 2102, 2160, and 2204 KCS. Frequencies were shifted at odd hours twice each day. These were all good working frequencies. The two letter coordinated attack code was satisfactory both in speed and completeness.

It is recommended that submarines going on patrol as part of a coordinated attack group be equipped with three high frequency receivers. With only two the necessity of guarding both a schedule and pack frequency prevents a guard on either the inter area frequency or China. A third receiver would also eliminate the disadvantage of having to secure one of the guards in order to transmit.

(M) RADAR

SJ-1

Throughout the patrol, the SJ was operated continually at night on power sweep. If a target was received, a range and true bearing was obtained and the probable nature of the target determined. The use of the SJ during the day was limited for the most part to training on objects sighted from the bridge.

The telegraph key mounted on the range indicator unit has proved to be very satisfactory. Provided the range is not too short, interference from another SJ is received only when the two antennas are trained in the general direction of the other. Hence, depending on the speed of rotation of the two antennas, interference will be picked up at infrequent intervals. If the other antenna is trained continuously on ours, interference will be picked up on every rotation, and vice versa. It is thus possible to attract attention for the exchange of recognition signals. The knife switch must be open both when sending and receiving.

The ranges obtained with the SJ were satisfactory. Land was more than once picked up at the extreme end of the main sweep. An escort carrier was easily detected at 32,000 yards, a large ammun-

Subject: U.S.S. MAKBILL - Report of First War Patrol.

ion ship was easily detected at 24,000 yards, and other submarines were picked up from 9,000 to 13,000 yards.

During a torpedo approach, a good plot can be obtained by training directly on the target and using the lobe switching motor. However, we found it of great value toward keeping an overall picture of the situation to keep the antenna rotating in power and observe the FPI. Especially when bearings can be given from the bridge, a plot can be maintained and the ranges picked up on the A scope as the antenna sweeps by the target. We found the continuous picture on the FPI particularly helpful while tracking a nine ship convoy with three escorts. Relative movement of the ships within the convoy and of the escorts around the convoy can be quickly spotted.

The SJ has been of great navigational help while passing through straits.

On the night of September 2 we picked up many pips which looked like genuine targets and not rain squalls at ranges of from 1800 to 4000 yards. These could be plotted to have a definite course and speed. After from five to ten minutes they usually disappeared. From the bridge small bursts of lightning were observed in all directions and it is believed that these bursts gave us small pockets of ionized air from which echos were received and which traveled with the wind eventually dispersing.

The only interference we encountered on the SJ was that which was from another SJ. Magnetron 706 AY.

Troubles in the SJ were limited to tube failures with the following exceptions. The range stop and precision sweep went out from time to time. This was due to a faulty jack where the coax leads from the range unit to the range indicator unit. The SJ was out of commission for about 27 hours while we searched for the cause of high current and low voltage as indicated on the meters on the main control unit. C15 in the transmitter receiver unit was at fault.

SD - The SD has been used during the daylight hours keying it for seven seconds out of every minute or for the same time out of every two minutes. The BK is on whenever the SD is on, and several times a friendly IFF signal was received before an echo pip. As soon as either a friendly IFF or a pip is picked up, the ABK is warmed up. In the case of receiving a friendly IFF signal, the ABK is put on the antenna immediately. If an echo is received without the friendly signal, the ABK is put on at the discretion of the OOD. Maximum range on receiving echos was about 24 miles for planes, 55 miles for land. Planes were usually not picked up until from 6 to 15 miles distance. Troubles in the SD were limited to tube failures.

AFR - The AFR was found to be of little value. All reasonably strong receptions were due to our own SJ and SD. The radio shack used it at times to guard its VIF channel.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fleet War Patrol.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Sound conditions were excellent for each of the three attacks made. Isothermal layers extended down 100 to 120 feet and then strong negative gradients set in that continued as far as 450 feet. These gradients offered protection for evasion while sound listening ranges, both sonic and supersonic, were as great as 11,000 yards at periscope depth. All sound gear performed satisfactorily throughout the patrol.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

See comments under section (N).

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

Health of the crew was good. Habitability of the ship was satisfactory. Food was ample and tastefully prepared. One case of yellow jaundice, diagnosed at SAIPAN as catarrhal fever, was treated successfully at sea.

(Q) PERSONNEL

I can add nothing to the glowing compliments already made to our submarine crews in previous reports. The conduct of all hands throughout the patrol was exemplary.

Number enlisted personnel aboard	-	78	
Number enlisted personnel qualified at commencement of patrol	-	39	
Number qualified at end of patrol	-	68	
Number of advancements in rating during patrol	-	14	

12 0668

It is the policy aboard this ship that a prerequisite to advancement in rating is qualification in submarines ABOARD THE HAMBILL. This has proved necessary because of the tendency of those men qualified in O, S, and R boats to consider such qualification as a substitute for "clearing the boat". It is recommended that men qualified in submarines in O, S, and R boats be so designated, in order that they will not lose their incentive to qualify in fleet type submarines. We found the brand new submarine school graduates much easier to teach than the qualified men from the old class boats.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

	<u>Miles Steamed</u>	<u>Fuel Used</u>
Base to area	4104	54,700
In area	6653	54,800
Area to base	2850	47,500

Subject: U.S.S. LAUREL - Report of First War Patrol.

(S) DURATION.

Days enroute to area	-	17
Days in area	-	30
Days enroute to base	-	6
Days submerged	-	0

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.

<u>Torpedoes</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Provisions</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
6	14 days	15 days	10 days

Limiting factor this patrol-

Ordered to return to base at expiration of normal patrol.

(U) REMARKS

None.

Serial 0327

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 October 1944.CONFIDENTIALFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report
of First War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWELVE.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET,
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

12 0668

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of First War Patrol.

1. The first patrol of U.S.S. HAWKBILL covered a period of 55 days, 90 of which were spent in the Philippines - South China Sea area as part of a coordinated attack group consisting of BILLY, BUCUNA, HAWKBILL. HAWKBILL departed Pearl Harbor on 23 August 1944, and arrived Fremantle, W.A., on 18 October 1944.

2. Area coverage was excellent. Except when driven down by enemy aircraft, while making submerged approaches, or conducting training dives, the entire patrol was conducted on the surface. It is notable that the entire passage from Mindoro Strait to Fremantle was accomplished entirely on the surface.

3. Four torpedo attacks were made, in which eighteen torpedoes were fired for a total of six hits.

Attack No. 1: On 7 October, a night surface attack was made on an escorted AK, heavily loaded. Six Mark 18 torpedoes were fired at a range of 3000 yards, but all missed, and HAWKBILL was chased off by escort.

Attack No. 2: Thirty-five minutes after the first attack, a second attack on the surface on the same target was consummated. This time the range was closed to 2000 yards, and two hits out of three Mark 18's fired resulted in quickly sinking this AK loaded with explosives.

Attack No. 3: This attack, on 9 October, was made on an escorted convoy of twelve AK's, AO's and AP's. This convoy was also attacked by BUCUNA, whose count of ships in the convoy was ten instead of twelve. However, the latter states that his count may well have been in error. Six torpedoes were fired at two medium AK's, four at one target, two at the second. Two hits were obtained in the first, and it was seen to sink. One hit in the second AK was observed, but counterattack by escorts forced HAWKBILL deep and further observation was prevented.

FC5-12/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWELVE

Serial 0327

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
27 October 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report
of First War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of First War Patrol.

Attack No. 4: After withdrawal of the escorts following attack No. 3, HAWKBILL surfaced and commenced an end-around on the same convoy, which now consisted of nine ships. Three hours later, three Mark 18's were fired, on surface attack, at a large ship, on a 140° track, 2300 yard torpedo run. One hit was observed. The proximity of shallow water, expenditure of all torpedoes forward, and exhaustion of the crew caused HAWKBILL to retire.

4. The HAWKBILL will be refitted by the U.S.S. DURYALL and Submarine Division 181-2 Relief Crew during the normal period. Detached fresh water recirculating pumps for machine engine cooling will be installed. The HAWKBILL returned from patrol in excellent material condition.

5. The Squadron Commander takes pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew for the conduct of an aggressive and successful first patrol and the damage inflicted on the enemy.

J.F. Griggs
J.F. GRIGGS.

Serial: 01320

7 November 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
 USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3 Serial 021, dated
 18 October 1944. Report
 of First War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
 To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
 Via : The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of First War
 Patrol - Comment on.

1. HAWKBILL's First War Patrol was conducted in a Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of BAYA, BECUNA and HAWKBILL. While under the Operational Control of Commander Submarines PACIFIC, the group patrolled East of the PHILIPPINES and in LUZON STRAITS. After passing to this Operational Control operations were conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA North of DANGEROUS GROUND.
2. HAWKBILL showed commendable determination in pressing home a second night surface attack only thirty-five minutes after having been chased away by an escort following an unsuccessful attack.
3. In the late afternoon only two hours after receiving BECUNA's contact report on a large heavily escorted convoy, HAWKBILL delivered a submerged attack which resulted in sinking one medium AK and damaging another. The convoy was scattering as this attack was made, due to an attack which BECUNA had completed about five minutes previously. Undeterred by ninety-six depth charges dropped by two escorts, HAWKBILL surfaced promptly at dark, and in one hour was in position for a night surface attack. The Commanding Officer out-manuevered three active and alert escorts and delivered an undetected attack, damaging a large AK with two hits from the last three torpedoes carried forward.
4. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.
5. The Force Commander is pleased to welcome HAWKBILL's Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew to this Force, and to congratulate them on the skill, aggressiveness, and good judgment

FILMED

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
 SORG. _____ MICRO _____
 PHOTO-LAB. _____ OP-16 _____
 RETURN TO F-4253

Serial 01320

7 November 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
 USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3 Serial 021, dated
 18 October, 1944. Report
 of First War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of First War
 Patrol -- Comment on.

-----v
 exhibited on this first war patrol. HAWKBILL is credited with
 inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK

1 - AK (Large - EU)	7,500 Tons (Attack No. 1 & 2)
1 - AK (Medium - EU)	<u>4,000 Tons</u> (Attack No. 3)
Total	11,500 Tons

DAMAGED

1 - AK (Medium - EU)	4,000 Tons (Attack No. 3)
1 - AK (Large - EU)	<u>7,500 Tons</u> (Attack No. 4)
Total	<u>11,500 Tons</u>

Grand Total 23,000 Tons

R. W. CHRISTIE.

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(3)	- Direct	CTG-71.3	(2)
Vice Opnav	(2)	- Direct	CTG-71.4	(2)
Vice Opnav Op-230	(1)		CTG-71.5	(2)
Com1stFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-12	(1)
Com2ndFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-16	(1)
Com7thFlt	(2)		DivComsSubRon-18	(1)
ComSub1stFlt	(30)		S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)		SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
CTF-71	(4)		S/MS 7TH FLT	(1)
CTF-72	(2)			

P. F. Straub, Jr.
 P. F. STRAUB, Jr.,
 Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR
 TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3-4/wmw)

Serial: 03063

25 NOV 1944


12 0668

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Conf ltr.
A16-3 Serial 021,
dated 18 October 1944,
Report of First War
Patrol.

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of First War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and crew of the U.S.S. HAWKBILL for the completion of a highly successful patrol during which 11,500 tons of shipping was destroyed and 11,500 tons damaged.


C. E. VAN HOOK,
Deputy.

EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SRCG. _____ MICRO _____
PHOTO-LAB _____ OP-16 _____
RETURN TO F-4253

151 COPY

U.S.S. HAMBILL(SS366)

C/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
5 January 1945

SS366/213-3
Serial 01)

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
 To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
 Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division 261.
 (2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 26.
 (3) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
 (4) The Commander SEVENTH Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL(SS366), Report of War Patrol
 Number Two.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
 (B) Track Chart. (To ComTaskFor 71 only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the second war patrol of
 this ship conducted in the Philippine - South China Sea area
 during the period 15 November 1944 to 5 January 1945 is for-
 warded herewith.

F.W. SCANLAND, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
 BY OP-0989C DATE 5/30/72

DECLASSIFIED

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from first war patrol 18 October 1944. From 19 October 1944 until 1 November 1944 inclusive underwent normal refit by U.S.S. EURYALE at FREMANTLE, W.A. 2 November 1944 regular officers and crew relieved relief crew and commenced period of loading and training. 5 November to 10 November 1944 in ARD-10 to replace port shaft, found to be bent. Received flashing and sound test. Training period included firing three exercise Mk. XIV-3A torpedoes, and day and night convoy exercises. 15 November 1944 training and loading period completed. Captain E.H. BRYANT, U.S.N. reported aboard for temporary duty as Commander Task Group 71.10.

(B) NARRATIVE

15 November 1944 (All times are HOW, ZONE -8).

1310 Departed FREMANTLE, W.A. in company with U.S.S. BECUNA and U.S.S. FLASHER, forming Coordinated Attack Group under command of CAPTAIN E.H. BRYANT, U.S.N., embarked in HAWKBILL.

1515 Test fired 5" gun, 20 MM guns, and .50 Cal. gun.

1630 Commenced convoy exercise.

2300 Completed convoy exercise, set course for DARWIN, AUSTRALIA.

16 November 1944 - 21 November 1944

Uneventful enroute DARWIN.

22 November 1944

Sighted numerous aircraft during approach to DARWIN.

0735 Joined up with escort R.A.N.M.L. 614 and proceeded up swept channel to DARWIN.

1022 Moored alongside U.S.S. CANTICLEER at DARWIN, W.A. The services of this ship were most efficiently and cheerfully given, for which we are very appreciative.

1025 U.S.S. FLASHER departed for patrol area.

23 November 1944

0430 After having received fuel, lub oil, water and minor repairs from U.S.S. CANTICLEER, departed DARWIN, W.A. for patrol area via JOINT ZONE.

1152 S. D. radar contact, range 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #1) received friendly I.F.F. signal, but did not sight plane.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

1510 Sighted B-24, range 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #2) He
crossed ahead at $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

24 November 1944

0330 Commenced passage through straits at eastern tip of THOR.
A careful search with the APR detector and SN4-B portable
detector failed to verify the presence of a radar station
reported as being on the eastern end of THOR.

0820 Submerged for trim and to allow FLASHER to gain some distance
on us.

1200 Surfaced.

1253 SD radar contact, range 6 miles. Not sighted. Submerged
when range quickly closed to $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. (Aircraft contact #3)

1311 Surfaced.

25 November 1944

1414 Sighted three sails on horizon. Closed to investigate.

1443 Inspected each of three native luggers. Each doused sail and
hove-to, so we gave them three cartons of cigarettes for
their trouble.

2000 Passed through TIGER ISLANDS and along north shore of ISALAO
ISLAND.

26 November 1944

0756 Inspected small native sail boat, lateen rigged. Had to
either cease giving cigarettes away or quit smoking. Decided
on the former.

0826 Sighted small native sail boat. Did not investigate.

0932 Sighted DEBRIL LIGHT. There were numerous small sailing
craft anchored on the reef.

1436 Investigated medium sized lugger. As soon as the natives
identified us, one of them made frantic gestures with a piece
of paper. We stopped and they put a boat over the side and
delivered a letter to us. It is written in Malayan, and all
we can decipher is that it is addressed to "Americans". It
probably says to watch out for two patrol boats off LALASSAR,
nor at

1604 Sighted masts bearing 288° T. (Ship contact #1)

1615 Submerged and commenced approach. The calm sea and mirage
effects made these fellows most difficult to identify, and
it was not until the range had closed to about 9,000 yards

that they were seen to be two MPC boats of about 400 tons, apparently patrolling the approaches to KALASSAR. So at

1520 Surfaced and opened out to north at 18 knots.

27 November 1944

0445 Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BESUGO by SJ radar.

0540 Sighted patrol boat off CAPE WILLIAM. Avoided at 18 knots.
(Ship contact #2)

28 November 1944

0941 SD radar contact, range 5 miles, closing to 4½ miles.
(Aircraft contact #4) Submerged.

1007 Surfaced.

1058 Sighted friendly aircraft, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #5) He passed well clear astern.

1217 Sighted friendly aircraft, range 10 miles (Aircraft contact #6). He turned towards us at 5 miles, but turned away when we fired the recognition signal.

1426 Sighted submarine through high periscope. (Ship contact #3).
Closed and spoke U.S.S. HARDHEAD.

29 November 1944

0400 Made transit of SIBUTU PASS.

0900 SD radar contact, 6 miles. (Aircraft contact #7) Sighted friendly plane, B-24.

1328 SD radar contact, 11 miles. (Aircraft contact #8) Not sighted.

30 November 1944

2300 Completed passage LINDORO STRAIT.

1 December 1944

0846 Made a trim dive, deep submergence test, and sound test. Port shaft very noisy at 80 rpm. (See sect. K)

1235 Sighted submarine through high periscope. (Ship contact #4)

1627 Closed and spoke U.S.S. FLASHER.

2 December 1944

Patrolling on line of bearing with FLASHER.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

1038 Closed and spoke U.S.S. JACK.

3 December 1944

0730 Made rendezvous with BECUNA and FLASHER and passed them additional patrol instructions by line-throwing gun. Set course for new patrol line.

4 December 1944

0721 Sighted smoke on horizon bearing 359°T. (Ship contact #5)

0723 Picked up masts, identified as large tanker on westerly course. Sent contact report to Group and commenced end around. FLASHER should be dead ahead of target.

0856 Heavy rain between us and target, so commenced closing track rapidly.

0918 Heard two torpedo explosions, followed by depth charges.

0932 Escort emerged out of rain and commenced firing what appeared to be 3" gun at us. We put him astern and went ahead at full speed. Some ten or twelve rounds all fell short.

1043 In position ahead of target.

1110 Sighted burning target and three escorts.

1137 Saw terrific explosion on tanker. We now believe target to have consisted of one AO and three escorts, and that FLASHER has destroyed the AO. Skirted around burning tanker and escorts to north, alternately seeing and not seeing them as continual rain squalls passed. Later heard from FLASHER that AO did not sink until he finished her off after sunset. We returned to our patrol line.

1230 Sighted floating mine. Attempted to sink with rifle fire, but no success. (See Sect. I).

5 December 1944

Uneventful.

6 December 1944

0946 Sighted aircraft, range 6 miles (Aircraft contact #9). Heading at us, range closed to 5 miles.

0957 Submerged.

1008 Surfaced.

7 December 1944

Subject: U.S.S. EA KBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

1351 Sighted aircraft, range 6 miles (Aircraft contact #10).
Heading at us, range closed to 5 miles, so submerged.

1411 Surfaced.

1822 Submerged to flush out #4 F.B.T.

1836 Surfaced.

8 December 1944

1121 Sighted aircraft, range 12 miles (Aircraft contact #11).
Identified as B-24. Exchanged recognition signals. At range
3 miles he closed bomb bay doors. He went away to eastward.

1158 Sighted same aircraft returning (Aircraft contact #12). As
he circled us we tried all channels of VHF, and finally con-
tacted him on channel ONE, but he had by this time opened out
to ten miles, and no further communication was possible. If
he comes back tomorrow we'll talk to him.

1620 Commenced patrolling new station on 118th meridian.

9 December 1944

1930 Received contact report from FLASHER. Commenced closing.

10 December 1944

0002 Radar contact, range 23,000 yards. Commenced tracking.

0037 Identified target as large hospital ship, course 250°T. speed
14, enroute MANILA to SAIGON. Closed to 6,000 yards and kept
him on our starboard quarter while we awaited an answer from
the Force Commander to our request for permission to capture
this ship.

0407 Received "NEGATIVE" to our request, so returned to patrol
station at longitude 117°E.

0903 SD radar contact, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #13)
Plane not sighted.

11 December 1944

Uneventful.

12 December 1944

1214 Sighted B-24, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #14) He did
not sight us

13 December 1944

1010 Sighted B-24, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #15) When

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

He had closed us sufficiently to permit visual communication, we signalled "Try radio". He came up on VHF at once, and we discussed the following points:

(a) He desired that we use calls BLUE FISH for ourselves, BLUE FIGHTER for the plane. He was only confused by the call which we had been given as that of the plane covering this sector.

(b) He said he had no idea we were equipped with VHF, that he knew nothing of the presence of friendly submarines in his search area, and that he could have given us a good contact two days previously had he known these things.

(c) We asked him to give the word to his mess mates concerning our mutual discoveries, which he assured us he would.

(d) We completed the conversation by asking him to tell us the effectiveness of the "BUCK ROGERS" recognition signal, of whose existence he was not aware. We fired one for him at a range of $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. He did not see it. The result of all this is that we have accomplished something in the way of cooperation between aircraft and submarine which may pay us dividends later on. We now stand a continuous VHF watch between 0900 and 1600 daily.

14 December 1944

0918 and 0922 Sighted 2 B-24, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #16 and #17) They did not sight us.

1547 While alongside BECUNA giving her the dope about VHF, sighted smoke bearing 312° T. Commenced end around.

1825 In position ahead of target. Identified him as hospital ship, course 070° T., speed 14 knots, enroute SAIGON to MANILA. He passed by at 3200 yards, lit up like a Christmas tree. Returned to patrol station.

15 December 1944

0341 Set course and speed to new offensive-reconnaissance line in accordance with Commander Task Force 71 orders.

0940 Sighted B-24, range 15 miles. (Aircraft contact #18) He did not sight us.

1044 Sighted B-24, range 10 miles. (Aircraft contact #19) He did not sight us, although we had him in sight for several hours.

1115 Sighted masts through high periscope, bearing 097° T. (Ship contact #8). Bearing drew slightly north, then slightly south. At

1121 Lookouts on bridge sighted masts. Decided we must be right ahead of line, so submerged and went to battle stations. It developed that these ships, of which there were three, were maneuvering to avoid the B-24 when we sighted them, and that their base course was such that we could not close them.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMMILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

Nearest range was 7,000 yards. These we definitely identified as MATSU class destroyers, and they agree very well with the sketch provided us by intelligence.

- 1341 Surfaced and attempted to contact B-24 by VLF.
- 1346 Established communication with B-24. He told us that the DD's were part of the escort for two transports, course 330°T, speed 7 knots. He then flew over the convoy to give us a bearing, warned us that the convoy contained six destroyers wish us good luck, and headed for home, since he was then on his reserve gasoline supply. Our efforts of the 13th have paid off! We commenced end around to north. Attempted to send contact report to base without success.
We kept the tops of two destroyers, apparently covering the starboard flank, in sight until dark, and then at
- 1820 Changed course to converge convoy.
- 1842 Made radar contact on two ships, commenced tracking.
- 1855 Identified ships as two DDs, commenced attack. There were no other ships within radar range at this time.
- 1927 Commenced firing three torpedoes at each of two DDs, the leading target being slightly ahead of and to starboard of the trailing target, range 2500 yards, track angle 98°P. Heard and saw four hits, at least three of them in the nearer MATSU class destroyer. This target sank at once, and the other one stopped. We hauled off to watch developments. At about
- 1935 He got underway at 12 knots headed east, so we assumed he was injured and starting back for MANILA.
- 1940 Picked up new target, size of pip indicating another DD, bearing 248°T, range 8000 yards. Tracked him at 10 knots so decided to go get the cripple and then come back for No. 3.
- 1945 Headed for what we thought was crippled DD, whose angle on the bow was 180°, speed 12 knots. He kept putting his stern to us, so at
- 2044 Not wanting to waste any more time on him, fired three torpedoes, range 1850 yards 130°P. track. They all missed! We couldn't believe it, because we had his course and speed checking perfectly. By this time it appeared as though we were obliged to sink this ship, having wasted six torpedoes on him already. We swung right about 270°, while the target turned left about 160°, putting him on our starboard beam with a sharp angle on the bow. We made a "figure eight" waiting to see what he would do, and when he continued on a westerly heading, we found he was coming on nicely for a stern tube shot. We stopped and let him come across, and at

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL -- Report of Second War Patrol.

- 2056 Fired four stern tubes at him, range 1800 yards, 83°P. track. All missed. We were absolutely astounded, and realize now that we should have let this fellow go long ago, but we were also getting too mad for logical thinking, so setting the torpedoes at 3 feet depth, we swung hard right 180° to bring the bow tubes to bear, and at
- 2116 Fired three torpedoes, range 1000 yards, 70°S. track. Swung hard right and passed by him, beam to beam, range 800 yards. All torpedoes missed. We quit.
- Throughout this aggravating engagement the DD dropped numerous depth charges, but otherwise took no offensive action. We made a sweep to the N.W. for about 15 miles, but made no further contacts. Having now been absent from our station in the offensive-reconnaissance line for some hours, we headed back for it at 17 knots. On the way we passed our friend with the charmed life, and went around him. We can offer no explanation for the expenditure of 16 torpedoes with the visible result of having sunk one destroyer and damaged another.
- 16 December 1944
- 0410 Arrived on station, commenced patrolling.
- 0505 Radar contact, two ships, bearing 195°T., range 21,000 yards. (Ship contact #9) Went to battle stations and headed for target at 18 knots, as dawn was about to break and it was a matter of getting there in time for a surface attack or not at all. When range had closed to 4000 yards it seemed unbelievable that the targets, two large destroyers, (who said the Jap DD Navy had been depleted!) could not see us, as dawn had broken, and we were east of them. Hung on as long as possible, and at
- 0525 Fired four torpedoes forward, range 2400 yards, 105°S. track at leading DD, and swung hard right to bring stern tubes to bear on trailing DD. As we presented our beam to the targets, the leading DD swung hard right, allowing the torpedo tracks to pass ahead of him, and gave us a zero angle on the bow. With-held fire of stern tubes, as situation now became tense. With leading DD on our port quarter, range closing to 1700 yards, A.O.B. zero, submerged and gave up the initiative, driving her down fast. Expected a good working over, and probably deserved it, but he only made one pass, dropping either one block-buster or three normal charges; the opinions vary. Targets hung around for about an hour, but never regained contact, as we were under a good layer.
- 0711 All clear on sound, so surfaced. Nothing in sight.
- 0745 Spoke BECUNA, who said he saw the tops of our DDs go over the horizon from his position to the south west of us.
- 1053 Sighted B-24, range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #20) He apparently did not sight us.

December 1944

1329 sighted aircraft, range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #21)
Communicated by VLF, but he had no information for us.

18 December 1944

0831 SD radar contact, range 21 miles. (Aircraft contact #22)
He did not close.

1253 Sighted B-24, range 12 miles. (Aircraft contact #23) Talked
to him and got the latest news on the LINDORO campaign.

2028 SJ radar contact on plane, range 11,000 yards. (Aircraft
contact #24) Plane opened at first, then got on a constant
bearing and closed rapidly. At 4 miles we submerged.

2140 Surfaced.

19 December 1944

0327 SJ radar contact on plane, range $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. (Aircraft contact
#25) Range opened and was lost at $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

0634 SD radar contact, range 22 miles. (Aircraft contact #26)
Did not close.

0919 SD radar contact, range $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles. (Aircraft contact #27)
Heavy clouds prevented us from seeing him and he passed over-
head. Finally got him on VLF, and asked him for Pete's sake
not to fly over our heads until he knew we had seen him. He
apologized and went on his way. It was a B-24.

20 December 1944

0917 SD radar contact, range 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #28)
Closed to 12 miles, then opened. Not sighted.

1624 Sighted 4 BETEYS, range 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #29)
Closed to 6 miles, but they did not sight us.

21 December 1944

0925 SD radar contact, 16 miles. (Aircraft contact #30) Not sighted.

1332 SD radar contact, 18 miles. (Aircraft contact #31) Opened
to 27 miles, not sighted.

1540 SD radar contact, 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #32) Sighted
IRVING at 5 miles. This fellow was foxy. He went into a
cloud and we lost sight of him on the port beam, elevation
about 15° , headed away. At

1556 Lookout sighted IRVING dead astern, flying just over the
water angle on the bow zero, range 4 miles. He submerged.

1557 Surfaced.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

22 December 1944

0246 SJ radar contact, 18,000 yards, bearing 180°T. (Ship contact #10) Target tracked on course 003°T., speed 14 knots, and turned out to be our old friend the hospital ship of ship contacts #6 and #7. This AH is unlike any pictured in ONI 208-J (Revised). She is a large ship, about 9,000 - 10,000 tons, two stacks, and coal-burning. She carries a large red cross on her after stack, outlined in red light, and a lighted green horizontal band along some 1/3 of her length. If this fellow comes by again he deserves to be sunk for being a general nuisance. We have burned some 6,000 gallons of fuel chasing him.

1830 Set course for Area A-6 to form pack with BAYA and CAVALLA.

23 December 1944

0620 Made rendezvous with BAYA and CAVALLA at posit 13°30'N. 117°45'E. to give them the dope on patrol line and communications with the aircraft. In the midst of this, at

0628 Sighted aircraft, range 15 miles. (Aircraft contact #33). He was too far away to identify. Continued conversation with other boats after notifying them of presence of aircraft.

0709 SD radar contact, 15½ miles. (Aircraft contact #34) Range closed to 5 miles, at which time we cut in the ABK. The range then opened, and at 7½ miles, we sighted him, a B-24. We were using VHF to talk to CAVALLA at this time, so did not get in touch with plane.

0737 Commenced patrolling on longitude 117°45' E.

1424 SD radar contact, 23 miles. (Aircraft contact #35) Did not sight him until range closed to 4 miles, at which time identified him as B-24 and called him on VHF. A very talkative fellow, this one, and he gave us all the latest news on MINDORO, asked us how we made out on the contact of the 15th. He told us that a plane had gone out the night of the fifteenth, and searched unsuccessfully all night for the convoy. He said that last week he had a large AP spotted and looked all around for a submarine to give the dope to, but had no luck. We tested the new Ik.I signal projector and signal, and the ABK. He said the Ik.I showed up beautifully at 5 miles, but he couldn't receive our IFF, although equipped to do so.

24 December 1944.

- 0605 SD contact, range 8 miles. (Aircraft contact #36) At range 3 miles sighted B-24. He passed well clear.
- 1305 Sighted BETTY, range 9 miles. (Aircraft contact #37) He passed us at range 6 miles, on course 240°T., but did not sight us.

25 December 1944. CHRISTMAS DAY.

- 0935 Sighted aircraft, range 15 miles. (Aircraft contact #38). He passed ahead without sighting us. Plane was B-24.
- 1234 Sighted aircraft, range 13 miles. (Aircraft contact #39) Exchanged Yuletide Greeting by VHF with B-24.
- 1431 Received word from CAVALLA that he was diving on SD contact, and at same time we made SD contact on plane at range 25 miles. (Aircraft contact #40) He did not close.
- 1526 SD radar contact, range 17 miles. (Aircraft contact #41) Sighted B-24 at 7 miles. He closed and circled us, but we could not raise him on VHF.
- 1746 Departed area in accordance with despatch orders of Force Commander. Opord routing changed to a route westward of BORNEO, through KARIMATA STRAIT, thence to LOMBOK STRAIT.

26 December 1944

- 1007 SD radar contact, 7 miles. (Aircraft contact #42) Because of rain and very low visibility, did not sight this B-24 until range had closed to 4 miles. We had a long chat with this pilot on VHF. He tested a red star in the Mk. I emergency identification projector, and he pronounced it quite visible despite the low visibility. He zoomed us at 100 feet, a thrill under any circumstances, and departed.

27 December 1944

- 1013 Submerged to flush out #3 and #5 F.B.T. and to check trim.
- 1024 Surfaced.

28 December 1944

- 0036 Passed two large luggers. (Ship contact #11)
- 2150 Sighted object on horizon. Closed and identified as a tug with two barges in tow. A nice gun target anywhere but in KARIMATA STRAIT. (Ship contact #12)
- 2220 Completed transit of KARIMATA STRAIT.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

2227 Exchanged recognition signals by SJ radar with U.S.S. BLUEGILL,
northbound.

29 December 1944

1800 Investigated two masted lugger near BALEAN ISLAND. Gave them a carton of cigarettes.

2015 Sighted object on horizon. (Ship contact #13) Closed and identified target as sea truck of about 300 tons.

2108 Opened fire with 5"25 Cal. deck gun and destroyed target with unknown number of hits out of 52 rounds fired. The target returned our fire ineffectively with a large caliber machine gun at a range of 4500 yards. Passed through wreckage consisting mostly of empty oil drums numbering about 100. Saw a few survivors, but they showed no willingness to come aboard. Small section of bow stuck out of water and showed number "230" painted in large white characters.

2205 Secured from Battle Stations and resumed course for LOMBOK STRAIT.

30 December 1944

1334 SD radar contact, 18 miles. (Aircraft contact #43) Closed to 16 miles, then disappeared from screen. Was not sighted.

31 December 1944

0158 Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. BESUGO by SJ radar. (Item for the camouflage division: O.O.D. could see the BESUGO clearly at 8,000 yards by the light of a full moon overhead) He told us three patrol boats were on the western side of LOMBOK STRAIT, which he had just left, northbound, and we were about to enter, southbound.

0312 Sighted patrol boat at eastern side of entrance to LOMBOK STRAIT. (Ship contact #14) He fired at us with 40 m.m., but we evaded at 20 knots to westward. The trip through the STRAIT was an exciting two hours. We slipped between two more patrol boats, one on the port beam at 4,000 yards and one on the starboard bow at 3,800 yards, by the grace of a fortuitous rain squall which lasted just long enough for us to squeeze by them. We had left the last one astern at 7,000 yards and begun to breath freely when the shore battery on the S.W. tip of LOMBOK ISLAND opened fire and illuminated with a large arc searchlight. The first salvo landed 200 yards over, the second 200 yards short, both right on in deflection. At

0449 When the third salvo was in the air, we submerged to periscope depth. He ceased fire but continued to hunt with the light for several minutes. We hope he thinks he sank us. His fire control is excellent and obviously radar controlled. We completed the transit submerged, and at

500,000 U.S.S. HAWKSHILL - Report of Second War Patrol

1000 Surfaced. Set course for ELMOUTH GULF, W.A. via JOINT ZONES. Although we are not in need of fuel, CAPTAIN BRYANT wishes to take a look at the GULF, so we plan on making a few hours' stop.

3 January 1945

1200 Anchored in ELMOUTH GULF, W.A. CAPTAIN BRYANT left the ship to return to FREMANTLE by air.

1600 Departed ELMOUTH GULF for FREMANTLE, W.A.

5 January 1945

0600 Passed through rendezvous point off ROTTNEST ISLAND, W.A.
0730 Ran sound and degaussing ranges.

0915 Secured alongside S.R.U. at FREMANTLE, W.A.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER.

The usual northeast monsoon weather was experienced in the SOUTH CHINA SEA. There would be about five days of rough weather, with about three days of clear, smooth weather following. Then the cycle would be repeated.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION.

Going through Sibutu Passage at full moon a southerly current of 4 knots was encountered.

In the near vicinity latitude 13°-00 N, longitude 117°-00 E., north of Dangerous Ground, a current set and drift of 175°T, 0.5 knots was experienced. The wind and sea was from north to northeast while in this vicinity, and it is believed that the current was due to wind rather than tide.

A set of about 150°T with a drift of about 0.8 knots was experienced from GREAT NATOENA Island through KARIMATA STRAIT.

A set to the south with a drift of three knots was experienced in LOMBOK STRAIT.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS.

No lighted navigational aids were observed during this patrol except those on the coast of Australia.

Excellent fixes were obtained with the LORAN navigation equipment in the TIMOR and BANDA seas.

Project: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second Air Patrol.

SHIP CONTACTS

No	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1	1604 11/26/44	04-51 S. 118-37E.	2 Jap Patrol Craft	25,000 Yds.	359.5 15 kts.	Periscope	Submerged for attack. Smoke when identified.
2	054C 11/27/44	02-26 N. 118-33E.	Jap Small Patrol Craft	18,000 Yds.	000 Pgc 15 kts.	Lookout	Avoided.
3	1426 11/28/44	02-43 N. 119-40E.	Up Sub (USS 65) (HAWKBILL)	10 mi.	001 Pgc 15 kts.	Periscope	Closed range and exchanged signals.
4	1235 12/1/44	12-04 N. 117-55E	Sub.	15,000 Yds.	307 Pgc 11 kts.	Periscope	Lost contact at 15,000 yds. Identified as FLASHER.
5	0721 12/4/44	12-52 N. 116-53E.	AO.	15 mi.	000 Pgc 9 kts.	Lookout	Smoke on horizon Periscope picked up masts. 359 (U).
6	0002 12/10/44	13-08 N. 117-00E.	Hospital.	11.5 mi.	000 Pgc 10 kts.	SJ Radar	Hospital Ship (Lighted) Course from Manila to Saigon.
7	1547 12/14/44	12-57 N. 117-01E.	Hospital	15 mi.	000 Pgc 10 kts.	Visual (Smoke)	Smoke sighted on horizon through periscope.
8	1115 12/15/44	14-50 N. 118-00E.	3 J.D. Latsu class	13 mi.	030 Pgc 17 kts.	Visual (Masts)	Made approach but range never closed in order to fire.
9	0442 12/16/44	14-55 N. 118-50E.	2 Sub.	9 mi.	047 Pgc 10 kts.	SJ Radar	Made surface attack. Fired 4 torpedoes (Missed) SJ sighted us and drove us down.

Subject: U.S. ... Report of Second Air Patrol.

(T) S-101 G-101 G-101

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
10.	0246 12/22/44	15-16 N. 119-12E.	Hospital Ship (Jap)	18,000 Yds.	236°T 10 kts.	SJ and Visual	Target WES on course 0030°T speed 14 knots.
11.	0036 12/28/44	02-48 W. 108-19E.	2 Large Luggers	5,800Yds 2500°T.	181°T 17 kts.	Visual then SJ	Range opened en drew at 1050° contact at 307° (T) 2,000 Yds.
12.	2150 12/28/44	02-46-40S. 109-14-20E.	Tug Tow- ing 2 Barges	12,000 Yds.	155°T 17 kts.	Visual then SJ	Range closed to 10,000 Yds and drew at 1050°T contact at 035°T
13.	2015 12/29/44	05-35-00S. 113-29-00E.	Sea Truck (Enemy)	14,000 Yds.	103°T. 11 kts.	Visual then SJ	Went to Battle Stations-Gun Action and sank ship.
14.	0300-0400 12/31/44	Lombok Strait	3 Patrol craft	10,000 Yds.	144°T 18 kts.	Visual	Waded on surface.

Subject: U.S.S. LAADIII - Report of Record for Patrol.

(G) AIRBORNE CONTACTS

No.	Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1	1452 23/11/44	128-52-40E. 11-23-10S	Unk.	3 miles	335°T 17 kts.	SD	Friendly IFF did not see plane
2	1510 23/11/44	128-56-40E. 11-19-10S.	Liberator One	6 miles 60 Elev.	335°T 17 kts.	Visual	Passed ahead at 4½ miles.
3	1253 24/11/44	126-35-20E. 07-19-56S.	Unk.	6 miles	10 kts. 298.5°T	SD	Closed to 4.5 miles. Did not see.
4	0941 11/28/44	119-37.4E. 01-50.1N.	Unk.	5 miles	001°Pgc 15 kts.	SD	Closed to 4.5 miles. Did not see.
5	1055 11/28/44	119-37-20E. 02-01-50N.	B-24 Liberator	10 miles.	001° 15 kts.	Visual	---
6	1217 11/28/44	119-37-55E. 02-19-20N.	B-25 Liberator	10 miles. 40 Elev.	001°Pgc 15 kts.	Visual	Closed to 4.5 miles. Turned away when E.R. fired.
7	0900 11/29/44	06-03-30N. 119-46-05E.	B-24 Liberator	6 miles.	005°T. 14 kts.	SD	---
8	1328 11/29/44	119-55-00E. 06-52-00N.	Unk.	11 miles.	005°T 14 kts.	SD	Range opened until lost at 13 miles. Did not sight
9	0946 12/6/44	116-59-40E. 12-46-10N.	B-24 Liberator	6 miles.	000°T 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed to 5 miles and we submerged.
	1351 12/7/44	12-49-30W. 117-02	B-24 Liberator	6 miles	130°Pgc 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed and we submerged.

Subject: U.S.S. WAVENET - Report of Second Air Patrol.

(G) INFORMAL COMBAT

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
11.	11:11 12/8/44	12-58-25N. 117-24-05E.	B-24 Liberator	12 miles	089°T 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed to 2 miles
12.	11:18 12/8/44	13-01-30N. 117-28-00E.	B-24 Liberator	6 miles	089°T 10 kts.	Visual and SD.	Range closed to 2 mi. and oriented. Recipient ion signals.
13.	09:03 12/10/44	12-53-10N. 116-28-00E.	Unk.	10 mi.	060° 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 9 mi. then pip disappeared. He as never seen.
14.	12:14 12/11/44	13-19-30N. 117-02-40E.	B-24	10 mi.	180°T 9 kts.	Visual	Did not sight S/W. No radar contact.
15.	10:10 12/13/44	13-02-40N. 117-01-00E.	B-24	10 mi.	000°T 9 kts.	Visual	Range closed and plane circled above.
16.	09:18 12/14/44	13-15-15N. 117-08-00E.	B-24	12 mi.	203°T. 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed. Planes headed west at 30 elev.
17.	09:22 12/14/44	13-15-15N. 117-08-00E.	B-24	9 mi.	203°T. 10 kts.	Visual	Did not sight us.
18.	09:40 12/15/44	14-19-00N. 117-40-10E.	B-24	15 mi.	030°T. 17 kts.	Visual	Passed aft. did not sight us.
19.	10:44 12/15/44	14-44-20N. 117-57-00E.	B-24	10 mi.	030°T. 17 kts.	Visual	Passed aft. Believed did not sight us.
20.	10:53 12/16/44	15-01-00N. 118-50-00E.	B-24	12 mi.	226°T. 10 kts.	Visual	Crossed our bow. Believed he did not sight us.

Subject: U.S.S. ALBATROSS - Report of Second Air Patrol.

(c) ALBATROSS COMBAT LOGS

no.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks.
21.	1325 12/17/44	14-54-15N 118-45-30W.	D-24	12 Mi. 10 Miles at 0400H.	180° PGC. 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed to 1 mile. Intercepted Rec. Signals by 1130H and Comm. with VERT.
22.	0831 12/18/44	14-33-00N. 118-51-40W.	Unk.	21 Mi.	179° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 20 miles and remained constant. Did not see.
23.	1255 12/18/44	15-01-10N. 118-50-50W.	D-24	11 ⁰ Miles. 12 ¹ / ₂ Mi. 3250H.	359° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 4 1/2 miles and then opened. Never contacted. Returned at 2037 and we submerged.
24.	2023 12/18/44	15-09-00N. 118-49-00W.	Unk.	6 Mi.	000° PGC 10 kts.	SJ	Communicated with plane by VERT.
25.	0321 12/19/44	15-00-30N 118-50-10W.	Unk.	4 1/2 Mi.	179° PGC 7 kts.	SJ	Range closed to 6 1/2 miles lost contact.
26.	0531 12/19/44	14-50-20N 14-41-30W.	Unk.	22 Mi.	179° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Lost contact turned. and never sighted.
27.	0915 12/19/44	15-07-00N. 118-47-10W.	D-24	9 1/2 Mi.	015° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Closed to 2 Mi and sighted. Contacted by VERT.
28.	0917 12/20/44	15-15-50N. 119-15-45W.	Unk.	16 Mi.	056° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 12 miles then opened out. Not sighted.
29.	1624 12/20/44	15-22-15N. 119-11-15	Botty	7 Mi.	056° PGC 10 kts.	Look-out	4 Botty's on course N.E. closest range 6 miles.
30	0925 12/21/44	15-16-20N. 119-16-00W.	Unk.	16 Mi.	055° PGC 10 kts.	SD	Lost contact turned. Never sighted.

Subject: U.S.A. MAILBILL - Report of Second Air Patrol.

(C) No.	TIME OF DAY Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
31.	1332 12/21/44	15-17-20N. 119-16-00E.	Unk.	18 Mi.	055.5°T 10 kts.	SD	Range increased to 27 Mi. and disappeared ared, never sighted
32.	1540 12/21/44	15-11-40N. 119-06-10E.	Erving	7 Mi.	235.5°T 10 kts.	SD	Range decreased to 2 Mi. Sighted on 0500T, then lost contact as range opened.
33.	0028 12/23/44	15-13-00N. 117-49-00E.	Unk.	15 Mi.	168.5°T 12 kts.	Look- out	Range remained constant and then disappeared in clouds.
34.	0709 12/23/44	15-20-20N. 117-49-10E.	B-24	15½ Mi.	013.5°T 15 kts.	SD	Range closed to 5 Mi. then opened to 7 Mi. then disappeared and then disappeared.
35.	1424 12/23/44	13-48-55N. 117-45-30E.	B-24	23 Mi.	356.5°E 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 0 Mi. then sighted plane at 2620T 356 Elev. exchanged with
36.	0808 12/24/44	13-38-30N. 117-43-00E.	B-24	8 Mi.	000°E 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 3 miles and was sighted.
37.	1305 12/24/44	13-31-30N. 117-44-30E.	Betty	9 Mi.	190°E 10 kts.	Visual	Planned passed ahead of us. Did not sight S/A.
38.	0935 12/25/44	13-22-10N. 117-47-20E.	B-24	15 Mi.	225°E 10 kts.	Visual	Plane passed ahead of us. Did not sight S/A.
39.	1234 12/25/44	13-33-20N. 117-46-20E.	B-24	1350T 20 Elev. 13 Miles	1800T. 10 kts.	Visual	Range closed, changed range closing, with was sighting with range opened.

Subject, U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Second War Patrol

(2) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
40.	1431 12/25/44	13-26-30N 117-47-20E	Unk.	25 mi.	000° PGC&T 10 kts.	SD	Range remained constant and then lost contact. Never sighted.
41.	1526 12/25/44	13-34-20N 117-47-20E	B-24	17 mi.	000° PGC&T 10 kts.	SD	Range closed to 7 miles and was sighted at 1080 ft. Plane circled us and opened. Did not exchange VHF calls.
42.	1007 12/26/44	11-27-20N 113-53-30E	B-24	7 mi.	224° T 17 kts.	SD	Range closed to 4 miles and sighted. Contacted by VHF.
43.	1334 12/30/44	06-00-25N 116-34-40E	Unk.	18 mi.	120° PGC 15 kts.	SD	Range closed slightly then lost contact. Did not sight.

Subject: U.S.S. HARKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Attack #1

Time: 1927(H) Date: 15 Dec. 1944 Lat. 16 W. Long. 117°39'E.

TARGETS - MATSU DD's

Draft: 7 feet; course 005°; Speed 12 knots; Firing Range 2500 Yds.

OWN SHIP

Speed: 12 knots; course 085°; Depth: Surface.

Tube	6	5	4	3	2	1
Track Angle	98P	100P	96P	118P	116.5P	119.5P
Cryo Angle	000	358	002	339	337.5	340.5
Depth Set	4	4	4	4	4	4
Hit or Miss	Hit	Hit	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
Mk. Torpedo	23	23	23	23	23	23
Serial No.	65798	65776	41148	41631	49762	49467
Mk. Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	26797	25856	26760	25687	25436	26653
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	None	None
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	13444	2380	19414	5886	11697	19393
Explosive	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2
Firing Intervals	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent					
Sea Conditions	Moderate					

Overhaul Activity U.S.S. EURYALE.

Three torpedoes at each of two targets.

ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Attack #2

Time: 2044(H) Date: 15 Dec. 1944 Lat. 16 N. Long. 117°39'W

TARGET - MATSU DD

Draft: 7 feet; course: 051°; Speed 12 knots; Firing Range 1850 Yds.

OWN SHIP

Speed: 11 knots; course 100°; Depth: Surface.

Tube	1	2	3
Track Angle	130P	130P	133P
Gyro Angle	359	359	356
Depth Set	4	4	4
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
Mk. Torpedo	23	23	23
Serial No.	65484	65785	49365
Mk. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	25907	26776	26658
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	None	None	None
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16
Serial No.	12425	17395	3749
Explosive	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2
Firing Interval	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent		
Sea Conditions	Moderate		
Overhaul Activity	U.S.S. MURYLE.		

Torpedoes assumed to have run under target.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Attack #3

Time: 2056(L) Date: 15 Dec. 1944 Lat. 16 N. Long. 117°39'E.

TARGET - IANISU DD

Draft: 7 feet; course 252°; Speed 12 knots; Firing Range 1800 Yds.

OWN SHIP

Speed: 12 knots; course 170°; Depth: Surface.

Tube	7	8	9	10
Track Angle	83P	83P	83P	89P
Cyro Angle	179.5	179.	179.5	173.5
Depth Set	4	4	4	4
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Ik. Torpedo	23	23	23	23
Serial No.	65697	65660	49716	41516
Ik. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	25937	25330	25262	8031
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	None	None	None	None
Ik. Warhead	16-1	16	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	9645	2132	11854	19387
Explosive	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2
Firing Interval	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent			
Sea Conditions	Moderate			
Overhaul Activity	U.S.S. EURYALE.			

Checked TDC setup with ranges and bearings for one minute after shooting. No change in solution required. Assume torpedoes underran target.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

(7) ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Attack #5

Time: 0525(H) Date: 16 Dec. 1944 Lat. 14°52'N. Long. 118°45'E.

TARGET - FLEET DD

Draft: 9 feet; course 330°; Speed 12 knots; firing range 2400 Yds.

OWN SHIP

Speed: 12 knots; course 255°; Depth: Surface.

Tube	1	2	3	4
Track Angle	105 S.	102 S	101 S	102 S
Cyro Angle	002.5	005.5	004.5	005.0
Depth Set	4	4	4	4
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
Mk. Torpedo	23	23	23	23
Serial No.	65759	65792	61731	65584
Mk. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	26793	26632	5317	26783
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	None	None	None	None
Mk. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	12716	3236	2773	16371
Explosive	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2
Firing Interval	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent			
Sea Conditions	Moderate			
Overhead Activity	U.S.S. MURYLE.			

Target sighted sub at firing and turned toward, allowing torpedo tracks to pass ahead.

Subject: U.S.S. MURVALE

(E) ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Attack #4

Time: 2116(H) Date: 15 Dec. 1944 Lat. 16 N. Long. 117°39'E.

TARGET - MATSU DD

Draft: 7 feet; course 190°; Speed 11.5 knots; Firing Range 100 Yds.

OWN SHIP

Speed: 14 knots; course 300°; Depth: Surface.

Tube	4	5	6
Track Angle	70 P	72 P	70 P
Grac Angle	343	345	343
Depth Set	3	3	3
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
Ik. Torpedo	23	23	23
Serial No.	65749	41656	65613
Ik. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	26641	26770	26638
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	None	None	None
Ik. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	10477	13499	17446
Explosive	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2
Firing Intervals	5 sec.	5 sec.	5 sec.
Type Spread	Divergent		
Sea Conditions	Moderate		
Overhaul Activity	U.S.S. MURVALE.		

(E) ATTACK DATA

TARGET DATA

Gun Attack #1

Time: 2108(H) Date: 29 Dec. 1944 Lat. 05°35'S. Long. 113°29'E.

Sunk: One sea truck of 300 Tons, carrying drums of kerosene or some similar fuel. Number on bow read 230.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Type Guns: 5"/25 Cal. 52 Rounds AA Cum. Fired.
20 M.M. 110 Rounds HEI, HEIT Fired.

Hits: Assume 5 to 10.

Average Range: 4,700.

Comments: Original deflection was obtained from range and deflection scale. Range by radar. Second shot was on in deflection. Range spots were made by radar, and resulted in small changes of 50 and 100 yards on the range scale. The last 20 rounds fired were spotty in deflection due to deflection scale jumping one to two mils each time the gun fired. After the first 10 to 15 rounds were fired the firing pin failed to function. This was at first believed to be a miss fire and the round ejected and thrown overboard. The firing pin was replaced after a second failure, and functioned satisfactorily throughout remainder of firing. Approximately the last 20 rounds were ejected by hand, the breech failing to open on counter recoil. Fire was opened with two 20 mm guns at a range of 1000 yards. Tracer control was used. Shooting was erratic. Only a small portion of the target was visible above water. Gunners were blinded by their own fire.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol

(I) MINES.

On December 4 sighted floating mine in latitude 13-26 N, 116-40 E. It was a spherical shaped, about three feet in diameter, and covered with barnacles. At least three horns were observed projecting from it's case. An unsuccessful attempt was made to destroy it with rifle fire.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

The only comment to be made on anti-submarine measures encountered in the area is the ineffectiveness thereof. We made five night surface attacks against destroyers, during which the only measures taken by the enemy were indiscriminate dropping of depth charges. The patrol boats in LOMBOK STRAIT were fast and troublesome but inefficient. They used red rockets on Very stars to pass the word along that a submarine was in the STRAIT. The gun battery, presumed to consist of two five or six inch guns and a powerful arc searchlight, is accurate and effective at 15,000 yards. Their first salvo was 200 yards over, the second 200 yards short, both right on in deflection although we were making 23 knots over the ground. The battery is situated atop the steep cliff on POINT PANDAMAN, on the S.W. end of LOMBOK ISLAND, at about Lat. 8°45'30"S, Long, 115°49'30"E. A white light appeared on our beam on NUSA PE SAR about five minutes before the battery across the STRAIT opened fire.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE.

(1) ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL.

(a) On December 3rd a broken cylinder head stud was discovered on number three main engine. The broken stud was removed with considerable difficulty and after removal it was discovered that the replacement stud fitted more loosely than it was actually supposed to have. An examination of the tap used in clearing the threads revealed that although labeled as a 1.250 inch tap, it was actually a 1.262 inch tap or .012 inches oversize. A replacement stud of mild steel was turned out on the ship's lathe and installed. Subsequent examinations have shown the manufactured stud to be entirely satisfactory and no elongation has been detected.

(b) The performance of the master gyro-compass was erratic throughout the patrol, with varying errors of from 2° east to 1° west. The source of error is believed to be mal-functioning of the automatic dampening device while zig-zagging using the Arma clock.

On December 13th one of the bearings of the south rotor became noisy, requiring renewal. After renewal it was found impossible to get a vacuum lower than 28 inches of mercury, although the rotor was pumped down twice.

(c) On November 18 while enroute to Darwin, a pronounced rubbing noise was heard emanating from the port shaft. This noise was heard whenever the shaft speed was 70 r.p.m. or greater. At high speeds a distinct whirring noise could also be

heard in addition, at high speeds, a pronounced vibration could be felt in the after torpedo room, and to a lesser extent, throughout the ship.

By the time we reached Darwin on November 22nd the noise had almost disappeared and the vibration at high speeds was no longer noticeable. A diver was sent over the side to inspect the propellers and shafting but could detect no abnormalities. Enroute to the area and while on station no further trouble from vibration was encountered although the shaft was still noisy at speeds above 70 r.p.m. On the return trip home however, while making full speed through Lombok Strait a pronounced vibration was again noticed throughout the entire ship.

The port shaft and both propellers were renewed during the last refit period. In addition, the strut bearings for the port shaft were bored off-center and oversize, but in spite of all this, the alignment still does not appear to be fully satisfactory.

2. HULL.

No major defects noted.

3. TORPEDOES AND GUNNERY.

No major defects noted.

(L) RADIO.

18 November 1944. We conducted an exercise with the U.S.S. BECUNA and U.S.S. FLASHER to determine the effective range for communication on the V.H.F. and on the TBL (2880 KCS) with reduced coupling.

We could communicate on all 4 channels of the VHF at 2,000 yards. At 2200 we lost contact on channels 3 and 4. At 3,000 we lost contact on channel 2 and at 3400 yards we lost contact on channel 3.

We reduced power on the TBL in accordance with instructions as outlined in TBL radio transmitter tuning procedure for voice modulation from the electronic coordinator dated 7 November 1944.

We found that we could communicate at normal pack operating ranges with coupling cut to zero. We have been operating in this manner ever since. More specific data on ranges can be obtained from the BECUNA who opened out from the FLASHER and the HAMBILL, during the exercise.

Upon leaving DARWIN, we called the FLASHER who was an estimated 120 miles ahead of us and got through with zero coupling. We tried the BECUNA the following day, but had to boost our output slightly to get through.

The HAMBILL transmitted four messages addressed to VIXO all of which were originated by Commander Task Group 71.10.

1. Originated 0350 GCT 20 November used 16940 KCS. No response. Shifted to 8470 KCS. Answered immediately by VHM and VHAL. Passed to VHAL. Received for at 0416 GCT. Total time from first callup to receipt was 26 minutes.
2. Originated at 1650, 9 December. Passed directly to VIXO. First callup at 1652, received for at 1717. Frequency 8470 KCS.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

3. First callup on 16,940 KCS at 0235 GCT. Then shifted to 12705 KCS then 8470 and back to 12,705. Raised VHM strength 2 readability 0-1. Our signal strength to VHM was the same. Message was not receipted for but was resent by VIXO on Baker Sked. Garbled. Time from first call to receipt on schedule was about three hours.
4. First callup at 1201 GCT on 8470 KCS. Receipted for by VIXO at 1216. Total time 15 minutes including a 4 minute wait from VIXO.

On the fifteenth of December we attempted to transmit a message addressed to VIXO but were unable to raise any station. Sent blind twice on 8470 but did not get through.

Throughout the patrol we copied Baker schedules. From the 15 until the 23 of November copied on 9250 and 4370. From the 23 until the 9 of December we used 12620 during daylight hours and 9250 during darkness. From 9 December on we used 16620 during daylight and 9250 during darkness. While in the patrol area reception was poor during the day but good at night.

During the first half of the patrol the transmitter failed intermittently to oscillate. After k-7 (plate load resistor) was replaced, the transmitter has operated satisfactorily. 9250 KCS. had a constant drift making it hard for an operator to copy messages on an RAL type receiver with its narrow band width.

No messages have been missed with the exception of serial Tare dated either the 16 or 17 of November. However, our VIXO Baker numbers are complete indicating a possible mistake in serializing.

(M) RADAR

SJ-1

The SJ was operated continually at night and when foul weather was such as to make its use advisable. Its performance was satisfactory. Average submarine range was about 12,000 yards, maximum about 19,000 yards. A hospital ship of approximately 10,000 tons was picked up at about 24,000 yards, large destroyers at about 18,000 yards, sea truck at 14,000 yards, and aircraft at 30,000 yards. There was no interference encountered on the SJ other than that from other SJ's of friendly submarines in the vicinity. The SJ proved to be of great value both for navigational purposes and for intercommunication between submarines. During our gun attack, the SJ was used for tracking the projectiles and for spotting range errors. There were no outstanding troubles other than normal tube failures. The SJ was never out of commission for more than fifteen minutes.

SD - The performance of the SD during the first part of the run was not satisfactory. Maximum aircraft range was about 15 miles; average about seven. After the RF pre-amplifier was removed, its performance improved greatly. It now appears to be working better than it has since its installation. Aircraft were detected between 9 and 27 miles; average about 18 miles. Other than the pre-amplifier our troubles consisted of normal tube failures.

subject. ... report of ...

BN - Although the BN appeared to be operating normally, results were not entirely satisfactory. We are not certain whether this was due to the BN or to planes not having their equipment turned on. The output when we left Darwin was 900 watts - 200 above the minimum specified.

AFR - We used the AFR between Timor and the Sernata group in an effort to pick up reported radar stations located on Timor. None were apparent. We also used it passing through Lombok Strait without any reception.

SNB-4 - Although this portable radar detector gave us directional pickup from friendly submarines' SD the rest of the time we were unable to get anything but broadcast transmission.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS.

No comments.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS.

The usual sharp gradient was found in the SOUTH CHINA SEA Area.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY.

Health of all hands was excellent throughout the patrol. One lookout suffered a sprained ankle while clearing the bridge at night, our only casualty.

Food throughout was excellent, including ice-cream for dinner every day of the patrol. Australian beef is of an exceedingly poor quality, and can only be eaten when ground to hamburger.

Habitability was excellent, as the entire patrol was spent on the surface.

(Q) PERSONNEL.

The performance of all hands was up to the usual high standard.

Number of qualified men aboard at start of patrol - 50

Number of qualified men aboard at completion of patrol - 61

Number of men advanced in rating during patrol - 6

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED.

Fremantle to Area	- 4167 miles	48,240 gallons.
In Area	- 5420 miles	48,213 gallons.
Area to Fremantle	- 3600 miles	44,001 gallons.

(S) DURATION.

Days enroute to area	-	16
Days in Area	-	25
Days enroute to Base	-	11
Days submerged	-	0

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Second War Patrol.

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING.

<u>Torpedoes</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Provisions</u>	<u>Personnel Factor</u>
4	3,900 gallons	20 days	14 days

Limiting factor this patrol -

Orders from Force Commander at termination of normal patrol.

(U) REMARKS.

Although this patrol has been most disappointingly negative in concrete results, it is sincerely hoped that some major benefit may resolve from our extensive experience gained in the matter of submarine - aircraft coordinated search and attack. Of thirty three aircraft contacted while actually in the operating area, only three were identified as enemy, and of the remaining thirty, nineteen were definitely identified as friendly reconnaissance planes. Of these we talked to the majority by means of VHF high frequency aircraft voice radio, and from them we learned these things:

(a) We had no mutual voice calls with friendly reconnaissance planes in the area.

(b) The planes knew naught of our presence in their patrol sectors, did not realize they could communicate with us, and strongly felt the need of such knowledge.

(c) More training is necessary in the recognition of friendly aircraft by our lookouts and officers of the deck. We now feel certain that contacts #9 and #10 were friendly, but not recognized as such by the bridge watch. From our experience of the 15th of December, when a plane gave us the location, course, speed, and composition of a contact which later developed into our sole successful attack, we learned the tremendous value of this type of coordination.

It is highly recommended that a study be made of the possibilities afforded by coordinated search and attack of aircraft and submarines, and these suggestions are offered for what they may be worth:

(a) That an experienced submarine officer be assigned to the aircraft operating base from which the recco planes operate.

(b) That he have access to all BASE-SUBMARINE radio traffic so that he is always informed of the location of our submarines.

(c) That he acquaint the air personnel with the submarines' viewpoint, our emergency identification systems and their limitations, and when and where the pilots may expect to find the submarines.

(d) That a simple, universal call system between recco planes and submarines be established.

(e) That commanding officers of submarines be acquainted with the advantages to be derived from such coordination.

Serial (017)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 January 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS HAWKBILL report of
Second War Patrol
SS306/A16-3 serial 01
of 5 January 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Second War Patrol.

1. HAWKBILL's Second War Patrol extended over a period of 52 days, 39 of which were spent north of the Malay Barrier, and 25 in the assigned area in the South China Sea. HAWKBILL was one of a Coordinated Attack Group consisting of HAWKBILL, BECUNA and FLASHER, with Captain E. H. Bryant, U.S.N., as Group Commander in HAWKBILL.

2. Area coverage was excellent. The entire patrol was conducted on the surface for short-duration dives for purposes of evasion or training.

3. Eight ship contacts were made, three of which were worthy torpedo targets. One of these, an AO, was successfully attacked by FLASHER. The second contact, consisting of three DDs, could not be closed, as they were avoiding our B-24s which were active in the vicinity. Six hours later, contact was made on two MATSU class DDs, probably two of the three sighted earlier. A night surface attack was pressed home, resulting in the sinking of one DD, and the damaging of the second. The damaged destroyer, still capable of 12 knots speed, was repeatedly attacked for the next two hours. A total of 13 torpedoes were fired at this ship at ranges varying from 2500 to 1000 yards, but all torpedoes, after the first attack, missed. It appears that these misses must have been due to control errors, as there was no other indication of erratic torpedo performance. The following day, a dawn surface attack on a DD, in which the destroyer successfully maneuvered to avoid four torpedoes, was broken off when HAWKBILL was forced to dive at 1700 yard range.

4. In all of these attacks, the enemy counter measures were particularly ineffective and bungling. This is remarkable, considering the fact that all these targets were destroyers, the last a Fleet type, where the presence of experienced and capable personnel would be expected.

5. A sea-truck, estimated at 300 tons displacement, was destroyed by gunfire at an average range of 4700 yards. The shooting, as well as material performance of the 5" 25 caliber deck gun, was only fair. Fifty-two rounds were fired, for five to ten hits. Return fire with automatic weapons was ineffectual.

6. HAWKBILL's experience with our aircraft in the China Sea clearly shows the need for vast improvement in mutual interchange of information between submarines and aircraft when operating in the same area. Aircraft should certainly know what friendly submarines to expect in his area, and the submarine should know that the plane knows it. Otherwise, friendly planes will greatly hamper the

FC5-26/41(-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX

Rr

Serial (017)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
15 January 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS HAWKBILL report of
Second War Patrol
SS366/416-3 serial 01
of 5 January 1945.


Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Second War Patrol.

submarines, and a vast amount of valuable information known to the planes will be wasted because they do not know whom to tell.

7. HAWKBILL reached Fremantle in good material condition and refit will be completed in the normal period.

8. The Squadron Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of HAWKBILL on the completion of a successful and aggressive patrol.

L. J. Huffman
L. J. HUFFMAN



3602

Serial 0162

24 January 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LSECOND ENDORSEMENT to:

USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial 017, dated 15 January,
1945. Report of Second War
Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Second War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Second War Patrol of the HAWKBILL was conducted in the SOUTH CHINA SEA as a member of a Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of HAWKBILL, BECUNA and FLASHER. Captain E. H. BRYANT, U.S.N., in HAWKBILL, acted as Group Commander.

2. On 15 December HAWKBILL executed a series of aggressive surface attacks on two MATSU destroyers. On the first attack, at 1927, six torpedoes were fired, and one DD was immediately sunk, and the other was hit and damaged. At 2044, range 1850 yards, the same damaged destroyer was attacked with three torpedoes; all missed. At 2056 range 1800 yards, this destroyer was again attacked, but no hits were made. The torpedoes were now set at depth three feet, and at 2116 a fourth attack was made with three more torpedoes at range of 1000 yards, and again no hits resulted. This series of unsuccessful attacks is most difficult to explain in view of the fact that the Commanding Officer is an experienced and capable submarine officer, and HAWKBILL has proved herself to be a well trained and effective submarine.

3. A gun attack was conducted on 29 December, and one sea truck was sunk.

4. The successful efforts to establish communication, understanding and cooperation with friendly planes in the area were commendable. The remarks concerning suggested procedure for further coordination with aircraft are constructive and will be given consideration in connection with the development of this important problem.

5. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

Serial 0162

24 January 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr. A16-3
 Serial 017, - dated 15 January,
 1945. Report of Second War
 Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Second War
 Patrol - Comment on.

6. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding
 Officer, Officers and Crew of the HAWKBILL upon the completion of
 this aggressive patrol and upon inflicting the following damage upon
 the enemy:

SUNK

1 - DD (MATSU Class) (EU)	1,000 Tons (Attack #1)
1 - MIS	<u>300 Tons (Gunfire)</u>
	Total 1,300 Tons

DAMAGED

1 - DD (MATSU Class) (EU)	<u>1,000 Tons (Attack #1)</u>
	Grand Total 2,300 Tons

James Fife
 JAMES FIFE.

ORIGINAL COPY.

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(3) Direct	CTG-71.5	(2)
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Com1stFlt	(1)	DivComsSubRon-12	(1 each)
Com2ndFlt	(1)	DivComsSubRon-18	(1 each)
Com7thFlt	(2)	DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)
ComSub1stFlt	(30)	S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)	COMDT NYD, Puget Sound.	(1)
CTF-71	(7)	SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
CTG-71.3	(2)	S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)
CTG-71.4	(2)		

J. B. Miller
 J. B. MILLER,
 Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO
 ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(8)(F-3-4/jk)

Serial: 01233

Reg. No.	2857
R. S. No.	4 01832

5 APR 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 Serial 01, of
5 January 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of
Second War Patrol - Comment on.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet notes with satisfaction the damage inflicted on enemy combatant ships by the HAWKBILL.

T. C. Kinkaid

T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
ComSub7thFlt
ComSubRon 26
CO USS HAWKBILL

U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366)

SS366/ A16-3
Serial (03)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
6 April 1945.

~~C-SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division 261.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 26,
(3) The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.
(4) The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of War Patrol number Three.

Enclosures: (A) Subject report.
(B) Track Chart. (To ComTaskFor 71 only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the third war patrol of this vessel conducted in Java Sea - South China Sea during the period 4 February 1945 to 6 April 1945, is forwarded herewith.

/s/ F. W. SCANLAND, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-0989C DATE 5/30/72

DECLASSIFIED

118983

Subject: U.S.S. BLUEGILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(Holland was detached 5 March 1945 at Subic Bay, P.I. for physical reasons).

4 February 1945 (All times are HON, ZONE -8)

1300 Departed FREMANTLE, W.A. Set course for EMOUTH GULF, W.A.

1816 Exchanged calls with E.M. Submarine P-178. (SHIP CONTACT # 1).

6 February 1945

Enroute EMOUTH GULF, W.A. conducting training dives, radar tracking exercises, communication tests, and practice approaches with U.S.S. BLOCIA.

0605 SD radar contact, range 30 miles. Aircraft closed to 28 miles then opened.

0722 SD radar contact, range 35 miles. Aircraft closed to 16 miles then opened.

0837 SD radar contact, range 40 miles. Sighted PBY at 3 miles and fired recognition signal.

Received orders from CTF-71 to rendezvous with U.S.S. BLUEGILL just inside N.W. Cape at EMOUTH tomorrow at 0500.

7 February 1945

0414 Passed VLAUGHTER LIGHT abeam to starboard.

0530 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. BLUEGILL inside N.W. Cape. We found the GULF too rough here to come alongside BLUEGILL, so we both proceeded up the GULF and moored alongside U.S.S. CHANTICLEER near what used to be the Naval Station before last week's hurricane blew it down. Enjoyed a very beneficial talk with CAPT. P.G. NICHOLS in regard to our impending special assignment. Although we had orders to fuel at ONSLOW, when CHANTICLEER offered to top us off, we accepted.

1450 Underway from alongside U.S.S. CHANTICLEER and proceeded out of GULF. Set course for LOBOK STRAIT via Joint Zone.

1755 SD radar contact, range 28 miles. Aircraft range opened.

1926 SD radar contact, range 16 miles. Aircraft range closed to 5 miles and then opened. Not sighted.

8 February 1945

Uneventful.

9 February 1945

2205 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. BESUGO by SJ radar. (SHIP CONTACT # 2).

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Third War Patrol

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from second war patrol 5 January 1945. From 6 January 1945 until 20 January 1945 inclusive underwent normal refit by SUBMARINE REPAIR UNIT, FREMANTLE, W.A. The following alterations were accomplished during refit:

(1) Moved 40 m.m. gun from after cigarette deck to forward cigarette deck. Moved 20 m.m. gun to position vacated by 40 m.m.

(2) Installed doubler hatches in ATR, AER, and crews' mess hatches.

(3) Installed gate valves in 10 lb. blow lines to F.B.T. # 3, 4, and 5.

(4) Blanked off torpedo tube outboard vents.

(5) Removed bridge-to-conning tower voice tube and blanked hull opening.

(6) Installed two D.I.D.T. switches to enable balancing of lighting load.

On 21 January 1945 regular officers and crew relieved relief crew and commenced period of loading and training, including three days special exercises with MK XXVII torpedoes. 3 February 1945 training and loading period completed, ship ready for sea.

(B) NARRATIVE

The following officers and CPO's are attached and on board. Numbers after each name indicate the number of war patrols each has made, including this patrol:

COMDR. F.W. SCANLAND, JR., USN	5
LT. CDR. F.B. TUCKER, USN	3
LIEUT. J.E.A. SCRODER, USNR	3
LIEUT. L.R. FOCKLE, USNR	3
LT(jg). G.A. CHRISTOPHER, USNR	3
LT.(jg). J.D. LIND, USNR	3
LT.(jg). R.L. LUPPEY, USN	9
ENS. T.J. BLACK, USNR	2
ENS. R.W. LUZEY, USNR	1
ENS. E.L. BARKLEY, USNR	1
BUDLONG, J.F., CTR(PA), 223-20-78	5
CALLAHAN, SAM, CRM(PA), 228-32-15	3
CAMMIN, R.G., CPO1(AA), 356-01-57	1
ODOM, R.D., CEM(AA), 266-08-59	7
ORTON, ROBERT, CCS(AA), 336-80-37	11
PETROVSKY, J.M., CEM(AA), 238-65-34	8
STORY, L.F., CMO1(AA), 356-00-47	11
HOLLAND, R.E., CMO1(AA), 283-31-12	2½

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War Patrol

10 February 1945

- 0028 Exchanged calls with USS HARDHEAD by SJ radar (Ship Contact No. 3).
0035 Exchanged calls with USS PERCH by SJ radar (Ship Contact No. 4).
0210 Exchanged calls with USS BLENNY by SJ radar (Ship Contact No. 5).
0932 Exchanged calls with USS GABILAN by SJ radar (Ship Contact No. 6).
1027 Exchanged calls with USS KRAKEN by SJ radar (Ship Contact No. 7).
We asked each one of this parade of boats what they had seen in LOMBOK STRAIT, and they agreed on one large PC boat, one small PC boat, and radar equipped aircraft.
2310 Entered LOMBOK STRAIT, hugging the coast of NOESA BESAR to give the shore battery a wide berth. A 200 mc radar on LOMBOK steadied on us from time to time, but apparently was never quite sure.
2351 SJ radar contact on aircraft at range 7.5 miles. He tracked right down the middle of the STRAIT.
Period from 11 February to 17 February in LOMBOK STRAIT on special mission covered by separate TOP SECRET REPORT.

16 February 1945.

- 0300 Set course north and departed LOMBOK STRAIT after six very interesting but somewhat harrowing days and nights. We are confident that the STRAIT is now clear until something further is brought in by the enemy.
1750 SD radar contact, range 10 miles. Aircraft range closed steadily, so at 6 miles submerged to 150 feet.
1754 Received one depth bomb, well clear.
1843 Surfaced.

17 February 1945.

- 1117 Sighted RUFÉ, range about 9 miles. Do not believe he saw us, as he maintained an angle on the bow of about 30°, but since we desired to remain undetected, submerged when range closed to 7 miles.
1204 Surfaced.

18 February 1945.

- 0900 Exchanged recognition and calls with USS TUNA.
1344 Entered KARIMATA STRAIT.
2030 Exchanged calls with USS HOE who is north of us and on same course.
2235 Departed KARIMATA STRAIT.

19 February 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

- 0828 Lookout sighted VAL, range 9 miles. Watched him for a couple of minutes, and when he turned towards us, we submerged.
- 0918 Sighted smoke on horizon bearing 358° T. (SHIP CONTACT # 14).
- 0926 Surfaced to look for ships. Sighted four ships on course 270° T., range about 9 miles.
- 0930 Submerged as VAL headed in for us again.
- 1303 Surfaced, smoke in sight, VAL apparently gone home. The sea is unbelievably glassy calm, bright sun, and 17 fathoms of water under the keel, so made the decision to end-around the convoy and attack at night after moonset. Convoy appears to be heading for SINGAPORE, speed along his base course about 4.5 knots. Thanks to his abundant smoke, we had no difficulty keeping him in sight while keeping ourselves well away.
- 1950 Head of convoy, radar range 17,000 yards. Commenced tracking.

20 February 1945

- 0112 Moonset. Commenced first attack from port bow of convoy.
- 0130 Obtained full picture of convoy, which is composed of one large AK, one medium AK, two small AKs, and two escorts of about PC boat size. Just before firing time, convoy zigged towards us, presenting a 15° port MOB, and boxing us in between our target and the port flank escort. Delayed firing in the hope that something might change the picture, but at range 1,600 yards the escort saw us and fired the usual rocket warning. He went ahead full and turned hard right until the escort was astern, and commenced getting clear. At range 1,300 yards he opened with his 20 n.m. and filled the air all about the ship with tracers. It is a miracle we were not hit, for they were literally everywhere.
- 0201 Fired three MK XVIII torpedoes from aft on a purely defensive down-the-throat shot, range 1,300 yards, track angle 10° P., gyro angles 170°, spread 4 degree, depth set zero feet. No hits.

Sent the lookouts below and opened the throttle. The range gradually opened, until it had reached about 5,000 yards, when he slowed down, turned on a red light, and commenced dumping depth charges. Hoping to get back to the convoy before the escort could return and fill the hole he had vacated, we maintained speed and worked back up to the port bow of the targets.

- 0300 Commenced second attack. We beat the escort to it, because he hasn't quite caught up, being about 5,000 yards behind his proper station. Went right into the open flank, and at

Subject: U.S.S. HUMBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

- 0312 Commenced firing six Mk. XIV and Mk. XVIII torpedoes forward at the large AK and the medium AK which are overlapping beautifully, the smaller of the two being astern of the other. Range 3,300 yards, track angle 60° P., gyro angles 000°, depth set at 4 feet.
- 0314 First torpedo hit after end of leading target, and in succession, the second and third hit the trailing target and the fourth, fifth, and sixth hit the leading target. All six hits were clearly seen and heard. Our friend took out after us, - but we had a head start this time, and he never got close. Just turned on his red light and dropped charges.
- 0321 Both targets disappeared from radar screen, leaving only four visible. We hauled around to the westward until dead ahead of the convoy, then headed in until we could decide on a target. There were now two small AKs with the two escorts on their port bow, so we came in from the starboard bow.
- 0400 Picked up indications of enemy air borne radar on LFR and assumed they had called out the dogs. We are only 160 miles from SINGAPORE, and it has been over two hours since the convoy became alerted.
- 0420 Fired four bow tubes at small AK, range 2,300, track angle 90° S., gyro angles 10°, depth set 4 feet. We apparently ran into a big patch of phosphorescent water just as we started shooting, for we could plainly see the torpedoes running. So could the target, and he turned hard left to an AOB of 180° and very neatly avoided the wakes.
- 0430 Because of the presence of aircraft, the shallow water (15 fathoms), and approaching dawn, we discontinued the attacks and opened out to the N.E. at 18 knots so as to be clear of the area by daylight. This was accomplished without incident.
- 1028 SD radar contact, range 10 miles. Plane closed to 9 miles, then opened.

21 February 1945

Uneventful proceeding to rendezvous with U.S.S. FINTDO.

22 February 1945

1930 Made rendezvous with FINTDO at 5° 30' N., 104° 00' E. Put rubber boat in the water and sent executive officer aboard FINTDO for conference with CAPTAIN CLAREY.

2200 Commenced patrolling scouting line to eastward of FINTDO.

23 February 1945

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

0800 Departed scouting line for assigned lifeguard station 30 miles east of SINGAPORE CHANNEL.

24 February 1945

0600 Arrived at lifeguard station and commenced circling.

0708 Sighted masts through high periscope bearing 190° T., range 14 miles. (SHIP CONTACT # 15). Lost sight of them almost immediately, and because of primary mission, did not close them.

0950 Commenced getting numerous SD radar and IFF signals at ranges from 20 to 50 miles as B-29s hit SINGAPORE.

1010 Could hear planes talking to each other on 4475 KCS.; and as the gist of their conversation was how well they had "plastered the place", as they put it, assumed they were all right. By 1030 the air was clear.

1200 Received contact report from planes on 4475 Kcs. giving the position of an enemy DD on the west side of the MALAY PENINSULA, so they have apparently headed back to base without mishap.

1215 Commenced heading north to assigned area, but kept watch on 4475 until

1800 when shifted to pack frequency.

25 February 1945

0700 Arrived in assigned position as directed by Pack Commander, and commenced patrolling east-west line at entrance to GULF OF SIAM.

2000 Made rendezvous with PINTADO and received revised patrol instructions.

26 February 1945

1330 Set course for entrance to JOINT ZONE enroute SUBIC BAY, P.I. in accordance with despatch orders from CTF-71.

27 February 1945

2317 Exchanged calls by SJ radar with U.S.S. HAMBURGO. (SHIP CONTACT # 17).

28 February 1945

1344 SD radar contact, range 11 miles. Sighted plane at range 9 miles. Exchanged recognition and conversed by VHF with PB4Y search plane.

Subject: U.S.S. ELIZABETH - Report of Third War Patrol.

1 March 1945

- 0957 SD radar contact, range 16 miles. Not sighted and range did not close.
- 1408 SD radar contact, range 24 miles.

2 March 1945

- 0000 Entered JOINT ZONE enroute SUBIC BAY.
- 0819 Sighted aircraft (PBM), range 9 miles. Exchanged recognition signals.
- 0900 Ticked up IFF signals of friendly aircraft at ranges between
1352 30 and 40 miles. Not sighted.
am
1432

3 March 1945

- 0515 Exchanged recognition with our escort at rendezvous off SUBIC BAY. Joined escort, U.S.S. DANIEL M. JOY (DE-585), and U.S.S. HILDEBRAND and proceeded into SUBIC BAY, P.I.
- 1020 Commenced fueling from tanker S.S. USSO PORTLAND.
- 1458 Moored alongside U.S.S. GRIFFIN for voyage repairs and torpedoes. Discovered a large leak in No. 3 F.B.T. where the flood valve is sprung, a result of our ill-advised attempt to lie on the bottom in LOMBOK STRAIT. Facilities for repair not being available, put a water seal in the tank and let it go until the forth coming refit.

4 - 5 March 1945

Received 12 steam and 3 electric torpedoes, a coat of paint, and minor repairs from the GRIFFIN, all efficiently and cheerfully given.

6 March 1945

- 0700 Departed SUBIC BAY for resumption of patrol U.S.S. DYSON (DD-572) escorted us and ELIZABETH from SUBIC to a point 65 miles at sea.
- 1153 Released escort.
- 1549 SD radar contact, range 22 miles. Sighted 10 B-25 planes at range 6 miles.
- 1640 Sighted 2 B-25 planes at range 7 miles.

Subject: U.S.S. BLUEBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

7 March 1945

- 0851 SD radar contact, range 13 miles. Sighted PB4Y and exchanged calls by VHF.
- 1004 IFF signals from group of planes, range 50 miles.
- 1157 IFF signals from plane, range 26 miles.
- 1805 IFF signals from plane, range 40 miles. Sighted PB4Y at range 6 miles, and exchanged calls on VHF.

8 March 1945

- 0643 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. BLUEBACK by SJ radar.
- 0957 IFF signals from plane, range 23 miles.
- 1142 SD radar contact, range 35 miles.

Patrolled assigned station today in accordance orders from C.O. U.S.S. BLUEBACK, O.T.C. of Coordinated Attack Group composed of BLUEBILL, BLUEBACK, FL-SILVER, BLACKPINE, and BIRCHALL. Our patrol area is C-3, and the group formed a staggered patrol line from an inboard point two miles east of CAPE VARELLA, INDO-CHINA, to an outboard point about 60 miles east of the Cape. Boats rotated from station to station nightly.

9 March 1945

- 0835 Sighted PB4Y at range 5 miles. Exchanged calls by VHF.
- 1025 IFF signals from plane, range 35.

Patrolled same station as yesterday, 18 miles east of CAPE VARELLA.

10 March 1945

Went to new patrol station 2 miles east of VARELLA.

- 0645 Submerged for patrol. The weather is very foul, with visibility about 5 miles, heavy seas. Had difficulty maintaining depth control.
- 1220 Surfaced.
- 1222 SD radar contact, range 5 miles. Hoped we could see him and identify as friendly so as to exchange information, but as he remained unseen, when range closed to 3½ miles, we submerged.
- 1239 Surfaced and worked our way north a bit. We found a 3½ knot southerly current off VARELLA, which makes it very difficult to maintain station.

Subject: U.S.S. WHEBELL - Report of Third War Patrol.

1309 Submerged.

1945 Surfaced.

Opened out to new station 60 miles east of WHEBELL.

11 March 1945

0920 SD radar contact, range 32 miles. Exchanged calls by VHF at TWENTY-ONE MILES, then range opened.

1109 Sighted unidentified aircraft dead ahead, angle on the bow 00°, elevation 10°, range 4 miles. Submerged.

1133 Surfaced.

1139 Sighted ship bearing 169° T., AOB 25° P., range 16,000 yards. (SHIP CONTACT # 17). The visibility is poor. Submerged and commenced approach.

1200 Identified target as hospital ship BIKINI MARU, on course 006° T. speed 10 knots.

1315 Surfaced.

12 March 1945

Uneventful except for two friendly aircraft contacts.

13 March 1945

0301 SF radar contact, range 4000 yards. (SHIP CONTACT # 18). As we were close in to the shore of CAPE WHEBELL and our group has had patrol boat troubles here lately, we turned away. Continued to make intermittent contacts out to 6,500 yards and finally at

0556 we lost him.

0631 Submerged.

1358 Surfaced to investigate one of a fleet of 14 sailboats. Inspection disclosed nothing suspicious, so at

1434 Submerged.

1936 Surfaced.

14 March 1945

0300 Received several bags of mail from ELUBACH, brought to us by SEROBIN from WHEBELL.

0936 Aircraft contact, friendly.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

15 and 16 March 1945

7 aircraft contacts, all friendly PB4Y, B-25, and FBY flights. These daily contacts continued until we left the area.

17, 18, 19, and 20 March 1945

Uneventful, carrying out routine surface patrol except on the 18th when our station was two miles off CAPE VARELLA, where we conducted a submerged patrol.

21 March 1945

O.T.C. changed arrangement of boats in the general patrol plan, putting three boats along the coast two miles off shore, and the other two ten and thirty miles east of VARELLA respectively. This was to cover the approach of a convoy reported by the search planes to be heading up the coast from S.IGON. We are off V.ATONG BAY today.

- 0306 Commenced getting strong radar indications on the LPR, 155 mcs. Believed this to be from an enemy submarine or aircraft, probably the former. Was at a loss for a counter measure if it is a submarine, except to refrain from patrolling back and forth over the same ground.
- 0337 Lost LPR contacts.
- 0608 Submerged.
- 1953 Surfaced.

22 March 1945

- 0610 Submerged off CAPE VARELLA.
- 1104 Sighted 2 B-25s and a FBY, so came to 45 feet and called them on VHF. Much to our surprise we raised them at once, as the VHF antenna was only 2 feet clear of the surface. They were a bit puzzled as to where we were talking from, so we surfaced, and with this air cover, took ten minutes of fresh air. The FBY was on a rescue mission, so we thought they ought to know where to find us if they need us. Submerged.
- 1550 We have over 70 sailing boats varying in size from large sampans to small junks, so decided to surface and investigate the largest of the lot.
- 1555 Put a boarding party of one officer and one enlisted man aboard a junk. Their careful inspection revealed only a cargo of sand ballast, so we let them go. We have the O.T.C. permission to sink these boats at discretion, but we haven't

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

the stomach for it. The crews are Chinese and Annamese, and most of the boats contain women and children.

1610 Submerged.

1947 Surfaced.

23 March 1945.

0130 Received several very welcome bags of mail from BLUEBACK, brought from SUBIC BAY by GUAVINA. This is certainly a morale builder, and highly appreciated.

Headed for new patrol station in accordance with change in general patrol plan by O.T.C. This no doubt because of BERGALL'S close shave with an enemy torpedo, the third such in this vicinity within a week. BERGALL experienced the same AFR indications prior to her narrow escape as we did on the 21st., within 10 miles of the same location.

24 March 1945.

0330 Received orders for FLASHER and HAWKBILL to assist a Dumbo search for 4 ditched aviators off HON NGOAI ISLAND 10 miles N.E. of CAMRAHN BAY. Sent word to FLASHER giving her the dope and a station 15 miles off the bay as a contact point for the search plane, and headed for HON NGOAI ISLAND at 18 knots.

0848 Sighted 2 floating mines Lat. 12-06 N. Long. 109-25E.

0910 Submerged 3 miles off the beach and 5 miles south of MUI RACHTRANG LIGHT. Planes are due at 1030(H).

1026 Sighted 4 B-25 escorts and PRY.

1029 Surfaced and established VHF communication with planes. Unfortunately the search was negative.

1115 Planes departed. We opened out from the coast, as we had been parading up and down in front of MUI RACHTRANG LIGHT for almost an hour, CAMRANH BAY airfield is 10 miles away, and SD is saturated with land pips in to 3 miles. Gave FLASHER the negative news of search and closed him for a chat.

1206 AFR picked up strong radar indications at 156 mgs. This is probably the MK. 13 air search radar at CAMRANH BAY.

1800 Departed area in accordance with despatch orders of CTF-71. Set course for KARIMATA STRAIT.

25 March 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

0910 Exchanged calls with U.S.S. BOARFISH by SJ radar.

26 March 1945

0400 Received orders from CTF-71 to remain in vicinity of SINGAPORE for lifeguard duties in connection with B-29 strike due there about the 28th. Spent 26th, 27th, and 28th patrolling north - south line across SINGAPORE - BORNEO traffic routes without contacts other than daily SD radar contacts on enemy aircraft. It appears that a daily sweep is made of this area. Air strikes were finally scheduled for 0030(H) 29th and 0200(H) 30th, but we were somewhat concerned at not receiving information as to the Reference Point for the rescue operations. SINGAPORE is not covered by CINCPAC Air - Sea Rescue Points and Code words corrected to 11 November 1944. Lacking any better assumption, we took the same Reference Point as given for the raid of 12 March although this differs from the point given for the strike of 24 February. Hope we're right.

29 March 1945

0000 On lifeguard station in position Lat. $01^{\circ} 05' N$. Long. $105^{\circ} 25' E$.
Commencing at

0030 heard B-29s talking to each other on 5440 kcs. and received two contact reports from them on 4475 kcs. Spent day patrolling east of SINGAPORE.

30 March 1945

0100 On lifeguard station. Commencing at

0230 heard B-29s conversing on 5640 kcs. and later on 5943 kcs.

0500 Departed lifeguard for continuation of return to Base.

1110 SD picked up aircraft at range 9 miles. When range closed to 7 miles, we submerged.

1132 Surfaced.

1604 Sighted two masts on horizon.. (SHIP CONTACT # 19).

1609 Submerged and commenced approach.

1720 Surfaced when target developed into a two-master schooner.

1757 Came alongside target. It is a typical Celebes prau, about 75 feet long, manned by half a dozen natives. We let them go.

31 March 1945

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

0600 Completed uneventful transit of KARIMATA STRAIT. In three transits of this strait we have failed to find any indications of the 160 mc. radar reported to be on KARIMATA ISLAND.

1 April 1945

0600 Completed uneventful transit of JAVA SEA.

0800 SD radar contact on plane at range 9 miles. When range closed to 7 miles, we submerged.

Set all clocks ahead one hour to Zone -9 time. For remainder of this report all times are ITEM.

0930 Surfaced.

2130 Completed uneventful transit of LOMBOK STRAIT. No contacts, air or surface, in the vicinity of the STRAIT.

2, 3, 4, and 5 April 1945

Uneventful enroute to FREMANTLE, W.A.

6 April 1945

0600 Arrived rendezvous point off ROTTNESST ISLAND.

0725 Ran surface sound and degaussing tests.

0909 Moored alongside U.S.S. CLYTIE at FREMANTLE, W.A.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER

The weather off Cape VARELLA, out to a distance of 60 miles, was for the most part overcast, making navigation difficult. The wind and sea were from north to northeast, of average force two.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

The tidal current in LOMBOK STRAIT during the period 11 - 16 was in general of a southerly set with a drift of from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 knots. However, marked variations from the general flow were observed, particularly while submerged.

On February 12th., while running at 150 feet and coming up to periscope depth for a fix each half hour a set of 150° with a drift of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots was observed. HAWKBILL was on course 110° T at the time. When a position midway between NOESA BESAR and the southwestern peninsula of LOMBOK ISLAND was reached, the current suddenly reversed itself, and although course was changed to 150° T. and speed maintained at $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots, we were set northwest three miles in about an hour and a half.

On another occasion, when four miles bearing 120° T from the northeast point of BALI ISLAND, HAWKBILL was encountering a 4 knots southerly set, working slowly out from the BALI shore on course 060° T. Suddenly the current was lost, and we made good five miles to the northeast during the next two hours.

It was observed that current changes usually followed close on a sharp temperature gradient while running at a constant depth.

The southerly current seemed to split north of NOESA BESAR, part flowing through the channel between NOESA BESAR and LOMBOK, and part flowing through PADOENG CHANNEL. Numerous eddies were discovered close in to the north east shore of NOESA BESAR, although one night when coming north, between NOESA BESAR and LOMBOK, 4,000 yards from NOESA BESAR, an eight knot current setting south was discovered.

There were very heavy tide rips observed about five miles in to three miles east and northeast of the northeast tip of BALI. Swells and waves in these rips were over 2 feet high in places. Heavy rips were also observed approximately four miles east of NOESA BESAR. It was observed that a marked change of current was felt on going through one of these rips.

Close into the BALI shore no current was observed on surface, but a northerly set was discovered on an attempt to bottom at 315 feet.

In summation, the currents in LOMBOK are pretty much an unpredictable factor. The bathythermograph was of great assistance in predicting a change of current, although the nature of its change would not be predetermined. On occasion, while running at a constant depth, as much as a twelve degree change of temperature was experienced. Later developments showed that this running from one strata of water into another was accompanied by a decided shift in the current.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No lighted navigational aids were observed on Japanese-held territory. The light on CAPE VARELLA, adjoining a white, two-story building is very conspicuous, and could be seen through the periscope, while running submerged, in spite of heavy, low overcast at ranges up to six miles, the overcast rendering indistinguishable other details and landmarks on CAPE VARELLA. It was also discovered that accurate periscope ranges could be obtained on CAPE VARELLA light.

A black buoy was observed on "Annie Florence" reef, Lat. 5°-13' S. Long. 113°-17' E.

Subject:

U.S.S. HANBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(P) SITP CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Own Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1	1816 H 2-4-45	31-25.6 S 114-47.5 E	SS	12,000 Yards	324° T 15 kts.	Sighted by periscope	Exchanged calls H.M.S. P-178
2	2205 H 2-9-45	13-45.1 S 114-55.3 E	SS	UNK	009° T 13 kts.	S.J. interfer- ence	Exchanged calls by radar
3	0028 L 2-10-45	13-13.5 S 115-00.0 E	SS	UNK	009° T 13 kts.	S.J. interfer- ence	Exchanged calls by radar
4	0035 H 2-10-45	13-13.5 S 115-00.0 E	SS	UNK	009° T 13 kts.	S.J. interfer- ence	Exchanged calls by radar.
5	0210 H 2-10-45	12-54.5 S 115-02.7 E	SS	UNK	009° T 13 kts.	S.J. interfer- ence	Exchanged calls by radar.
6	0932 H 2-10-45	11-12.3 S 115-18.4 E	SS	12,000 Yards	013° T 15 kts.	Sighted by periscope	Closed range and ex- changed S.J., VHF and visual calls.
7	1027 H 2-10-45	11-12.3 S 115-18.4 E	SS	12,000 Yards	013° T 15 kts.	Sighted by periscope	Closed range and ex- changed calls with S.J. and VHF.
8	0008 H 2-11-45	08-45.0 S 115-45.0 E	PC (?)	5,000 Yards	050° T 11 kts.	S.J.	Later believed to have been sail boat.
9	0610 H 2-11-45	08-25.0 S 115-45.0 E	3 Sea Trucks	5,000 Yards	020° T 2 kts.	Periscope	Seen moving along the coast.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL * Report of Third War Patrol.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
10	02-19-45	01-51.0 S 108-01.0 E	Convoy 4 AK'S	18,000 Yards	0000 T. 15 kts	Visual Lookout	First sighted air cover, then smoke, then tops. Sank two AK'S.
11	0708 2-24-45	01-36.0 N 105-03.0 E	Unidenti- fied Ship or Ships	1-24,000 Yards	Circling on station 10 kts.	Visual Periscope	Lost sight almost immediately We are on lifeguard duty.
12	2358 2-27-45	09-08.2 N 109-09.0 E	SS	10,000 Yards	0500 T. 15 kts	SJ radar	Exchanged calls by SJ radar then picked up pip, Lost contact at range 11,000 yds.
13	1139 3-11-45	12-55.0 N 130-05.0 E	AH	16,000 Yards	2700 T. 10 kts.	Visual Periscope	AF BAIKAL MARU 85 rpm gave him 10 knots.
14	0301 3-13-45	13-16.0 N 109-40.0 E	PC (?)	4,000 Yards	0000 T. 10 kts.	SJ radar via Tamedoa at 7,000 yards.	Lost contact at 7,000 yards.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Own		How Contacted	Remarks
				Initial Range	Course Speed		
15	1604	1-12.0 S 107-51.7 E	2 Masted Schooner	18,000 Yards	140° T. 17 kts	Visual Periscope	Submerged on sight. Surfaced to close range.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Outside of a few enemy A/S search planes encountered between the MALAY BARRIER and latitude 8° N., the most outstanding impression of this patrol is the completeness with which our aircraft dominate the east coast of INDO-CHINA. The PB4Y navy search planes cover the coast daily and thoroughly, and their cooperation with submarines along the coastal patrol areas is heartening. Almost daily shipping strikes of from twelve to twenty four B-25 bombers were observed, making us feel just a bit on the useless side.

While patrolling between SINGAPORE and BORNEO had daily aircraft contacts, apparently from A/S search planes, as they were detected invariably between 0930(H) and 1100(H). In no case were we detected, being amply warned by radar.

Subject: U.S.S. AMERICA - Report of Third War Patrol

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 1

Time: 0201(L) Date: 20 Feb. 1945 Lat: 0-47 S Long: 106-22 E.

TARGET S. ALL ESCORT TYPE

Draft: 4 Course: 100° Speed: 17 Range: 1300 yards

ON SITE

Speed: 15 Course: 105° Depth: Surface

Tube	7	8	10
Track angle	10 F	8.5 F	10 F
Gyro angle	170	171.5	170
Depth Set	0	0	0
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
M. Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	56834	53284	56153
M. Explosive	8-5	8-5	8-5
Serial No.	8079 W	8104 W	10030 W
M. Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	3534	3525	4102
Explosive	TMA-2	TMA-2	TMA-2
Firing Interval	7	7	7
Type Spread	0	2 R	2 L
Sea Conditions	Glass Calm		
Overhaul Activity	SRU, Navy 137		
Down-the-throat shot at pursuing escort.			

Subject: U.S.S. ALBATROSS - Report of Third Air Patrol.

FORM NO. 10, Rev. 1-54

Time: 0322(Z) Date: 20 Feb. 1945 Lat: 9-42 S Long: 100-10 E

TARGET: LARGE & MEDIUM AIRCRAFT

Draft: 12 Course: 205 Speed: 7.5 Range 3300 yards

0325

Speed: 5 Course: 029 Dept.: 4

Tube	1	2	3	4	5	6
Track mile	56 F	57 W	56 F	60 F	62 F	61 F
Gyro angle	062	065	002	000	350	359
Dept. Set	4	4	4	4	4	4
Tower	Li	Li	Li	Li	Li	Li
Hit or Miss	Hit	Hit	Hit	Hit	Hit	Hit
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
M. Torpedo	14-3A	23	23	23	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	63678	65972	65706	65647	63550	63643
M. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	27028	19613	19589	26964	27012	19791
M. Torpedo	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	19592	14038	14456	14440	3530	17317
Explosive	TMA-2	TMA-2	TMA-2	TMA-2	TMA-2	TMA-2
Firing Interval	6	6	6	6	6	6
Type Spread	Divergent					
Sea Conditions	Glass Calm					
Overhaul Activity	SRU, Net 133					

Sunk: (1) Large M
(1) Medium M

Subject: U.S.S. MILL - Report of Third Patrol.

TORPEDO LOG No. 3

Time: 0420(L) Date 20 Feb. 1945 Lat: 0-31 S Long: 100-13 E

TARGET S. II SA (SV)

Draft: 10 Course: 260 Speed: 9 Range: 2300 yards

01511

Speed: 5 Course: 150 Depth: Surface

Tube	1	2	5	6
Track Angle	90 S	-	-	-
Grp Angle	014.5	013	000	000.5
Depth Set	4	4	4	4
Power	Hi	Hi	Hi	Hi
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No
TK. Torpedo	14-3A	23	14-3A	23
Serial No.	63611	50444	63553	50535
TK. Explosive	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	19983	26977	19630	19744
TK. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	14442	17697	3531	19605
Explosive	TK-2	TK-2	TK-2	TK-2
Firing Interval	8	8	8	8
Type Spread	Divergent			
Sea Conditions	Glass Calm			
Overhaul Activity	SRU, Navy 137			

Target saw wakes and zigged away radically. All missed ahead.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(I) MINES

Two floating mines were sighted off HON NGOAI ISLAND on 24 March, Lat. 12-06N., Long. 108-25E. These were spherical mines with horns plainly visible.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS.

During our stay in LOMBOK STRAIT we encountered the usual patrol craft and radar equipped aircraft. The former were very ineffective, hugging the coast of BALI as though trying to avoid contact rather than seek it. They patrol at a speed of about 7 knots, and do not ping or use radar, although our sound operator says that the craft attacked on the night of 11-12 February was using supersonic gear, hand keyed, during our approach. This may have been some other noise, although the sound operator has been our battle operator for three patrols, and has heard plenty of Jap supersonics. The radar-equipped aircraft, using equipment of 178 mc., appeared only at night except on the morning when we attacked a PC boat, and we believe he was called out for that mission. Our defence against these planes was to slow to 5 knots or stop when the APR indicated their presence, and then watch them on the PFI screen. They would approach us to within 2000 to 4000 yards, and then apparently lose us and open out.

The shore based search radar operating at 200 mc. seemed unable to detect us as long as we remained 16,000 yards from it. One aircraft bombed us ineffectively during daylight of the 16th while we were well clear of LOMBOK to the north.

The only effectiveness of the VAL providing air cover for the ships contacted 19 February was to point out the presence of the convoy to us, since he returned to base upon reaching his endurance limit, and was not replaced. The surface escorts with this convoy were as confused as the general run of Jap escorts during the night attacks. They would chase us for a few minutes, firing 20MM, then stop, turn on a red truck light, and drop strings of D.C.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(a) Engineering and Electrical.

On the 25th of February, while zig-zagging using the Arma course clock, it was noticed that the master gyro-compass was acting erratically. The trouble was traced to a dirty commutator on the follow-up motor. The gyro-compass was secured for an hour and a half while the follow-up motor was cleaned; since then no further trouble has been experienced.

On the 20th of February a broken cylinder head to crankcase stud was discovered on number twelve unit of number four main engine. The stud was removed and replaced with a new one.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL * Report of Third War Patrol.

On the 1st of March two broken cylinder head to crankcase studs were discovered on number one unit of number four main engine. Both studs were removed and replaced without difficulty using a jig designed by the ship's force for this purpose. The jig is made of a heavy piece of boiler plate, one inch thick, drilled to fit the four cylinder head studs, and is secured in place by the unbroken studs. A case-hardened insert two inches long with an inside diameter slightly smaller than the stud is inserted in the hole over the broken stud and serves as a guide for the drill. An "odd-man" is mounted on the center of the jig to facilitate drilling. This jig allows a broken stud to be drilled evenly and to the desired size with a single pass of the drill.

Engine performance on this run and both previous runs has been better than excellent. The engines never once failed to answer any demands made on them and were often called on to run at full or flank speeds for varying lengths of time. Despite the fact that over 15,000 miles were covered this run, a large part of it at high speeds, little or no trouble from smoking was encountered.

The number of studs replaced on this run (3) while higher than previous patrols (none on the first, one on the second) is still lower than the average reported by other boats with the same type engines (278A). It is believed this is due to our policy of checking the tension of the head studs at regular intervals.

On the first run, some difficulty was encountered with smoking, this has been largely eliminated on later runs by the cleaning out of the air boxes at periodic intervals. In addition, the engine used for battery charging is placed on propulsion for one hour at the conclusion of the charge to burn up accumulated lubricating oil.

(b) Hull

At Subic Bay an inspection of the shafts, propellers, and underwater hull were made. The divers reported both shafts and propellers to be in good condition. and the tank hull around number 3B fuel ballast tank flood valves stove in for about four feet with the lower stringers and braces collapsed. Dry docking will be necessary to effect repairs.

The bow planes tilting motor is excessively noisy.

(L) RADIO

Serial one transmitted on 6 February 1945. Originated 060143. First call at 0150 passed to VIXO direct. Received for at 0155. Frequency 8470 kcs.

Serial two transmitted on 15 February. Originated 152126. First call 2128. Passed to VIXO direct. Received for 2149. Frequency 8470.

Serial three transmitted 19 February. Originated 192217. First call 2220. Answered by Z4N and sent to Z4N for retransmission to

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

VIXO. Received for by Z4N at 2232. Received for by VIXO on baker schedule at 2300. Frequency 8470 kes.

Serial four transmitted 26 February. Originated 261518. First call 1520. Answered by VHC and transmitted to VHC for retransmission to VIXO. Received for at 1542. Broadcast by VIXO as #566 on baker schedule at 1747. Frequency 12705 kes.

Serial five transmitted 28 February. Originated 280347. First call 0350. Answered by VIXO on baker schedule at 0400. Sent to VIXO at 0403. Heard no receipt either on schedule or ship shore circuit. Message was resent by VIXO as #598 on baker schedule at 0435. Frequency 12705. Although this message had an info addressee in the text it was rebroadcast only twice within a half hour of reception, during daylight hours. The info addressee did not receive the message resulting in much confusion and many transmissions on the wolf pack frequency.

Serial six transmitted 3 April. Originated 030108. First call 0110. Answered by VIXO on baker schedule at 0116. Sent to VIXO at 0119. Received for by VIXO on baker schedule at 0121. Message was resent by VIXO as #418 on baker schedule at 0142. Frequency 8470.

We copied VIXO throughout the run. No serials were missed. Used 12630 kes during daylight hours and 9250 kes during darkness. No particular difficulty encountered in copying. Troubled by interference occasionally but not to an extent which made VIXO unreadable. No jamming encountered. Did not use 16150 kes. except as a check. Signal strength never more than 3. WOPACO frequencies were guarded north of the barrier. Communication was satisfactory on these frequencies, both voice and CW. Bothered by interference on the standard frequencies which is not present on the alternates.

It is recommended that the amount of transmissions, testings, etc. on wolf pack frequencies be drastically reduced.

When entering Subic Bay 355 kes and 2716 kes were guarded.

VHF and WOPAC communication with aircraft was satisfactory.

During aircraft rescue operations VIXO and 4475 kes were guarded and 500 kes was monitored. In order to guard 5640 kes an additional high frequency receiver would be necessary.

In accordance with CTF- 71 serial love of 2 March a log of signal strength accompanies this report.

Installation of TBL radio transmitters in Portsmouth design submarines is desirable for maintenance due to track in deck and rollers on the transmitter providing for easy removal and access.

(M) RADAR

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

SJ-1

The operation of the SJ has been satisfactory with two exceptions. The PPI failed (large spot, forshortened sweep) because of reduced resistance of cathode resistor R-44. This is the second time this has occurred. The silicon crystal detector failed. This resulted in poor echo response. The SJ was out of operation for about three hours while the TR tube and crystal were replaced and a complete tuneup performed. Landfalls were picked up at the extreme range of the equipment, medium AK's at 22,000 yards and submarines at 14,000 yards.

SD-4

Operation of the SD has been satisfactory throughout the patrol. Failures were limited to tubes. Landfalls ranged up to 55 miles. A/C to 30 miles.

BN

Operation of the BN has been satisfactory. Saturation IFF response received at 60 miles.

ABK-7

Operation of the ABK has been satisfactory.

APR-1

Operation of the APR was satisfactory. APR will be found of great value for test purposes with the SD, BN, and ARC. We installed electric tuning on our unit and found it to be of infinite value when the APR is used extensively. A suitable motor (Bodine) will be found among the Pit Log spares.

ARC-4

Operation of the ARC-4 was satisfactory. Considerable confusion exists on information concerning corresponding numbered and lettered channels. It is recommended that S/MS adopt A/C system of lettered channels and sets be labeled accordingly.

While operating submerged three miles off French Indo-China successful communication was established with friendly air craft on the VHF at 45 foot depth. Channels baker and dog (four and one) were used. In the first instance, communication was with a striking force of four B-25s (channel four). In the second, communication was with a PBV and two B-25s - The rescue unit for the striking force (channel one). Information received from the base concerning the type of aircraft and their calls was of considerable help.

We have found that communication with aircraft is definitely possible at five miles with the VHF antenna three feet out of water. It is recommended that the base of the antennabe raised well above the periscope shears to permit VHF communication without exposing the shears.

We also have found that on several occassions search planes have not answered up to VHF calls although well within VHF range.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

This would indicate that they do not maintain a continuous watch on the VHF. We recommend that they stand a continuous watch so that we can contact them without their having sighted us. We have a remote station in the conning tower permitting VHF communication from either conning tower or bridge by use of a portable french type phone. It saves numerous minutes which are lost when the radio room has to relay all conversation on VHF. It is particularly valuable for inter-boat communications while close aboard when the C.O. wishes to both converse on the phone and Conn his ship.

Our system of watch standing has worked out very well and may be of interest to other boats. We have nine auxiliary electricians trained in the operation of all radar, radar detection, and sound equipment. These men, (three per watch) rotate at twenty minute intervals on the high periscope, radar (SD), and auxiliary electrician when on the surface during daylight. At night on the APR, SJ, and auxiliary electrician. When submerged sound and auxiliary electrician.

(N) SOUND GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

Operation of the sound equipment was satisfactory throughout the run. Listening conditions in Lombok Strait were fair from 9 February through 15 February.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

Strong negative gradients were found in Lombok Strait necessitating a change of as much as 10000 pounds for a depth change between periscope depth and 150 feet. In other operating areas either iso-thermal or slight negative gradients were found.

(P) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

The high standard of health which has highlighted every patrol of this ship continued. There was a mild epidemic of colds during the latter patrol, believed due to a lowering of resistance because of the length of the run, which is over sixty days.

The quality of the food remains good, and particular thanks are due the tender for 1200 pounds of State-side beef given to us at the start of the patrol. There is no comparison between Australian and American beef.

Habitability continues to be good of the surface character of Hawkbill's patrols.

(Q) PERSONNEL

Hawkbill is now beginning to feel the loss of the trained men who put her in commission, although the new men received from the relief crews are of a high standard and eager to learn. It remains the policy on this ship that no man is eligible for advancement in

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

rating until he has qualified himself in submarines aboard the HAWKBILL. We have found this necessary because of the low type of training received by men qualified in other classes of submarines, particularly O and R boats.

(a)	Number of men detached after previous patrol	20
(b)	Number of men on board during this patrol	78*
(c)	Number of men qualified at start of patrol	53
(d)	Number of men qualified at end of patrol	61
(c)	Number of unqualified men making their first patrol	15

* One man was transferred at Subic Bay for medical reasons.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

Fremantle to Area	1800 Miles	19,430 Gallons
In Area	11,730 Miles	128,190 Gallons
Area to Fremantle	1475 Miles	28,360 Gallons

(S) DURATION

114005

Days enroute to Area	7
Days in Area	47
Days enroute to base	55
Days submerged	11
Days of reload and voyage repairs	3

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

TORPEDOES

FUEL

PROVISIONS

PERSONNEL

23

6000 gallons

14 days

7 days

LIMITING FACTOR THIS PATROL -

Orders from Force Commander.

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

Radar Countermeasures

(1) At 1215 Z 10 February 1945 forty miles south of Lombok Strait 198 mgs. prf. 1050 pl. 4 microsec trainable radar was picked up on the APR. This is believed to be the MK. 1 Mod. 2 air search radar listed addendum 1 to annex baker of CTF-71.1 OPOD no. 14-45.

At 1214 Z 12 February 1945 a 178 mgs. prf. 400 pl. 3.5 microsecon second airborne surface search radar was picked up by APR possibly type 3 special modle MK.VI. This appeared to be trainable and capable of lobing. This was picked up while operating in Lombok Strait.

At 1900 Z 20 March 1945 10 miles east of Cape Varela a 157 mgs. prf. 1000 pl. 9 microsec. Airborne surface search radar was detected on the APR.

0409 Z 24 March 1945 20 miles east of Camranh Bay a 156 mgs. prf. 500 pl. 7-8 microsed. Radar was detected on the APR. This is believed to be MK. 13 portable air search radar reported to be in the vicinity of Camranh Bay by CINCPAC secret letter serial 3700(C) dated 1 February 1945.

There was no evidence of Jamming during the patrol.

No deception was apparent on the part of the enemy and none was employed by ourselves other than keying of radars (SD and SJ).

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No evidence of communication countermeasures.

No evidence of sonar countermeasures.

(V) REMARKS

Pars. 4(a) and (b) of Comsubs 7th Fleet Coh. ltr. FE24- 71/L13-1
Serial 0243 of 2 February 1945 have been complied with.

The most outstanding impression of this patrol is the vast progress which has been made in the coordination of effort between submarines and aircraft. The following comments are offered with a view to improving still further the progress already made.

- (1) The plan for search planes to man the effective SAFPLAN frequency upon entering the submarine areas is excellent, and works well.
- (2) Search planes do not now keep their VHF manned at all times while in the area, and often when the S/M can see the A/C, but the latter is not aware of the proximity of the S/M, communication is not possible without cluttering up the pack frequency. We think the A/C should listen in on the VHF whenever in the GENERAL vicinity of S/M.
- (3) The information as to A/C search sectors and calls, while of great value, is far from complete. For instance, we daily heard, and on occasion conversed with a plane called "HOMEWARD XRAY", but we could only guess at his sector and type. It is felt that changes and additions to A/C search sectors would be well worth while putting on the schedules.
- (4) Why not include the A.N.F. in our plans? Their planes were daily in our areas, but, although we knew lots about them, they knew little about us except in our capacity as lifeguard.
- (5) Why not simplify the VHF problem by using the same designating characters for the various channels for both S/M and A/C? It's no help to be using two different channels, especially when our channel ONE does not correspond to their ABLE, as one might expect. In line with this, it is suggested that we all get on the same channel while in the S/M areas. Frequently each channel would have to be tried by the S/M before hitting on the one being used by the A/C, and this applies to both Army and Navy A/C.
- (6) It is suggested that the VHF whip antenna be put atop an extension so that it will be about three feet above the shears, thus allowing communication between S/M and A/C with the former submerged. It works; we tried it with surprising success.
- (7) A need was felt for a simple geographical code such as that in effect in TF 71 for mutual use by S/M and A/C when time does not permit resorting to the aircraft code. On one occasion we

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Third War Patrol.

China heard a plane tell a S/M he was heading for "LONELY HILL". This is a code word for use in A/C - S/M rescue operations and should not be used for other purposes. On another occasion we heard a plane refer to a "POINT SOX". We couldn't find this one anywhere. When mutual A/C - S/M operations are going to be carried on in a general locality such as the Indo-China Coast, six or eight geographical code names could be promugated by the liaison officer and issued to both members of the team by despatch. This seems to be particularly necessary when operations are off a coast whose geographical names are hard enough to understand under any conditions, and twice that bad over voice radio.

Serial 20Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
8 April 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of Third War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY.
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War Patrol.

1. The third patrol of the U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366), conducted in the Java Sea and South China Sea Area, was of sixty-one days duration, forty-seven of which were spent in the assigned areas. The HAWKBILL returned to Subic Bay for three days to effect minor repairs and reload.

2. From 22 to 25 February, the HAWKBILL was part of the coordinated attack group with the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. PINTADO (SS387) as OTC. On 24 February lifeguard duty was performed off Singapore. In addition, a highly successful special mission was performed which is the subject of a separate report.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER ONE

3. The first contact on 20-21 February was with a convoy of four AKs and two escorts. This convoy was contacted in the daytime, trailed and attacked after moonset. The first attempt to attack this convoy was frustrated by a zig toward, just before firing, and detection by a near escort. The HAWKBILL turned away and fired three Mark 13 torpedoes at the escort, track angle 10°, gyros small, spread $\frac{1}{4}$ °, depth set zero. No hits were obtained. The HAWKBILL was sprayed with 20MM machinegun fire from the escort, but fortunately escaped damages.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER TWO

This was a night surface attack on the same convoy after an end around. Six Mark 14 and Mark 23 torpedoes were fired at a large AK and a small AK overlapping on a 60 track, gyros near zero, depth set four feet, at a range of 3300 yards. Six hits were seen and heard. Both targets disappeared from the radar screen and probably sank.

TORPEDO ATTACK NUMBER THREE

This was a night surface attack on the remaining ships of the convoy attacked previously. Four MK 23 torpedoes were fired at a small AK on a 90 track, gyros 10°, depth set four feet, range 2300 yards. All torpedoes missed when the target spotted the phosphorescent wakes and maneuvered to avoid. Further attacks on this convoy was abandoned due to shallow water, approaching dawn and indications of aircraft radar in the vicinity.

FC5-30/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON THIRTY

Serial 20

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
8 April 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War Patrol.

4. The HAWKBILL returned from patrol in good material condition, clean and shipshape. The state of morale is high in this excellent fighting ship. It is expected that the refit will be completed in the normal time.

5. The officers and crew are heartily congratulated on the completion of this well conducted and arduous patrol.

Jesse L. Hull
JESSE L. HULL.

Serial 0708C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L22 April 1945. JTB

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial (03) dated 6 April
1945. Report of Third War
Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War
Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Third War Patrol of the HAWKBILL, under the command of Commander F. W. SCANLAND, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in LOMBOK STRAIT, the JAVA SEA and the areas of the SOUTH CHINA SEA off the coast of INDO-CHINA. The patrol consisted of two phases separated by voyage repairs in SUBIC BAY from 3 to 6 March.
2. The period from 11 to 17 February was spent patrolling LOMBOK STRAIT, and is covered by separate top secret report.
3. At 0201 (H) on 20 February HAWKBILL was driven off from a convoy consisting of four Marus and two escorts by close gunfire from one of the escorts. Three torpedoes fired at the pursuing escort all missed. However, HAWKBILL was able to circumvent the escort and return to the convoy for a second attack at 0312. Six torpedoes were fired and six hits were made in two targets, sinking them both. Four more torpedoes were fired at the remnants at 0430, but the target was alerted by the phosphorescent torpedo tracks, and maneuvered to avoid.
4. The second phase was conducted off the coast of INDO-CHINA as a member of a large coordinated group consisting of BLUEBACK (OTC), HAWKBILL, BERGALL, FLASHER and BLACKFIN. No contacts were made during this period.
5. Lifeguard Services were performed on 24 February and on 29 and 30 March. No rescues were necessary.
6. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.
7. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew on the completion of this active and well conducted patrol during which a Special Mission was skilfully performed and the following damage was inflicted upon the enemy:

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

14/hr

Serial 0708

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr. A16-3
Serial (03) dated 6 April
1945. Report of Third War
Patrol.

22 April 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War
Patrol - Comment on.

S-U-N-K

1 - AK (Small - EU)	300 Tons*	<i>Feb 16</i>
1 - AK (Small - EU)	300 Tons*	
1 - PC (EC)	300 Tons*	<i>Feb 12</i>
2 - Landing Craft	100 Tons*	<i>Feb 12</i>
1 - AK (Large - EU)	7,500 Tons (Att.#2)	<i>Feb 20</i>
1 - AK (Medium - EU)	4,000 Tons (Att.#2)	<i>Feb 20</i>
	<u>Total 12,500 Tons</u>	

* - Sunk during period covered by separate report.

+ 300 Tons sunk by *Cuty*
on 14 Feb 45

JAMES FIFE.

DISTRIBUTION

Cominch	(3)	Direct	ComSubRon-22	(2)
Vice Opnav	(2)	Direct	ComSubRon-26	(2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c	(1)		ComSubRon-30	(2)
Com1stFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-22	(1 each)
Com2ndFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)
Com7thFlt	(2)		DivComsSubRon-30	(1 each)
ComSub1stFlt	(30)		S/M School, N.L. Conn.	(2)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)		Comdt. NYD, Puget Sound	(1)
CTF-71	(7)		SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
CTG-71.5	(2)		S/MS 7thFlt	(1)
CTG-71.8	(2)			

J. B. Miller
J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

5 04631

A16-3(8) (F-3-c/whr)

Serial 02771

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.,
serial 03 dated 6 April
1945.

12 MAY 1945

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Third War
Patrol.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet sends a well
done to the HAWKBILL for an aggressive and successful
patrol which resulted in extensive damage to enemy shipping.

Copy to:
ComSubs, 7thFlt
ComSubRon 30
CO, USS HAWKBILL (SS366)

D. E. BARDEN

1st copy

U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366)

SS366/A16-3
Serial (07)

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.,
18 June 1945.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HAWKBILL.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via ; (1) Commander Submarine Division 261.
(2) Commander Submarine Squadron 26.
(3) Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet
(4) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (To Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fourth war patrol of this vessel conducted in Gulf of Siam and South China Sea area during the period 5 May 1945 to 18 June 1945, is forwarded herewith.

F. W. Scanland
F. W. SCANLAND, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C

BY OP-0989C DATE 5/30/72

DECLASSIFIED

132586

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from third war patrol 6 April 1945. Between 7 April and 20 April 1945 underwent normal refit from U.S.S. CLYTIE at FREMANTLE, W.A. The following alterations were accomplished during refit:

- (1) Installed cross connection between the high pressure air supply from No. 1 air bank and the 600 lb. blow manifold. BuShips Ltr. SS/S49 (515) EN28/A2-11 of 8-20-44.
- (2) Removed ventilation exhaust terminal from ship's office. Authority: BuShips Ltr. SS/S38-1 (515) of 10-2-44.
- (3) Installed air silencer on air bleeder line to pump room. BuShips Alt (all ships) SS/S48-23 (515) of 9-12-44.
- (4) Installed Dead Reckoning Tracer. BuShips Ltr. SS/S24-7 (634-815) of 4-27-44.
- (5) Provided ventilation supply for magazines. BuShips Ltr. SS/S38-11 (815) of 7-11-44.
- (6) Removed forward fuel oil filling line and blanked off hull opening using a bolted blank and tack welded studs. BuShips Ltr. SS/S55-1 (515) over EN28/A2-11 of 11-23-44.
- (7) Installed JA sound powered telephone outlet with headset at the gyro indicator regulators in each torpedo room. BuShips Res. Ltr. SS/S65-1 (665-515-815) over EN28/A2-11 of 11-13-44.
- (8) Installed additional valve between the fuel oil filling and transfer main and hull stop valve for the fuel filling connection. BuShips Ltr. SS/S48-1 (515-815) of 8-24-44.
- (9) Installed a stop valve in the compensating water discharge overboard line to permit easy defueling. It is installed in line between head box and deck hose connection. Reference: BuShips Ltr. SS/S55-1 (815-515) of 2-22-45.
- (10) Installed ST radar periscope.
- (11) Installed additional 5"/25 cal. gun on fore-castle.
- (12) Altered antennae rig to clear both 5" guns.
- (13) Removed fore-castle 20m.m. gun.
- (14) Removed 17,000 lbs. of lead ballast from super-structure.

Subject: U.S.S. FREMONT - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

On 20 April 1945 regular ship's officers and crew returned to the ship for period of training and loading. Loaded 14 MK. XIV, 6 MK. XVIII, and 6 MK. XVII torpedoes.

On 5 May 1945 training and loading completed, ship ready for sea.

The following officers and C.O.F.s are aboard for this patrol, and have made the indicated number of war patrols, including this one:

COMDR. F.W. SCHELLAND, JR, USN	6
LT-COMDR. F.B. TUCHER, USN	4
LIEUT. L.R. FOCKELE, USNR	4
LIEUT.(jg) G.A. CHRISTOPHER, USNR	4
LIEUT.(jg) R.L. MURPHY, USN	10
LIEUT.(jg) A.A. ROMAN, USNR	1
LIEUT.(jg) T.J. BLACK, USNR	3
ENS. R.W. MUZZY, USNR	2
ENS. E.L. BARILEY, USNR	2
ENS. M.E. KELLY, JR, USN	1
CALLAHAN, S., JR, 228 32 15, CRM(PA)	4
CARTER, R. G., 358 01 57, CRM(....)	2
NORDE, E.L., 223 89 65, CRM(....)	4
ODON, R.D., 266 08 59, CRM(....)	8
ORTON, R. (n), 336 80 37, CCS(....)	12
PETROVSKY, J.L., 238 65 34, CRM(....)	9
FRUDEN, D. (n), 376 04 69, CG(....)	5
ROERE, T.R., 360 37 44, CRM(....)	4

(B) NARRATIVE:

ALL TIMES ARE TIME, ZONE -9.

5 May 1945.

1300 Departed FRENCHVILLE, N.A.

1400 Test fired new 5"/25 gun and fired 20 rounds from both 5" guns, rapid fire. Test fired 40 m.m. gun.

1500 Made submerged and surface radar practice approaches on U.S.S. HUTCHINSON.
to
2100

2100 Set course for LOBEOR SHELVE via JOHN BONE.

6 May 1945.

Drills and battle surface enroute area.

Noon Posit: Lat. 29° 46' S. Long. 113° 27' E.

7 May 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HELMHILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

0622 SJ radar contact, range 9,000 yards (Ship Contact #1). Ship is on an opposite and parallel course, and is probably U.S.S. ZIMARDVISCHE, which is due at PEARL AND HERMES Bay after tomorrow.

Trim dive and drills enroute area.

Noon Posit: Lat 25° 22' S. Long 112° 14' E.

8 May 1945.

1448 Sighted submarine through high periscope, range 14,000 yards (Ship contact #2). Overtook U.S.S. TERRIFIC and asked permission to make practice approach on him.

1710 Made practice approach.

Noon Posit: Lat. 20° 18' S. Long. 112° 59' E.

9 May 1945.

Uneventful.

Noon Posit: Lat. 15° 06' S. Long. 114° 42' E.

10 May 1945.

0930 Sighted submarine through high periscope (Ship Contact #3). Closed range and spoke southbound U.S.S. HERMES.

1745 While about 65 miles south of LOBCK STRAIT, made SJ radar contact, range 9 miles. Submerged when range closed to 7 1/2 miles.

1749 Received two depth bombs, not close.

1821 Surfaced.

2200 Entered LOBCK STRAIT. Spent next six hours thoroughly combing the STRAIT for patrol boats, but could find no contacts of any kind. Sent our Serial C-1 to CAP-71 giving information on LOBCK and telling him we would assume life guard for B-24 strike on HERMES ISLAND.

Noon Posit: Lat. 10° 49' S. Long. 115° 21' E.

11 May 1945.

0400 Departed LOBCK STRAIT.

0840 Sighted HERMES ISLANDS.

1040 Sighted first of about eight float planes which we observed landing and taking off from behind SUBI ISLAND during the day.

1107 Submerged 4 miles off SUBI ISLAND.

1524 Surfaced.

1537 Submerged. Patrolling at periscope depth off SUBI ISLAND

Subject: U.S.S. RAMBOLD - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

anchorage.

- The B-24 strike is scheduled between 1900 and 2100, so at
- 1924 surfaced in dusk, sun having set at 1914. Turned on IFF and VHF, and listened on pack frequency, but heard nothing.
- 1928 SD radar contact at 7 miles, closing rapidly. This is probably friendly aircraft, but there's no way of knowing.
- 1929 Submerged to SD radar depth. Planes closed to 3 miles.
- 1957 Surfaced and called planes unsuccessfully on VHF and pack frequency.
- 2003 Observed string of bombs hit KINGEY ISLANDS, so know now that these are our B-24. SD radar range began opening on planes.
- 2030 Set course for SOMERSET - RAMBOLD traffic route.
- Noon Posit: Lat. 7° 02' S. Long. 115° 26' E.

12 May 1945.

- 0833 SD radar contact, range 12 miles. When range closed steadily to 8 miles, submerged.
- 1107 Surfaced. Proceeding west across SOMERSET - BATTLE route. No contacts except numerous sailboats.
- 1840 Submerged off REILING, J.V.
- 2027 Surfaced.
- 2032 Picked up SJ interference and exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. B.V. (ship Contact #4).
- 2130 Came alongside B.V. and told him we were going to investigate REILING HARBOR and invited him to come along.
- 2210 Landed Battle stations and commenced entrance into REILING anchorage (Posit: Lat. 6° 42' S. Long. 111° 21' E.).
- 2246 Crossed 10 fathom curve. Made careful and thorough inspection of this anchorage without any results. Very disappointing, after cruising around in 6 - 7 fathoms of water.
- 2320 Left anchorage.
- 2350 Had another chat with B.V. and set course for KARIBU STRAIT.
- Noon Posit: Lat. 6° 20' S. Long. 113° 19' E.

13 May 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. BRILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1627 Entered southern end of MALAKKA STRAIT.

Noon Posit: Lat. $4^{\circ} 20' S$. Long. $109^{\circ} 54' E$.

14 May 1945.

Proceeding through MALAKKA and towards SINGAPORE CHANNEL.

2100 Observed searchlight display from SINGAPORE, lasting about an hour.

2300 Commenced patrolling off SINGAPORE 20 miles south of U.S.S. BRILL.

Noon Posit: Lat. $0^{\circ} 00'$ Long. $106^{\circ} 45' E$.

15 May 1945.

0500 Made rendezvous with BRILL (Ship Contact #5).

0600 Proceeding north to patrol area DOB THIE off PULO TENGCEL, MALAYA.

1303 SD radar contact, range 16 miles. Sighted what appeared to be single tailed Liberator, 1B4Y2. Attempted communication by VHF and S.F.P.L.F. frequency without success.

Noon Posit: Lat. $03^{\circ} 23' N$. Long. $105^{\circ} 06' E$.

16 May 1945.

0200 Patrolling on line $330^{\circ} T$. - $150^{\circ} T$. seven miles from the shore line just above PULO TENGCEL.

0419 SJ radar contact, bearing $269^{\circ} T$., 16,000 yards (Ship Contact #6). Commenced tracking. Target determined to be zigging on base course $150^{\circ} T$., speed 14 knots.

0458 Battle Stations Torpedo Attack. Turned in to target to get at him before he entered mined area behind PULO TENGCEL.

0523 Commenced firing six MK. XIV-3 torpedoes forward, torpedo run 2800 yards, gyros 352° , depth set 3 feet, track angle $100^{\circ} F$. Because of rain and poor visibility, we could not see the target, and all fire control was by radar. Depth of water 16 fathoms.

0525 Observed and heard first of two timed hits in target. Shortly before firing we discovered a smaller target close by the larger, and decided he was an escort.

Target stopped and opened up with a barrage of 4" and 20 m.m. which lasted off and on until

0700 when we submerged. The target was obviously hurt, but not sunk and his gunfire held us off during darkness. Commenced closing

Subject: U.S.S. REMBERT (S-366) - Report of Fourth War Patrol

target as dawn broke. He was finally seen to be lying to about 3000 yards off shore, and had a 10° list to port.

- 0951 Battle Stations Torpedo Attack.
- 1002 Observed single engine plane circling over target.
- 1015 Saw that the target, now identified as ALCM MATSUTAKA CLASS of 2000 tons, was being towed into the beach stern first by a sea truck of about 400 tons. We decided we had to get him now or lose him, so at
- 1044 fired 3 MK. XIV-3A torpedoes forward, set at low power, gyros zero, torpedo run 4650 yards, depth set three feet, track angle 30° S., using 1/2° spread. First torpedo ran erratic, but the other two ran normal, smoking like locomotives. The target opened up with everything aboard at the torpedoes, but to no avail. At
- 1049 one torpedo hit target amidships with an explosion we couldn't believe, due probably to the fact that the target was in 60 feet of water and we weren't in much more. The target broke in two amidships, and her bow stuck straight into the air. The sea truck scrambled for a nearby cove.
- 1114 Surfaced to try and find the sea truck, but he must have run into the nearby DUMAY RIVER, because we couldn't find him anywhere. Cruised around in wreckage, 1000 yards off shore, taking pictures and looking for a life ring we could bring back to decorate CLUB CISCO at SUBIC BAY. We hope the club appreciates this gift, because we messed around in 60 - 80 feet of water for 45 minutes before we found one.
- 1200 Hauled clear of area towards the 20 fathom curve at 16 knots.
- 1228 Submerged on 20 fathom curve.
- 1724 Surfaced.
- 1746 SD radar contact, range 9 miles. Not wishing to be sighted here in the hopes the enemy might think we had cleared the vicinity, submerged.
- 2108 Surfaced.
- Commenced patrolling on a line parallel to and 5 miles off coast just south of FULO TINGGOL.
- Noon Posit: Lat. 4° 50' N. Long. 103° 27' E.
- 17 May 1945.
- 0720 Submerged for patrol 4 miles off MLAY coast.
- 2053 Surfaced.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBINE - Report of Fourth Air Patrol.

Noon Posit: Lat. 4° 28' N. Long. 103° 36' E.

18 May 1945.

- 0015 Received orders from Task Force Commander to proceed to area DOG ONE, in the GULF OF SIAM, and to divide area with U.S.S. COBIA and H.M.S. SUPREMACY. Sent message to COBIA requesting rendezvous, and set course for new area.
- 1101 SD radar contact, range 20 miles.
- 1103 SD radar contact, range 6 miles. Sighted unidentified aircraft. Efforts to communicate by VHF and SIFFLON frequency unsuccessful.
- 1115 Lost sight of plane at range of about 12 miles.
- 1120 Regained radar contact on this or another plane at 7½ miles. Temporarily lost contact, then regained almost at once at 4 miles. Submerged at once, diving time 40 seconds.
- 1218 Surfaced.
- 1503 Sighted unidentified plane at range 12 miles. He apparently did not see us.
- 1800 SD radar contact, range 15 miles. Range closed to 12 miles then opened. Not sighted. We now believe these are large enemy transport planes flying between HOLL BIRU and COCHIN CHINA.

Noon Posit: Lat. 6° 13' N. Long. 103° 50' E.

19 May 1945.

- 0500 Made rendezvous with COBIA (Ship Contact #7). Divided area between us, COBIA taking area north of 9° N. and ourselves the area south of that line. Learned from Captain Al Becker that a minelayer had given the COBIA a thorough working over a few days before, and we felt even more happy at having given one the deep six.
- 1731 Sighted unidentified plane at 10 miles. He maintained course and apparently did not see us.

Noon Posit: Lat. 7° 47' N. Long. 102° 32' E.

20 May 1945.

- Patrolling in a general north - south line between 7° N. and 9° N.
- 1004 Submerged for repairs to gyro compass.
- 1218 Surfaced.
- 2043 JK sound watch reported definite torpedo screws on port side.

Subject: U.S.S. BERGILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Avoided with full rudder and flank speed. Sound tracked torpedo down the port side. The sound operator has been a Sonar for 4 patrols, and his description of the high speed, high pitched, whirring noise he heard leaves little doubt in our minds that a torpedo was fired at us. As no wake was visible, the assumption is that the torpedo was electric.

Noon Posit: Lat. 8° 00' N. Long. 103° 13' E.

21 May 1945.

- 1000 Sighted coast of TAILAND in vicinity of PALMI ROADS.
- 1505 Sighted aircraft flying along coast, range 13 miles.
- 1507 Submerged.
- 1600 Surfaced.
- 1611 Sighted aircraft over coast. Submerged.
- 1716 Sighted aircraft through periscope.
- 1807 Surfaced.
- 1904 Sighted aircraft over coast. Submerged.
- 2115 Surfaced.

It had been our intention to close the coast in the vicinity of HILLY CREEK, 15 miles east of PALMI ROADS, but the weather does not permit closing to within range of coast-hugging traffic, as this will necessitate crossing the 10 fathom curve. The night is cloudless with a bright 3/4 moon, visibility 20,000 yards. Opened out from the coast.

Noon Posit: Lat. 7° 25' N. Long. 102° 14' E.

22 May 1945.

- 1418 Submerged for repairs to gyro compass and 600# master blow valve M.B.F. manifold.
- 1636 Surfaced.
- 2216 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. BERGILL. (Ship Contact #8).
- 2300 Made rendezvous with BERGILL. Received copy of instructions for coordinated patrol of this area.

Noon Posit: Lat. 7° 22' N. Long. 103° 24' E.

23 May 1945.

- 1340 SD radar contact, range 15 miles.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1345 Sighted PB4Y2 search plane. All attempts at establishing communications futile.

1506 Sighted PB4Y2 at range of 20 miles. Detected on SD radar at 18 miles. Again our attempts to communicate with this plane were unsuccessful.

Noon Posit. Lat. $7^{\circ} 22' N.$ Long. $103^{\circ} 17' E.$

24 May 1945.

0328 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. KRANE. (Ship Contact # 9).

0419 Made rendezvous with KRANE and took aboard one bag of very welcome mail.

0440 Set course for patrol line at northern end of GULF OF SIAM.

Noon Posit: Lat. $8^{\circ} 28' N.$ Long. $103^{\circ} 05' E.$

25 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface, uneventful.

Noon Posit: Lat. $10^{\circ} 42' N.$ Long. $101^{\circ} 29' E.$

26 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface, uneventful.

Noon Posit: Lat. $11^{\circ} 20' N.$ Long. $100^{\circ} 05' E.$

27 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface, uneventful.

Noon Posit: Lat. $11^{\circ} 37' N.$ Long. $102^{\circ} 03' E.$

28 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface, uneventful.

Noon Posit: Lat. $11^{\circ} 21' N.$ Long. $100^{\circ} 59' E.$

29 May 1945.

0000 Headed north to patrol 12th north parallel.

0714 Submerged for patrol.

1205 Surfaced. Set course for station off SAMI BAY, THAILAND.

1737 Sighted KAO IAU ISLAND.

2200 Commenced patrolling north - south line between KAO IAU and mainland.

2237 SJ radar contact, range 9,000 yards (Ship Contact #10).

Subject: U.S.S. BERGALL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Commenced tracking and found target to be on course 160° T.,
speed 6 knots.

- 2250 Sound picked up screws on target bearing. Sighted target in moonlight and identified it as a small, stack-amidships steamer of about 400 tons.
- 2305 Went to Battle Stations Gun Attack. Closed range to 3000 yards and at
- 2321 opened fire with both 5"/25 guns. Fired 50 rounds of 5" ammunition, number of hits undetermined.
- 2359 Closed target and raked with 20 mm.

Noon Posit: Lat. 12° 00' N. Long. 100° 36' E.

30 May 1945.

- 0002 Ceased firing all guns and headed for loaded life boat.
- 0008 Went alongside life boat containing 12 persons, including one young woman. Survivors appeared to be natives so brought all those aboard who could climb the side. Four men were too badly wounded to move. We dressed the wounds of those on deck, bailed out the life boat, which was half flooded, and put our rubber boat in the water, as it was obvious their boat would not safely carry 12 persons. The survivors were Siamese, and they said (we think) that there were no Japanese aboard the ship. After fixing them up as best we could, we put 6 people in the rubber boat, 6 in the life boat, secured the rubber boat astern of the life boat, and secured the life boat to our stern with a tow line.
- 0015 Target sank, both visually and on radar screen.
- 0027 Exchanged recognition signals and calls with U.S.S. BERGALL by SJ radar.
- 0033 Went ahead at one third speed, towing the life boats astern. Range to the nearest land is 14 miles. Set course for THAILAND coast.
- 0100 BERGALL came close aboard for a short pow-wow.
- 0110 BERGALL shoved off and headed north.
- 0220 Brought the life boats alongside; we gave them a supply of fresh water, and medical kit, directions to the nearest land, now 4 miles away and clearly visible in the moonlight, and shoved them off. We were in 8 fathoms of water, and didn't feel warranted in going in any closer. We turned around and headed back for patrol line.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

0725 Submerged between KAY TAU and Mainland.

1500 Surfaced.

1501 Received message from pack commander to form scouting line off SINGORA, THAILAND. Headed south at 18 knots.

Noon Posit: Lat. $10^{\circ} 07' N.$ Long. $99^{\circ} 33' E.$

31 May 1945.

Patrolling on surface in five boat scouting line off KALAY coast.

Noon Posit: Lat. $8^{\circ} 12' N.$ Long. $100^{\circ} 55' E.$

1 June 1945.

Patrolling on surface in scouting line.

1657 Sighted float plane at range 12 miles, flying north along coast.

1659 Submerged.

1708 Surfaced.

1723 Talked to COBIA by megaphone. He says he has orders for COBIA and HAMBILL to search close in to coast after dark, and that he will look into LAKON ROADS.

1818 Sighted same plane returning from what appears to be a search of the coast north of SINGORA. We decided to close the coast just south of LAKON ROADS and make a close-in search toward SINGORA.

2330 Arrived at the coast 70 miles north of SINGORA and commenced search to south. For the next three hours the fathometer readings came up as anything from "too shallow to obtain a reading" to "four fathoms". We searched about forty miles of coast without contact.

Noon Posit: Lat. $8^{\circ} 11' N.$ Long. $100^{\circ} 59' E.$

2 June 1945.

0230 With the moon an hour high and visibility making this shallow water too risky, opened out to our position in the scouting line.

0430 Patrolling assigned scouting line.

1700 Departed scouting line for new patrol station in accordance with orders from Force Commander.

We decided to take a look into the anchorage at the mouth of the SAIBURI RIVER (Lat. $6^{\circ} 37' N.$, Long. $101^{\circ} 39' E.$), where, two days ago, search planes had reported a large ship anchored.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Noon Posit. Lat. 8° 08' N. Long. 100° 55' E.

3 June 1945

0100 Arrived off anchorage at mouth of SAIBURI RIVER. When 4,000 yards off the beach, turned around, shifted to battery propulsion, and backed into the anchorage. Much to our disappointment the anchorage was empty.

0130 Departed SAIBURI. Set course for MINGI ISLAND in the ANIBAS GROUP.

Noon Posit. Lat. 5° 44' N., Long. 103° 44' E.

4 June 1945

0400 Commenced patrolling station in general vicinity of a position bearing 315° T. 15 miles from MINGI ISLAND LIGHT.

Noon Posit. Lat. 3° 17' N. Long. 105° 25' E.

5 June 1945

Patrolling on surface. Uneventful.

Noon. Posit. Lat. 3° 29' N. Long. 105° 24' E.

6 June 1945

0302 SJ radar contact, range 25,000 yards. (Ship Contact #11).

0315 Identified target as properly marked hospital ship on course 030° T., speed 15 knots.

Noon Posit. Lat. 3° 24' N. Long. 105° 23' E.

7 June 1945

1045 Heard aircraft calling us on SAFFLE frequency using proper CT call. Answered call and were then asked in aircraft code (CSI 1270) to give our position. We did not consider this to be a very smart question, but felt that the plane would not have asked unless he had sufficient reason; possibly he is in trouble. Against our better judgement, we sent him our position. He then asked us for our VHF channel, which we gave him as DCG.

1120 SD radar contact, range 12 miles.

1121 Sighted PB4Y2 search plane. Plane commenced calling on VHF, using following call-up "HAMBILL from (proper plane Call)". This was repeated over and over until plane had closed us. We then were forced to answer up, despite our reluctance to answer such a call. We told the plane that he was using an improper call for us, and he told us he did not know our voice call. He then asked if there were other submarines in the vicinity. We answered this by asking him to interrogate his operations staff on both the voice calls for submarines and the location of the boats in his sector, and told him we considered he was making

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

serious violations of security on the voice radio. It was very discouraging to find this lack of coordination between aircraft and submarines after our outstanding success in this connection during our last patrol.

1150 Plane departed for base.

Noon Posit. Lat. 30° 37' N. Long. 105° 26' E.

8 June 1945

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

Noon Posit. Lat. 30° 16' N. Long. 105° 30' E.

9 June 1945

1250 Sighted unidentified submarine through high periscope. (Ship contact #12). When we still could not identify submarine at

1255 submerged and commenced closing.

1300 Exchanged recognition signals with U.S.S. THOROUGH via sound gear.

1314 Surfaced and exchanged calls by searchlight.

1650 SD radar contact, range 9 miles. Range closed to 3 miles, when we sighted FB4Y at very high altitude. Exchanged calls by VHF.

2255 SJ radar contact, range 5,000 yards. (Ship Contact #13). Turned stern to target as range closed rapidly to 3,000 yards. Sighted unidentified submarine. We flashed the recognition signal numerous times, without any answer from the target except an increased violence in his zigging. Commenced tracking. As there is only one friendly submarine this could possibly be, we sent a message in TORCO to U.S.S. THOROUGH, requesting his position, course, and speed.

We had his course to within one degree, speed right on.

Resumed patrol.

Noon Posit. Lat. 30° 24' N. Long. 105° 18' E.

10 June 1945

0600 Sent Hawkbill's Serial Three stating that operation order required our departure from area for base today. Received order to extend patrol until 15 June.

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

Noon Posit. Lat. 30° 07' N. Long. 105° 18' E.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

11 June 1945

0600 Sent Hawkbill's Serial Three stating that operation order required our departure from area for base today. Received orders to extend patrol until 15 June.

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

Noon Posit: Lat. $3^{\circ} 07' N.$ Long. $105^{\circ} 18' E.$

12 June 1945.

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

Noon Posit. Lat. $3^{\circ} 37' N.$ Long. $105^{\circ} 33' E.$

13 June 1945

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

Noon Posit: Lat. $3^{\circ} 30' N.$ Long. $105^{\circ} 18' E.$

14 June 1945

Uneventful; patrolling on surface.

2200 Sent Hawkbill's Serial Four giving time of departure from area.

Noon Posit. Lat. $3^{\circ} 22' N.$ Long. $105^{\circ} 23' E.$

15 June 1945

0258 Sighted properly marked hospital ship at range 25000 yards. (Ship Contact # 14). Ship was on course $210^{\circ} T.$, speed 12 knots.

1302 SD radar contact, range 15 miles.

1304 Sighted FB4Y2 search plane. Conversated with this plane, who is searching Sector 5, and Sector 6 plane joined in the conversation. Asked both planes to report any contacts in areas. Talked with Commander Mark Jensen, who was riding plane # 6.

1526 Plane reported on SAPPFLAN frequency that areas were clear to westward.

1700 Set course for entrance to JOINT ZONE enroute SUBIC BAY.

Noon Posit: Lat $3^{\circ} 48' N.$ Long. $105^{\circ} 53' E.$

16 June 1945.

1055 Sighted FB4Y2 at range 10 miles. No VHF communication; do not think he saw us.

Subject: U.S.S. MINNBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

-v- - - - -
1255 Sighted FB4Y2 at range 10 miles. Exchanged calls and pleasantries by VHF.

1349 SD radar contact, range 20 miles. Range opened to 23 miles. Not sighted.

Noon Posit: Lat. $8^{\circ} 37' N.$ Long. $109^{\circ} 53' E.$

17 June 1945

0900 Entered JOINT ZONE at POINT ANDY, two hours ahead of schedule.

1242 SD radar contact, range 18 miles.

1245 Sighted west bound FB4Y. Unable to contact on VHF.

1742 SD radar contact, range 16 miles.

1745 Sighted eastbound FB4Y. Exchanged calls by VHF.

1810 Sighted submarine bearing $070^{\circ} T.$, range 8 miles.

1820 Exchanged visual signals with U.S.S. SEASCOUT. (Ship Contact #15).

Noon Posit. Lat. $13^{\circ} 41' N.$ Long. $115^{\circ} 07' E.$

18 June 1945.

0445 SJ radar contact, range 29,000 yards, bearing $270^{\circ} T.$

0500 Exchanged challenge and calls with our escort, U.S.S. HUTCHINS. Proceeding to SUBIC BAY under escort.

Moored alongside U.S.S. ANTEDON at SUBIC BAY, P.I.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth Air Patrol.

(C) WEATHER

Weather in the Gulf of Siam was excellent. The sea was almost flat during the entire period HAMBILL was in this area. Although the sky was often overcast there were no days when it was impossible to take sun sights.

Off PULO LANGKAI, although the sun might be shining brightly the islands were frequently observed in mist and rain squalls, and would be invisible at ranges in excess of fifteen miles.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

In the Gulf of Siam tidal currents were diurnal, setting in general to the north during the hours near upper transit of the moon, and southeast during lower transit for a period of about four days before and four days after full moon.

In a position from ten to twenty-five miles northwest of PULO LANGKAI, in the Ananlas Islands, with an average wind of force two from the south, a set of 000° and drift of one knot was experienced.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No regularly lighted aids to navigation were observed in enemy controlled waters. On the night of 12 May 1945 a red light was observed on TANTONG BENDOH for a period of about fifteen minutes. It was later learned that BATA contacted a convoy just west of TANTONG BENDOH, headed west. It is believed that the observed red light was turned on to aid the Jap convoy in sounding TANTONG BENDOH.

On the night of 15 - 16 May 1945 about twenty minutes after sinking the YAEYARA (see narrative) an irregularly flashing white light was observed on TANTONG DUNGUN. It is believed that this was turned on to aid the convoy which the CM was escorting in sounding TANTONG DUNGUN.

(P) SAIL COINACTS

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	TOW Contacted	Remarks
1	0622 I 5-7-45	16-22 S 112-26 E	SS	9000 yards		SJ Radar	Believed Dutch ZMA. RDP. ISCH H.L.S. TERRAIN
2	1448 I 5-8-45	19-41 S 113-03 E	SS	14000 yards		Surface Periscope watch	
3	0930 I 5-10-45	11-10 S 115-20 E	SS	10300 yards		Surface Periscope watch	U.S.S. WARDEND
4	2032 I 5-12-45	6-30 S 110-18 E	SS	8000 yards		SJ Radar	U.S.S. BAY
5	0500 I 5-15-45	01-30 W 105-54 E	SS	10600 yards		SJ Radar	U.S.S. BRILL
6	0419 I 5-18-45	05-02 N 103-50 E	GM	16000 yards	1500 T 14 kts	SJ Radar	MINELAYER sunk
7	0436 I 5-19-45	08-05 N 102-22 E	SS	10500 yards		SJ Radar	U.S.S. COBIA
8	2219 I 5-22-45	08-20 N 103-00 E	SS	6000 yards		SJ Radar	U.S.S. BERGILL
9	0328 I 5-24-45	07-20 N 103-00 E	SS	8000 yards		SJ Radar	U.S.S. NURDIN
10	2237 I 5-29-45	10-17.1 N 99-33.4 E	Small Trawler 500 T.	9000 yards	1000 T 6 kts	SJ Radar	Siamese freighter sunk same with 5" gun fire.
11	0302 I 6-6-45	03-22 N 105-20 E	AM	25300 yards	0300 T 15 kts	SJ Radar	Properly marked hospital ship
12	1250 I 6-9-45	03-29 N 105-12 E	SS	12000 yards	1400 T 12 kts	Lookout	H.L.S. TACTUR
13	2255 I 6-9-45	03-27 N 105-14 E	SS	3000 yards	1650 T 11 kts	SJ Radar	H.L.S. THOROUGH
14	0258 I 6-15-45	03-28 N 105-37 E	AM	25000 yards		Lookout	Properly marked hospital ship
15	1810 I	14-07.0 N 116-30 E	SS	16000 yards	2550 T 12 kts	Surface Periscope watch	H.L.S. SEASCOTT Exchanged recognition signal by blinker

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Fourth Air Patrol.

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

Aircraft contacts were, in the main, friendly search planes, both PB4Y and PB4Y2. Aircraft were usually contacted by the SD search radar, at ranges of from 8 to 16 miles. An enemy aircraft, detected by radar at a range of 9 miles but not seen, was avoided by submergence. He dropped two ineffective depth bombs. Numerous float planes were observed on 11 May 1945 landing and taking off from an apparent base behind SAUBI ISLAND, in the KARGEAN GROUP. Communications with friendly search planes were more often unsatisfactory than not, it being usually impossible to raise them either on SHIPPLAN frequencies or VHF even when in visual range. Small enemy planes of the float type appear to search the MALAY coast in advance of coasting convoys.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HARBILL Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol No. 4

Time: 0523(I) Date: 16 May 1945. Lat: 4° 54' N. Long: 103° 28' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One CM HATSUTAKA Class in company with a small, (500 ton) freighter. The contact was made by radar at night. It was raining though the approach and attack, with visibility less than 1000 yards. All fire control was by SJ radar.

Ships Damaged: One CM, HATSUTAKA CLASS (EU)
Damage determined by seeing two torpedo hits.

Target Draft: 8' Course: 130 Speed: 14 Range: 2900

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 11 Course: 220 Depth: Surface Angle: Surface

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Night surface radar.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
TUBES						
Track Angle	90P	89.5P	91P	94.5P	96.5P	95.5P
Gyro Angle	001	000.5	358	354.5	352.5	354.5
Depth Set	3'	3'	3'	3'	3'	3'
Power	High	High	High	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Hit	Hit	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
TK. Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	66806	66918	64974	66920	65035	63543
TK. Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	25534	20856	20837	32583	20802	20874
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Action	- - -	Contact	Contact	- - -	- - -	- - -
TK warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	20579	34231	17397	20557	11155	34234
Explosive	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2
Firing Interval	- - -	8 sec	8 sec	8 sec	7 sec	7 sec
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
	0	2 R	1 R	1 L	2 L	0

Sea Conditions Calm

Overhaul Activity U.S.S. CLYTIE

Remarks: The first torpedo fired ran erratic to the left.

Time of Run: 1' 48" 1' 45"
Run in Yards 2820 2780 2700 2680 2620 2600

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HAWKBILL Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol No. 4

Time: 1044(I) Date: 16 May 1945 Lat: 40 52' N. Long: 103 28 E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

Description: One CP HATSUTAKA Class damaged night before by two torpedo hits, being towed by small 500 ton freighter. Contact made by periscope while submerged.

Ships Sunk: One CP, HATSUTAKA CLASS (EU)
Damage determined by seeing ship break in two and sink.

Target Draft: 8' Course: 007 Speed: 2 kts astern Range: 4200

OWN SHIP DATA

Speed: 2 knots Course: 224; Depth: 67' Angle: 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

Type Attack: Periscope, Submerged.

Tubes	3	4	5
Track Angle	34S	34.5S	35.5S
Gyro Angle	357° 30'	357° 40'	358° 30'
Depth Set	3'	3'	3'
Power	low	low	low
Hit or Miss	Miss	Hit	Miss
Erratic	Yes	No	No
MK. Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No	64982	20860	21131
Actuation Sec	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Action	- - -	Contact	- - -
MK. Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	20525	10908	20545
Explosive	TFX-2	TFX-2	TFX-2
Firing Interval	- - -	5 sec	7 sec
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
	0	1/2 R	1/2 L
Sea Conditions	Calm		
Overhaul Activity	U.S.S. CLYTIE		
Remarks:	The first torpedo fired ran erratic to the left.		
Time of Run		4' 18"	
Run in Yards	4740	4650	4550

Subject: U.S.S. HANKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

GUN ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HANKBILL

Gun Attack No. 1

Patrol No. 4

Time: 2300(I) Date: 29 May 1945 Lat: 10° 05' N Long: 99° 34' E

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

Sunk: One 400 ton Steamer (S.M.C.)
Damage Determined by: Target was observed to sink and disappeared from the radar screen.

DETAILS OF ACTION

The average firing range to the target was 2500 yards. 49 rounds of 5"/25 cal. ammunition (A.A. Com) were fired from the two 5 inch deck guns, 25 rounds from the forward gun, and 24 rounds from the after gun. Approximately 10 hits were observed. Radar ranges were used, and although visibility was good, pointers and trainers had considerable difficulty seeing the target through the gun sights.

After the 5 inch guns ceased firing, the target was closed and raked with 165 rounds of 20 m.m.

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(I) MINES

No mines were encountered. There is no effective mine field at REBANG, JAVA, and it is suggested as a profitable location for a submarine plant.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

No anti-submarine measures were encountered other than aircraft, and these were easily avoided. The minelayer damaged during the night of 15 - 16 May effectively held us out of range by using a heavy but indiscriminate barrage of 4.7" and 20 m.m. fire. He later directed this fire ineffectively at a shallow running torpedo approaching him in daylight, apparently with the intention of causing a premature.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(1) Hull and Machinery

(a) Hull - None.

(b) Main Engines

On 10 June, number one main engine evidenced difficulty in starting and emitted a black puff of smoke when units first fired.

This difficulty was traced to faulty injector operation, believed to be the result of improper injector overhaul during refit. Three injectors were completely replaced and six spray-tip and check valve assemblies were renewed.

Following this repair, while the engine was being tested on propulsion at 80-90 load, the temperature of Number two unit rapidly climbed to 750 degrees. The engine was secured and the cause determined to be that the pin connecting the micrometer rod to the fuel control rack of the unit had fallen out, permitting the injector to inject full fuel into the cylinder. Pin was replaced and cottered. Subsequent operation satisfactory.

(c) Mark VII Gyro Compass

On 21 May, sluggish and erratic operation of Mark VII gyro repeaters and radically increased gyro error gave indication that our old difficulties - follow-up motor trouble - were with us again.

The gyroscope was secured and upon inspection it was determined that bearings on the follow-up motor were frozen. The motor was replaced with the spare. Old motor was overhauled and fitted with new bearings.

Subject: U.S.S. ELABILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

Reason for this recurrent casualty is two-fold. At low latitudes, the rotors are operated at maximum speed thus tending to increase temperature of unit considerably. In addition, steering an anti-clock course causes the follow-up motor to be energized constantly. It becomes so hot during this type of operation that unprotected hands are burned upon contact. These combined sources of heat, therefore, drive grease from the follow-up motor bearings and the casualty follows. No ready method is provided for maintaining grease in these bearings. Necessity of removing motor in order to repack bearings indicates that re-design of bearing lubrication is of utmost importance.

On 23 May the follow-up circuit and amplifying circuit were checked with the Weston meter for correct resistance readings, since it was felt that the amplifying-circuit resistance might be burned out. Readings, however, were found to be relatively close to those specified.

On 11 June the casualty again occurred. Same method of repair - renewal of follow-up drive motor - was followed. Gyroscope again operated satisfactorily.

Two other times during the patrol, at intervals of roughly one week, noisy operation of the gyro necessitated securing it. In both cases the follow-up motor was removed and replaced with the spare. And in both cases, bearing operating was sticky because of grease loss. The necessity of improved design or revised methods of operation cannot be over-emphasized.

(2) Ordnance and Gunnery

(a) Torpedoes

Two Mark 14-3A torpedoes were observed to run erratic in deflection. The first, torpedo number 66806, was fired from tube number one in torpedo attack number one. The second, torpedo number 64952, was fired from tube number three in torpedo attack number two. Both ran to the left. No cause for these erratic runs could be determined.

All Mark 14-3A torpedoes were observed to smoke excessively. No cause for this could be determined.

(b) Gunnery

A small, slow leak in the hydraulic foot firing mechanism of the forward 5 inch gun necessitated hand firing on the night of 29 May. Frequent filling during the remainder of the patrol kept the mechanism operative.

The trainer's sight on the after 5 inch gun flooded out prior to the gun action on the twenty ninth of May. All sights are

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

unsatisfactory for night action. Pointers and Trainers had great difficulty in seeing the target on the night firing of 29 May.

The after gun failed to fire three times during the above mentioned gun action. One failure was due to a defective primer. The other two are believed to have been caused by a maladjustment of the camshaft which prevented the breech block from lining up true with the breech block guide. In both of these instances the firing pin failed to function. Removal and reloading of the shell permitted continuance of fire.

The 40 m.m. loader was found to be frozen, and prevented the gun's use on 29 May. The loader had been exercised the previous night with dummy rounds, and weekly lubrication routines had been carried out. On June 13 the gun was test fired, and failed to return to battery after firing the first round. The gun returned to battery by itself before any attempt was made to remedy the defect. This is believed to have been caused by grit or burrs on the guide or guide ways. Weekly test firing of this gun, when practicable, is of great advantage in keeping all parts exercised.

(L) RADIO

We copied VIKO until 15 May and NPT 1 from then until the end of the patrol. Two serials, IRAY of 12 May and PETER of 14 May, were missed from the VIKO Baker schedule. The main difficulty encountered was weather conditions. VIKO was copied on 4370, 9250, and 12630 kcs. No jamming was encountered on VIKO schedule.

On 15 May, we shifted to NPT 1 using same frequencies as VIKO. The difficulties encountered in copying NPT 1 until 29 May were numerous. Until that date, signal strength was very low, a shift in frequency of several dial divisions was noted on several occasions, and the tape was running very poorly. During this period, three serials were missed, 10 of 16 May, Peter of 16 May, and Uncle of 20 May. Since 29th of May conditions have been satisfactory indicating that the difficulties were attributable to the newness of the station. On copying NPT 1, we have used 9250 kcs. almost continuously, finding it to be the best.

Safplan frequencies were guarded north of the barrier. Communications were satisfactory on these frequencies. It is again recommended that the amount of transmissions and testings on Safplan frequencies be drastically reduced.

Communication with aircraft on the safplan frequency and VHF was satisfactory. However, some difficulty has been encountered due to the increasing number of aircraft and submarine calls. It is to be hoped that this confusion will be ironed out in the future. In accordance with CTF-71 Serial William of 30 May we guarded 4475 kcs. between 0730 - 1000 and 1900 - 2100 Item daily when in the Palawan search plane sectors.

In accordance with CTF-71 Serial Love of 2 March, a log of signal

Subject: U.S.S. HINKBIE - Report of Fourth War Patrol

strengths accompanies this report.

It is recommended that NPT 1 receipt and authenticate messages received via ship - shore on Baker Schedule. This a guarantee that messages are received by NPT 1.

For material failures, the pot metal rack teeth on the band switching units in the RBH receiver were consistently breaking off. This caused a complete failure of the equipment.

The TBL transmitter, when used with the present 60 foot antennas, needs a 20 ampere antenna current meter in place of 10 ampere meter in the HF section.

The operation of our new antenna system has been satisfactory. Due to the additional deck gun forward, the three originally constructed 100 foot half-wave wing antennas were replaced with three 60 foot half-wave length antennas erected amidships running fore and aft of the bridge superstructure. Transmission has been satisfactory. Therefore, we assume that the field strength has not been affected to any appreciable value. Since there has been no occasion throughout the patrol to operate on the intermediate frequencies, this assumption can only be made on the higher frequency bands. There has been no noticeable effect on the reception of radio signals.

COMMUNICATION - SHIP TO SHIP

Serial One - Originated 101915 (May). First call VIXO at 1922. Answered on Baker Schedule at 1928. Received for at 1950. Resent as #367 on Baker Schedule. Frequency - 8470 kcs.

An urgent message was originated at 152130 (May). Could not raise NPT 1. Called VHA 1. Sent message to VHA 1 but were told that he was being interfered with and to repeat. NPT 1 finally came in and told us to go ahead. We were forced to dive due to approaching daylight before we could send the message.

Serial Two - Originated 161209 (May). First call to NPT 1 at 1222. Again we could not raise NPT 1. Called VHA 1 at 1235 and were answered immediately being told to wait. Received for at 1255. Frequency - 8470 kcs.

Serial Three - Originated 092117 (June). First call to NPT 1 on 8470 kcs. at 2127. For the third time, we were unable to raise NPT 1. This we cannot understand. Called NAO at 2140. Shifted to 4235 kcs. at 2143. First call to NAO at 2150. Answered by VIXO at 2152. Received for by VIXO at 2202. Resent by NPT 1 at 2257 as Baker number 457. Frequency - 4235 kcs.

Serial Four - Originated 160107 (June). First call to NPT 1 at 0110. Answered by NPT 1 at 0114. At 0120 NPT 1 told us they were being interfered with. It was necessary to repeat several groups. At 0130 NPT 1 receipted for message. Resent by NPT 1 at 0206 as Baker number 575. Frequency - 8470 kcs.

Subject: U.S.S. MINIBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(II) RADAR

- SJ-1 The operation of the SJ has been satisfactory with four exceptions. The high voltage rectifier (range indicator) failed. This failure, because of modifications made for the ST radar, caused the loss of horizontal sweep control, focus control, and receiver tuning. The video cable from the range indicator was intermittently opened due to poor installation. This gave a spoked wheel effect. There were false echoes on the main sweep with the transmitter off-keyed caused by a loose coaxial cable fitting. Two 5HF1 cathode ray tubes failed causing a loss of intensity control. One has been in operation since commissioning. The relative power output has been constant and ringtime constant for the entire run. The transmitter unit, when pushed all the way into its case and securely screwed down, caused oscillations in the range indicator unit. The trouble was traced to a faulty interlock in the transmitter. Since the installation of the ST radar, the LP4 tube in the range indicator will not light. Landfalls were picked up at the extreme range of the equipment. The initial range to a minelayer was 16,000 yards. The average initial range to submarines were 10,000 yards. We obtained a range of 17,000 yards on H.M.S. THOROUGH. A range of 29,000 yards on a hospital ship was obtained. We also picked up a lighthouse at 23,280 yards.
- ST Although this equipment was not used during the patrol, we cannot say that the equipment was operating satisfactorily. Constant drift of the beat frequency oscillator necessitated tuning of the transmitter unit. Late in the patrol we found that by reducing the length of the probe on the beat oscillator, we partially eliminated this drift. We did get a landfall of 40,000 yards after this adjustment.
- SD-4 The operation of the SD has been satisfactory throughout the patrol. Landfalls ranged up to 55 miles. Aircraft ranges were up to 30 miles.
- BF The operation of the BF has been satisfactory with one exception. The failure of a 10 MFD., 600 volt filter capacitor in the low voltage rectifier circuit caused the 15E transmitter tube and two 5U4G rectifier tubes to burn out and arc. This failure necessitated retuning of the equipment. Saturation IFF response was obtained at 30 miles.
- ABK-7 The operation of the ABK-7 has been satisfactory.
- AFR-1 The operation of the AFR has been satisfactory. The installation of the directional antenna system has been of great value in locating shore stations and aircraft. However, upon installation of the ST transmitter in the control room and the installation of directional AFR antenna system, pick-up of RF energy from SJ via ST cables, and eliminating cross-overs, pick-up was cut down to only a few frequencies. It is recommended that CLYTIE installations be replaced with longer lead-

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

ins in order to displace them further from SF cable runs.

ARC-4 The operation of the ARC-4 was satisfactory with one exception. On two occasions, we were unable to establish communications with the BATA and the BRILL. We retuned the ARC, increasing the power output 0.15 milliamperes. This increased power output was apparent on the APR microammeter. Communication on each call-up thereafter has been immediate.

DAS-3 The operation of the DAS-3 was satisfactory. Troubles were limited to normal tube failures.

(E) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

The operation and performance of the sound equipment was satisfactory throughout the patrol.

Sound listening conditions were fair. During the submerged approach JF bearings averaged two degrees in error. Both JF and JB picked up the target a sea truck with a tow making three knots, at approximately five thousand yards. On one occasion JB lost contact on a friendly sub at fifty five hundred yards. after tracking it out from close aboard. Reduced sound listening conditions during the greater part of the patrol were mainly the result of shallow water.

A torpedo detection watch was maintained on the CA-2 gear during surface cruising and normal operations submerged.

There were no material failures.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

A sharp two degree negative gradient at seventy feet was recorded north of Fulo Tenggol in the Siam Gulf entrance. All other bathythermograph traces were isothermal.

(F) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

Health in general was satisfactory. Five cases of urithritis, venereal character undetermined, were successfully treated. A severe case of cellulitis was treated with penicillin. One case of catarrhal fever was treated.

The usual number of lacerations were suffered, including one of serious proportions requiring twelve sutures. A possible arm fracture has been splinted until X-ray is available.

Food has been adequate, tastefully prepared and fattening. Presence of roaches indicates fumigation is required.

Habitability remains good due to the surface character of HAMBILL's patrols. A booster cooler for the forward part of the ship would no doubt increase the comfort, especially of the forward torpedo room, but is by no means necessary.

Subject: U.S.S. HARKBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol	9
(b) Number of men on board during patrol	80
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol	56
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol	73
(e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol	8

(R) MILES STEAMER - FUEL USED

Fremantle to Area	1400 miles	16,000 gallons
In Area	9325 miles	83,500 gallons
Area to Subic Bay	380 miles	7,000 gallons

(S) DURATION

Days enroute to area	5
Days in area	38
Days enroute to base	2
Days submerged	1

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE RELIABILITY

<u>TORPEDOES</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>PROVISIONS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL FACTOR</u>
11		14	14

(U) COMMUNICATIONS, RADAR, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

COMMUNICATIONS COUNTERMEASURES

Definite jamming was encountered on 25 May. This was the only instance. Our position was 10° 52' N. 100° 23' E. During the broadcast of the 1200 z schedule (2100 Item) indiscriminate CW keying began and ended with the schedule.

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

There was no evidence of jamming during the patrol. No deception was apparent on the part of the enemy, and none was employed by ourselves other than keying of SJ radar.


The following enemy radar signals were intercepted:

- (1) 10 May 1945. 25 miles south of LOMBOK STRAIT. 150/1200/2. This is probably a type 3 special model Mark 6 airborne surface search as listed in Addendum ' to Annex Baker of CTG-71.1 Op Order No. 61-45.
- (2) 10 May 1945. 10 miles south of LOMBOK 198/1050/4. This

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

is probably a land based early warning air search radar located on LOBON ISLAND as listed in Addendum I to Annex Baker of CPG-71.1 Op Order No. 61-45.

- (3) 11 May 1945. Vicinity Mangene Islands 150/1200/3. This is probably a type 3 Special Model Mark 6 airborne surface search as listed above.
- (4) 2 June 1945. 150/750/5. Our position, $8^{\circ} 10' N.$ $100^{\circ} 54' E.$, would indicate that this was not the submarine radar having these characteristics as listed in CINC Pacific Fleet and CINCPAC CM and D Bulletin Serial 01712. This radar was keyed intermittently. However, we could find no other type radar with the above characteristics listed in our information.
- (5) 3 June 1945. $03^{\circ} 33' N.$ $105^{\circ} 20' E.$ 160/500/7. This radar is probably the one reported by the U.S.S. HARBHEAD on Anambas Island. This is probably an aircraft search radar Mark 1 Model 3. Since we spent some time off PULO HANRI Island, we were able to study the characteristics of this radar more fully. The minimum range is 1200 yards. This station is not operating at maximum efficiency. Double pulsing of the transmitter is indicated consistently, the pulse length increasing five microseconds over the normal pulse length of $6\frac{1}{2}$ microseconds. Frequent periods of maintenance activity in which he is obviously tuning his equipment have been observed. The hours of operation are very erratic. It has a rotating antenna and a beam width of approximately 25 degrees, and the antenna is not power trained at all times. Below are wave-form sketches as observed on the SPA viewing screen.



(V) REMARKS.

Comsub 7th Fleet letter Serial 0243 of 2 February 1945 has been complied with.

It is suggested that a two boat coordinated group could profitable be disposed, one to the northwest of, and one south of PULO TENGGOI, MALAYA. The reason for two boats is that each may give warning to the other in the case of traffic approaching from his direction, especially during daylight. The depth of water is not conducive to submerged attack, but the suggested disposition permits the contacting boat to give sufficient warning to the other to permit warning to the other to

Subject: U.S.S. HAMBILL - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

permit his attaining a position for night attack.

A submarine mine plant is suggested for the shallow stretch between
SINGORA and LARON ROADS, THAILAND. (7° 30' N., 100° 30' E.)

We lay close to the dubious distinction of being the first U. S.
Submarine to sink a ship east of the 100th east meridian.

Serial: (0177)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
26 June 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO HAWKBILL Conf. ltr.
SS366/A16-3 Serial 07
dated 18 June 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX,
To : The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
(3) The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. The FOURTH war patrol of HAWKBILL was conducted in the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea and lasted for 45 days, of which 38 days were spent in the area north of the Barrier.
2. Only one contact worthy of torpedo fire was made. This occurred in the early morning hours of 16 May, off PULO TENGGOL, and appeared as a single target on the SJ radar making 14 knots on a southeasterly course. The approach was conducted entirely by radar in poor visibility. The appearance of another small radar pip in the later stages of the approach indicated the presence of an escort, and six mark 14 torpedoes were fired forward with small gyros at a range of 2800 yards on a 90 port track. Depth set was 3 feet in calm water. The first torpedo was seen to run off to the left. The other five apparently ran normally, and No. 2 and 3 were seen and heard to hit. A spread coverage of 4 degrees was used which is considered ample in view of the fact that only radar bearings were used.
3. As the target failed to sink, a second attack was made submerged later the same morning, at which time the target was seen to be a GM of the HATSUTAKA class (EC) of 2000 tons. She was being towed stern first by a small sea truck, about 3000 yards off shore. A long range shot was necessary in order not to lose the target, and three mark 14-3A's were fired from the bow tubes in low power with a torpedo run of about 4600 yards in a 30 starboard track (150 port track considering her reverse direction of motion.) Depth was again set at three feet, and a total spread of 1 degree was used. This remarkable shot produced one hit amidships which immediately sank the CM, leaving her bow projecting vertically. It was learned later with great satisfaction that this was probably the same CM that had given COBIA a bad time a few days before with depth charges. Heavy gun fire of all calibres from the target failed to divert the hitting torpedo. All torpedo wakes were in clear view, emphasized by a smoke trail. The sea truck made off into a nearby river and could not be located after surfacing about twenty minutes later.

Serial: (0177)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
26 June 1945.FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO HAWKBILL Conf. ltr.
SS366/A16-3 Serial 07
dated 18 June 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

4. On the evening of 29 May, while surface patrolling near KAW TAU in the Gulf of Siam, HAWKBILL picked up on the SJ radar a small coastal steamer of about 400 tons (EU), and after tracking her at six knots on a southeasterly course, closed her to 3000 yards and attacked with both 5 inch guns and all 20 mm guns in moderate moonlight. The steamer was seen to sink at midnight, while HAWKBILL was assisting 12 SIAMESE survivors in a life boat. HAWKBILL's rubber boat was donated and both boats were given a ten mile tow towards land, being finally cut loose four miles from the coast of THAILAND. Directions and supplies were furnished the survivors.

5. On 6 June a properly marked hospital ship was sighted at 3-22 north, 105-20 east, and tracked as heading northeast at 15 knots. A second hospital ship was sighted during the midwatch on 15 June only a few miles from the first one, and on a reverse course.

6. A total of eleven friendly submarine contacts were made, and many plane contacts were made, both friendly and enemy. Two aircraft bombs were dropped after HAWKBILL dived for an aircraft radar contact, with no damage.

7. Again the lack of effective night sights for the five inch gun was felt, and a jury rig clamp-on adapter for regular 7X50 binoculars is being experimented with, until the binocular sights arrive in this area.

8. The Commanding Officer is assured that the Communications difficulties between our planes and our submarines are rapidly being improved by placing submarine officers of adequate rank at the major plane bases, both Army and Navy, to act as liaison between the aircraft and the submarine. The HAWKBILL's voice contact with Commander JENSEN is an example of such liaison.

9. The circumstances of the numerous casualties to the master gyro follow-up motor are being investigated, as this condition appears to be unique with HAWKBILL.

10. One definite torpedo was avoided by sound the evening of 20 May, and heard to pass down the port side.

11. The recommendation that NPTI receipt for submarine messages on their regular schedule is concurred in.

12. HAWKBILL arrived in an exceptionally clean condition and will be refitted in the normal period.

Serial: (0177)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
26 June 1945.FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO HAWKBILL Conf. ltr.
SS366/A16-3 Serial 07
dated 18 June 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LSubject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

13. The Squadron Commander congratulates HAWKBILL on the elimination of a valuable minelayer whose activities as a convoy escort have no doubt troubled many submarines. Club Cisco will proudly display the life ring as proof of HAWKBILL's success. It is recommended that she be credited with the following:

S-U-N-K

1 CM (HATSUTKE Class) (EC)	-----	2000 tons
1 AK (EU)	-----	<u>400</u> tons
TOTAL SUNK	-----	2400 tons

B. E. Bacon, Jr.
B. E. BACON, Jr.

Serial 0175-A

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

3 July 1945


SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
 USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3 Serial 07, dated
 18 June 1945. Report of
 Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
 To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
 Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.
 Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS-366) - Report of Fourth War
 Patrol - Comment on.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS-366) under the command of Commander F. W. SCANLAND, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in the GULF of SIAM and SOUTH CHINA SEA areas. The excellent, aggressive, and thorough area coverage was characteristic of this experienced and skillful Commanding Officer.

2. The HAWKBILL, in sinking a HATSUTAKA Class minelayer, won the hearty congratulations of all submariners in the Southwest Pacific area. This troublesome escort was identified by the COBIA as the one who had given her a bad depth charging a few days before. Other patrol reports from the SIAM GULF area indicate that this same escort vessel has caused our submarines considerable trouble. In order to sink this valuable target the HAWKBILL had to maneuver in the close vicinity of a known Allied Minefield. The first of two daring attacks was delivered on the surface one and one quarter miles from the northwest edge of the minefield and in 17 fathoms of water. Two hits stopped the target but did not sink her and in the face of a continuous barrage of gunfire from the target's 4 inch and 20 MM guns for the next hour and a half until daylight, another surface attack was out of the question. The HAWKBILL, however, refusing to let this two thousand ton minelayer escape, submerged; crossed one edge of the minefield, and delivered the coup de grace 1,500 yards from the western edge of the field in 17 fathoms of water, in a long-range, low power attack which speaks extremely well for the efficiency of fire control party of this veteran ship and crew. From this attack position the HAWKBILL had a 12 mile run to get into water deeper than 20 fathoms.

3. The HAWKBILL's unfortunate and embarrassing experience with a Navy search plane whose questions, if they had been answered, would have compromised not only the HAWKBILL's position but that of several other submarines, was due to the fact that the pilot had not



Serial 0175-A

3 July 1945

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
 USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3 Serial 07, dated
 18 June 1945. Report of
 Fourth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS-366) - Report of Fourth War
 Patrol - Comment on.

been properly briefed prior to leaving his base. Submarine Liaison Officers have been with the Navy air search commands in this area since February 1945 and are attempting to prevent such incidents from happening.

4. The award of Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.

5. The Force Commander congratulates the HAWKBILL on her aggressiveness in penetrating shallow water to sink another of the enemy's dwindling forces. The HAWKBILL is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S-U-N-K

1 CM (HATSUTAKA Class) (EC) 2,000 Tons
 1 AK (EU) 400 Tons

Total Sunk. 2,400 Tons.

James Fife
 JAMES FIFE

ORIGINAL COPY.

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(3)	Direct	CTG-71.8	(2)
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Com2ndFlt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-22	(1 each)
Com7thFlt	(2)		DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)
ComSubslstFlt	(30)		DivComsSubRon-30	(1 each)
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CTG-71.5	(2)		SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
			S/Ms 7thFlt	(1)

J. B. Miller
 J. B. MILLER,
 Flag Secretary.

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR TO ENTRY
 INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS.

7 05336

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

REG. NO F-664
R. S. NO 7-05336
REG. SHEET NO 294

A16-3(8)(F-3c/cgj)

Serial: 04218

21 JUL 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS HAWKBILL conf
ltr A16-3, serial 07,
dated 18 June 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS-366) - Report of Fourth
War Patrol - comment on.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet heartily congratulates the HAWKBILL for her tenacious efforts in sinking a Jap minelayer which had caused considerable trouble to the Submarines of this fleet.

T. C. Kinraid

T. C. KINRAID

Copy to:
ComSubs7th
ComSubRon-26
CO USS HAWKBILL

151004

U.S.S. HARBILL (SS366)

SS366/A16-3
Serial (011)

c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
19 August 1945.

~~C-O-FLEETPOSTOFFICE-A-L~~
DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. HARBILL.
 To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
 Via : (1) Commander Submarine Division 261.
 (2) Commander Submarine Squadron 26.
 (3) Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet.
 (4) Commander Seventh Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
 (B) Track Chart (To Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet only).

1. Enclosure (A), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in Gulf of Siam, Tonkin Gulf, and South China Sea during the period 12 July 1945 to 19 August 1945, is forwarded herewith.

F.M. Scanland
 F.M. SCANLAND, jr.

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.1C
 BY OP-0989C DATE 5/30/72

DECLASSIFIED

141961

Subject: U.S.S. KAMBI Report of Fourth War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE

Returned from fourth war patrol 18 June 1945. Between 19 June and 2 July 1945 underwent normal refit from U.S.S. ANTHEDON at SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

3 July 1945 ship's company returned to the ship from C.M.F. COE for period of loading and training. Loaded 12 MK. XVIII-1 forward, 6 MK. XIV-3A, and 3 MK. XVII torpedoes aft. Loaded 112 additional rounds of 5" ammunition in the four spare racks forward.

On 12 July 1945 training and loading completed, ship ready for sea.

The following officers and C.P.O.s are aboard for this patrol and have made the indicated number of patrols, including this one:

SCANLON, F.W., jr	Comdr.	7
TUCKER, F.B.	Lt-Comdr.	5
FOCILLE, L.R.	Lieut.	5
THOMPSON, L.E.	Lieut.	3½
CHRISTOFFER, G.A.	Lieut.(jg)	5
MURPHY, R.L.	Lieut.(jg)	11
ROMAN, L.M.	Lieut.(jg)	2
MC CREDY, E.J.	Lieut.(jg)	½
LUZZY, R.W.	Lieut.(jg)	3
BARKLEY, E.L.	Ensign	3
KELLY, H.B., jr	Ensign	2
BLY, D. (n)	CMOM(LA)(T)	10
CALLAHAN, S., jr	CRM(PA)(T)	5
NORDE, E.L.	CMOM(LA)(T)	5
ODON, R.D.	CEM(AA)(T)	9
PETROVSKY, J.M.	CEM(AA)(T)	10
PRUDEN, D. (n)	CGM(AA)(T)	6
ROERE, W.R.	CPM(AA)(T)	5
ORTON, R. (n)	CCS(AA)(T)	12½

(B) NARRATIVE

ALL TIMES ARE IPEN, ZONE -9

12 July 1945.

1400 Departed SUBIC BAY, P.I.

1500 Fired all guns at target towed by U.S.S. COUC.L.

1600 Gave services to DE escort as target for sound runs.
Made trim dive.

1700 Radar tracking exercises and surface radar approaches
to on escorts.

2000 :

Inspection of motor room disclosed J. KAFUSHYNSKI, Flc,

Subject: U.S.S. ANTHEM, U.S.S. ANTHEM, U.S.S. ANTHEM, U.S.S. ANTHEM

U.S.M., U.S.S. ANTHEM, together with all his belongings, stowed away. Escort came close aboard, put a boat in the water, and took our stowaway for return to his ship.

2300 Dropped escort, proceeding out JOINT ZONE.

13 July 1945.

1539 SD radar contact, range 17 miles. Not sighted.

Noon Posit. Lat. 13° 34' N., Long. 115° 34' E.

14 July 1945.

1216 SD radar contact, range 25 miles. Not sighted.

Noon Posit. Lat. 10° 26' N., Long. 113° 49' E.

15 July 1945.

Enroute area. Uneventful.

Noon Posit. Lat. 8° 10' N., Long. 108° 54' E.

16 July 1945.

0947 SD radar contact, range 24 miles. Not sighted.

2150 Made rendezvous with BRILL to deliver radar part. (Ship contact #1).

Noon Posit. Lat. 7° 02' N., Long. 104° 59' E.

17 July 1945.

0443 Made rendezvous with HAMMERHEAD to deliver patrol instructions for this pack. (Ship contact #2).

0829 Submerged for patrol close to coast of MALAYA just south of TULO TENGGOL.

1029 Surfaced.

1040 Boarding party boarded large southbound junk for inspection of cargo. Found junk heavily loaded with about 50,000 pounds of rice, Singapore bound. We removed the crew of nine to our forecabin and sank the junk with the 40 m.m. gun.

1200 Delivered crew of this junk to another smaller junk.

1213 Submerged.

1455 Surfaced and inspected another junk, northbound. He was carrying rock ballast, so we let him go.

1540 Submerged and continued patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

2013 Surfaced.

Noon Posit. Lat. 04° 43.5' N., Long. 103° 39' E.

18 July 1945.
0730 Submerged for patrol.

HAWKBILL is coordinating the movements of the three boats assigned to this area, which includes those parts of areas D-1, D-2, and D-3 south of 7° N. Since experience has shown that all enemy traffic in this area, both north bound and south bound, hugs the Malay coast, the plan for patrolling is to place HAWKBILL close to shore off TANJONG LABUAN, COD close to shore about 30 miles north of HAWKBILL and HAMMERHEAD close to shore just south of PULO REDANG, which puts the three boats along the coast and spaced about 30 miles apart. Inasmuch as a daylight submerged attack is a most difficult problem, to say the least, in this shallow water (each boat is between 5 and 10 miles inside the 20 fathom curve) the disposition is essentially a reconnaissance line, the plan being to allow any but the most important targets to go by, then surface and make the contact report to alert the other boats for night surface attack. To facilitate this, and work with the search planes, each boat will guard SAFFLAN frequency on the submerged antenna five minutes each hour on the hour. The planes have been advised of this arrangement. HAWKBILL and HAMMERHEAD are now in position, and COD should join us tonight. He has been told where to patrol, and to try to arrive after dusk so as not to be sighted. A copy of the patrol instructions issued to the boats is included in section (V) of this report.

- 0914 Sighted low-wing float plane, similar to RUFFE, flying along coast from south to north. Hope this forecasts a north bound convey.
- 1724 Sighted another plane flying along coast.
- 1817 Sighted still another plane, and right under him, masts and stacks of a ship, bearing 190° T., range 14,000 yards. (Ship contact #3). Took a fathometer reading -- 4½ fathoms under the keel.
- 1825 Battle stations torpedo attack. Identified target as a KAMIKAZE class destroyer. He is making 14 knots, and doing the fanciest zig plan it has ever been our misfortune to watch. He appeared to be making figure eights, extending each northerly leg so as to keep ahead of the convey he is escorting. He is about four thousand yards ahead of the convey and 4000 yards off shore. Convey appears to consist of two small tankers,

Subject: _____

about 2000 and 1000 tons respectively, a small AI of about 800 tons, and three other escorts of the IPE type. We finally managed, by dint of much twisting and turning, to get the sights on the Kamikaze, and at

1902 fired six MK XVIII-1 torpedoes from the bow tubes, range 2200 yards, track 110° P., gyros 30° left, depth set at 4 feet.

1903 Target turned hard right towards the beach, presenting a 180° angle on bow, and neatly combing all torpedoes. We are uncertain as to whether this was part of his zig zag, or he detected the approaching torpedoes. The latter seems to be indicated, as from this time on he knew we were there. Commenced a reload forward, in the meantime making a track like a water bug trying to keep our stern tubes bearing on him.

1910 Two depth charges, to discourage us. For the next hour he milled around at about 3000 yards range, apparently circling us, and then he spun on his heel and headed right for us. Fortunately we had managed to keep tail to him, and when the range was 1000 yards, angle on the bow zero, at

2009 fired three MK. XIV-3A torpedoes with MK. 10 exploders from aft, torpedo run 700 yards, gyro angles near 180°, 4° spread, down the throat.

Left the periscope up fully expecting to see him blow up in our faces. Either the torpedoes under ran him, or the run was shorter than calculated and the torpedoes were not aimed, because he kept right on coming. Could see all hands on the Kamikaze pointing at the scope. Started the periscope down, and had lowered it about halfway when he went roaring overhead and let go with the works. Hawkbill leaped, shuddered, and shook like a thing alive -- but she held. We lost power on everything and shot to the surface with a 20° up angle, exposing 60 feet of the forecastle, and putting the bow 20 feet into the air. The executive officer had the presence of mind to call for "all back full" over the phone to maneuvering room, while the C.O. passed the word to destroy all classified equipment in the ship. Flooded negative tank, stopped the motors, and hit bottom at eighteen fathoms. Fortunately, the order to destroy did not get through the ship, although all destructors were connected. (It is pertinent, we think, to note that we had six sea bags chock full of secret and confidential papers, weighted for jettisoning, and still had plenty left over). Kamikaze drew off and commenced a deliberate and systematic search and approach, and at

Subject: U.S.S. THUNDERBOLT - Report of Fifth Air Patrol.

- 2104 passed directly over the conning tower. The roar of his screws heard through the hull was a sound none of us will ever forget. We held our breath, but nothing happened. At
- 2122 he passed directly overhead a second time. Again nothing happened. We can't understand it -- we can hear his pinging, even through the hull, and he certainly has us spotted in. Issued brandy to all hands; a great morale booster and nerve steadier.
- 2134 Again he passed directly overhead, and immediately thereafter a terrific noise started, clearly audible throughout the ship, and sounded as though we had a high pressure air leak outside the boat, but a check on all gages failed to show any such leak. This noise persisted for an hour, and our best guess is that it may be a counter measure against an acoustic weapon.
- 2155 A fourth time he passed over, but astern, and this time he dropped a four charge pattern which did no more than bounce us around. We rather think he has us marked up as a definite kill and is just cutting us in for future salvage.
- 2248 Two more charges, well off.

Noon Posit. Lat. 04° 16' N., Long. 103° 38' E.

19 July 1945.

- 0016 Not having heard our friend for over half an hour, left the bottom, and at
- 0032 surfaced. Stood out toward PULO TENGGOL to clear the area and take stock of our damage, which appears to be as follows:
- (1) Neither periscope will raise.
 - (2) QB and JC out of commission.
 - (3) Both gyro angle regulators out of commission.
 - (4) The mercury gone from the master and auxiliary gyro compasses.
 - (5) Lobe-switching gone in the SJ radar.
 - (6) SD radar out of commission and unable to raise the mast.
 - (7) Searchlight literally smashed.
 - (8) Starboard antenna down.
 - (9) Two radio receivers and the TEL transmitter out.
 - (10) Enough broken crockery, light fixtures, tile decking, etc. to start a junk yard.

Sent message to HAMMERHEAD and COD directing them to form a scouting line on the convoy's probable course,

Subject: U.S.S. *Hammerhead* (SS-332) (S-332)

- went to 17 knots, and started getting the ship back in fighting shape. By
- 0700 All equipment was back in shape with the exception of items (3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) of the above list.
- 0730 Arrived in our position as center boat off the scouting line.
- 0741 Sighted aircraft in the early dawn light, and submerged.
- 1028 Sighted aircraft, and right under him, masts and stacks of the *KAMIKAZE*. (Ship contact #4).
- 1050 Battle stations torpedo attack, still working frantically on the gyro angle regulators. This approach was a repetition of yesterday evenings, except that we could never get within 3000 yards of our target. He was everywhere, ahead of the convoy, astern of it, twisting and turning, and in general being very difficult. Finally got the regulators working. We wish now we had given up the *Kamikaze* and gone after the convoy, for although they were small, it would have been some compensation for our efforts to have sunk one of them, but we held a deep grudge against this destroyer, and kept after him. During our approach he dropped 19 charges, none on us. Finally at
- 1312 we were forced to give up the attack, as he had gotten around us. In two and a half hours we made the tubes ready four times, only to have him turn away from us. At one time we counted five aircraft over the convoy.
- 1525 Surfaced and commenced end around.
- 1532 Sighted two aircraft at six miles, headed for us.
- 1533 Submerged.
- 1618 Sighted aircraft through periscope.
- 1649 Sighted three aircraft through periscope, range 1 mile.
- 1858 Sighted aircraft.
- 1915 Sighted aircraft.
- 1948 Sighted two aircraft. They are keeping this area well covered, and have very effectively put us out of the picture.
- 2055 Surfaced, too far astern of the convoy to catch them

Subject: 3rd Submarine Squadron Report of Operations

they are once again in 15 fathoms of water, and we feel we've had enough of that kind of submarining to last us a while. This ended a debacle, and our hats are off to the best Jap escort skipper it's been our misfortune to meet. Sent message to HAMMERHEAD and COD to rendezvous at discretion.

Our only damage which appears to be permanent now is no low-power visibility in the attack periscope, although high-power is usable, no lobe-switching in the SJ radar, and no SD radar. Set course for our patrol station south of PULO TENGGOL.

Neon Posit. Lat. 06° 13' N., Long. 103° 11' E.

20 July 1945.

0803 Submerged off the coast just south of TENGGOL mine field.

0920 Surfaced to inspect junk. Boarding party found him loaded to the scuppers with rice. Since the boat he carried was inadequate to carry the 8 man crew, we put a 7 man working party aboard, and with their unwilling assistance, dumped the cargo into the sea. The cargo invoice removed from the junk gave the cargo as 469 "pikuls" of rice, one pikul equaling 133 1/3 pounds. We jettisoned 62,500 pounds of rice. That would feed a lot of hungry Japs in Singapore.

1102 While bringing the working party back aboard, sighted four aircraft, range 4 miles. Made stationary dive to avoid ramming the junk, leaving 5 of our crew still aboard.

1113 Surfaced and recovered the remainder of our working party.

1120 Submerged for patrol.

1903 Surfaced and headed out to sea in order to run down the coast for a little foraging to the south.

2034 Headed back in towards the coast.

2200 Found two junks at anchor 1000 yards off shore. Boarded the larger and found him to be a diesel driven junk of about 25 tons, loaded to the gunwails with rice. Put the crew in their boat and sent them to the other junk. Set fire to the first junk, and were just turning about to head on up the coast when a small coastal ship (Sugar Charlie) of 600 tons rounded a head land and fell in our laps. (Ship contact #5). The range was 1000 yards, bow to bow, before he saw us in the brilliant moonlight. He turned to head for the beach when at

Subject: U.S.S. *Albatross* (AS-10)

2251 opened fire with the 40 m.m. Fired 64 rounds for about 90% hits. He beached himself and burned to the water line.

Our junk, which is carrying about 25,000 pounds of rice for SINGAPORE, was not burning at all well, so we raked it with one pan of incendiary 20 m.m., setting the fuel drums afire. He burned very nicely.

2316 Opened out from the coast. Upon watering batteries tonight we discovered cell 39A was cracked and had lost most of its electrolyte. This is a result, no doubt, of our heavy depth charging. Jumped out cells 39A and 39F.

Noon Posit. Lat. 04° 46' N., Long. 103° 31' E.

21 July 1945.

0745 Submerged for patrol.

1409 Surfaced.

1530 Sent our serial Two telling CTF-71 of our damage. Received reply to return to Subic Bay.

1553 Boarded and inspected junk. Fully loaded with about 40,000 pounds of rice. We put the crew on our fore-castle and sank the junk with the 40 m.m. We then put a boarding party plus the crew of junk # 1 aboard junk # 2 and commenced unloading 30,000 of rice cargo. We then picked up the crew of junk # 3, who had abandoned ship, put an inspecting officer aboard junk # 3, and put # 3 crew aboard junk # 2 to assist in jettisoning cargo. Retrieved boarding officer from # 3 and sank her with 40 m.m. She was loaded with about 40,000 pounds of rice. Picked up our stevedoring party from # 2 and left her empty but with all crews aboard. All junks were Singapore bound.

1745 Submerged.

1836 Sighted RUMI, range 2 miles.

2015 Surfaced.

2230 Rendezvous with U.S.S. COD to receive LORAN charts. (Ship contact #6).

2245 Set course for SUBIC BAY.

Noon Posit. Lat. 04° 44' N., Long. 103° 29' E.

Sub, sec

22 July 1945.

Uneventful enroute entrance to JOINT ZONE.

Noon Posit. Lat. $06^{\circ} 52'$ N., Long. $106^{\circ} 32'$ E.

23 July 1945.

Uneventful enroute JOINT ZONE.

Noon Posit. Lat. $10^{\circ} 32'$ N., Long. $110^{\circ} 54'$ E.

24 July 1945.

0600 Entered JOINT ZONE.

Noon Posit. Lat. $13^{\circ} 42'$ N., Long $115^{\circ} 37'$ E.

25 July 1945.

0530 Joined by escort DE U.S.S. FRATE, proceeding to SUBIC BAY.

0943 Moored to U.S.S. WATSON at SUBIC BAY, P.I.

While in SUBIC made essential repairs to battle damage, fueled ship, and received nine replacement torpedoes. Detached Lt. (jg) H.J. MC CLELLAN, U.S.N.R. and Lieut. L.S. THOMSON, U.S.N.R. reported aboard.

28 July 1945.

1600 Departed SUBIC for continuation of patrol under escort of U.S.S. WOODSON.

2036 Released escort.

29 July 1945.

Enroute area C-1 and C-2 at four engine speed.

1030 Sighted PB4Y2 aircraft, range four miles. Unable to raise on V.F.

1108 SD radar contact 2 1/2 miles. Our SD is obviously on the Fritz. Exchanged calls with PB4Y2 search plane.

1332 Sighted PB4Y2 at 6 miles.

Noon Posit. Lat. $13^{\circ} 34'$ N. Long. $115^{\circ} 18'$ E.

30 July 1945.

1546 Sighted land southeast of TOUTANE, Inao-Anna.

1600 On station patrolling off entrance to TOUTANE BAY.

Noon Posit. Lat. $15^{\circ} 53'$ N. Long. $109^{\circ} 58'$ E.

Subject: U.S.S. - -

31 July 1945.

- 0300 50 radar contact, 7000 yards. Tracked on course 030° T. speed 6 knots.
- 0344 Fired 5 rounds of 5" at target for 3 mts. Went alongside target which turned out to be a medium size junk with Chinese crew. He had only holed their sails, so let them proceed.
- 1149 Sighted EB4Y1. Could not communicate.
- 1722 Investigated junk. He appeared innocent enough.
Moon Posit. Lat. 16° 54' N. Long. 108° 34' E.

1 August 1945.

- 0725 Investigated junk, no contraband.
- 1130 On life guard station for B-24 strike on TOURANE.
- 1203 Sighted EB4Y2.
- 1213 IFF signals, 45 miles.
- 1223 Sighted 16 planes, B-24 and B-30, with one EB4Y. Exchanged calls with EB4Y. The bombers made one run over the target and headed for home after making their drop. The EB4Y made a thorough search of TOURANE and came back to us, telling us that the harbor is empty.
- 1343 Sighted B-17 rescue plane. He told him all planes had headed for home without incident, so he turned around and returned to base. Left life guard station.
- 1900 Closed coast west of Tourane to two miles and investigated several junks. All contained Chinese men, women, and children.
- 2030 Opened out from coast and resumed blockade of Tourane harbor.
Moon Posit. Lat. 16° 05' N. Long. 108° 34' E.

2 August 1945.

- 1143 Sighted EB4Y1 at 12 miles. Unable to raise on VHF.
- 1150 Sighted EB4Y2 at 5 miles. Exchanged calls by VHF.
- 1853 Sighted two EB4Y3 at five miles, very low and zero angle on the bow. Submerged.
- 2028 Surfaced.

Subject: USS BRUSH B.M. (DD-371)

Sent our Serial Four stating that search planes and we believe FOURIE empty, and that we would depart area tomorrow.

Noon Posit. Lat. $10^{\circ} 26' N$. Long. $100^{\circ} 17' E$.

3 August 1945.

0700 Departed area for lineguard station off SINGAPORE in area EAST O.I.

1107 sighted IB4Y2 at 14 miles. He closed us and circled five times, but we were unable to raise him on VHF.

1226 SD radar contact, 10 miles. Sighted and talked by VHF with IB4Y1.

1433 Investigated junk, 60 miles at sea. Although this is an unusual place for him to be, he appeared innocent enough.

Noon Posit. Lat. $10^{\circ} 10' N$. Long. $109^{\circ} 10' E$.

4 August 1945.

1011 SD radar contact, 5 miles. Sounded radar alarm bell and got under in 43 seconds despite the fact that the diving alarm chose this moment to go out of commission. Plane not sighted.

1021 Surfaced.

Noon Posit. Lat. $11^{\circ} 56' N$. Long. $110^{\circ} 33' E$.

5 August 1945.

0400 Received orders from CTF-71 to proceed to BRUSH B.M. for special mission. Went to 10 knots and altered course to comply.

1004 SD radar contact, 20 miles. Sighted but did not communicate with IB4Y2.

1620 SD radar contact, 14 miles. Lost radar contact on 6 planes at 35 miles. Not sighted.

Noon Posit. Lat. $7^{\circ} 00' N$. Long. $110^{\circ} 56' E$.

6 August 1945.

0530 Made radar contact with U.S.S. COUGL, who proceeded as our escort to BRUSH.

0934 Hoored port side to U.S.S. COUGL at VICTORIA HARBOR, BRUSH B.M., LORAI.

0930 Admiral Fife, CTF-71, and Captain Fell, R.M. paid us a call.

Subject: U.S. Submarine - BRUNEL - Special Mission

Fueled ship and installed two housings aft for rubber
cables. The following officers reported aboard for a
special mission job:

MAJOR W.L. JILLIS, U.I.F.
C. E. W. KENNARD, BRITISH ARMY
LIEUT. S. J. DODD, U.I.F.
LIEUT. R. J. LADDY, U.I.F.
F/LT. D. E. PITT, R.A.F.

The cabin and wardroom messes of U.S.S. BONAVENTURE
were host to the officers of BRUNEL at lunch, a much
appreciated treat.

1850 Underway from BRUNEL for Special Mission.

7 August 1945.

0327 Struck submerged log, bending pitometer log, rodmeter.
Replaced rodmeter with spare.

1203 SD radar contact, range 13 miles. Not sighted.

Noon Posit. Lat. $4^{\circ} 12' N$. Long. $111^{\circ} 54' E$.

8 August 1945.

1121 SD radar contact, range 14 miles. Sighted BB4Y1. Did
not close.

Noon Posit. Lat. $2^{\circ} 46' N$. Long. $108^{\circ} 23' E$.

9 August 1945.

0700 Submerged one mile off north coast of TAMBORA Island.
Headed down east coast for periscope reconnaissance

1155 While in center of 2,000 yard channel at southern end
of TAMBORA, master gyro compass went out of commission.
Before this was discovered we were heading for the
beach, fathometer readings diminishing rapidly. Came to
50 feet and got 3 fathoms under the keel. Surfaced! We
were 200 yards from shore. Closed to 75 yards from
shore while picking up several natives for questioning.
They told us there were 50 - 70 Japs on the island and
pointed out a radio station which they said was in daily
contact with Singapore.

1300 Continued reconnaissance on the surface.

1330 Questioned native in small fishing boat.

1405 Came alongside small Chinese junk. Took aboard and
retained one Chinese native from SINGAPORE.

Subject: U.S.S. ALBATROSS - Report of Patrol

1500 Lying 2,000 yards off shore, commenced bombardment of radio station, which sits right atop a 950 foot peak. Fired 40 rounds of 5", completely demolishing radio station and antenna mast.

1600 Departed SHIRAZI Is. for SHIRAZI Grotto.

10 August 1945.

0712 Submerged one mile off southwest coast of SHIRAZI ISLAND. Commenced periscope reconnaissance of west coast.

1100 Surfaced and ran into a little inlet between SHIRAZI IS. and SHIRAZI IS. put party ashore in rubber boat. They returned to the ship with a Chinese. This man was questioned and retained on board. He pointed out a radio and lookout station to us, which he said he had helped to construct.

1320 Opened fire on radio and lookout station sitting right on the top of a 1400 foot mountain. Demolished with 40 rounds of 5" at 4200 yards range. This shooting off tops of mountains is a neat gunnery problem.

1340 Continued reconnaissance.

1534 Put into a river at the village of SHIRAZI. Sent landing party ashore to the village.

Held swim call for all hands.

1717 Left river. Commenced patrolling for the night between SHIRAZI and SHIRAZI islands.

11 August 1945.

0709 Submerged one mile off south west corner of SHIRAZI ISLAND for reconnaissance.

0918 Rounded tip of SHIRAZI and entered SHIRAZI GROTTO, a narrow strait bet ween SHIRAZI and SHIRAZI ISLANDS. Made close pass of SHIRAZI GROTTO, capital of the SHIRAZI GROTTO.

1050 Being around a promontory and out of sight from SHIRAZI, we surfaced in the strait. We were surrounded on all sides by the most beautiful scene - towering mountains and jungles, the shore a 1,000 yards on each side of us. After putting the rubber canoes in the water, we rounded up about 30 assorted natives and Chinese, men, women, and children and brought them on deck for questioning. Our medicalist's notes were busy for the next four hours treating dreadful cases of yaws and other ailments. The natives said that the Japanese garrison of SHIRAZI had fled to the hills that morning.

Subject: U.S.S. THUNDERBOLT - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

- upon receiving word from H.M.S. that an American warship was shelling the place. There were 70 Jap naval officers and ratings in Terapan. With this news, at
- 1220 entered Terapan Harbor, where we lay to for the next four hours. Put an armed landing force of 5 Australians and 10 of our crew ashore, using 2 rubber canoes and a captured rowboat with 5 H.P. outboard motor. Our landing party set fire to 300 drums of gasoline, and confiscated great quantities of documents, equipment and souvenirs and at
- 1500 raised the colors over the Jap Compound. We had our cameraman ashore and took many feet of what we hope will prove to be some interesting pictures. Rescued one Indian I.C.I. from the 215 TURTLE HULL, captured in 1942. The native population of 3,000 persons had taken advantage of the absence of the Japs and been evacuating the town all day. At
- 1600 acting on intuition and a lucky hunch, sounded the ship's whistle, the prearranged signal for the immediate return of the landing party. Put an end to swim call (we had been swimming over the side in the crystal clear water all day), and by 1610 had all hands on board and started out of the harbor.
- 1620 All gear stowed, ready to dive, and clear of harbor entrance.
- 1640 Sighted three JAPES over Terapan Harbor, heading for us. Submerged. That guardian angel looks after submariners?
- 1802 Surfaced and continued recon of RUBUR ISLAND, west coast. Major Jenkins has decided that his mission has been successfully accomplished. So we sent a message to base giving our E.M. BRUCE.

12 August 1945.

1118 IPF signals, 45 miles.

1129 Sighted 103 UTM at 4 miles, flying high and fast. This fellow reported us to his base as a destroyer making 25 knots!

Noon Posit. Lat $03^{\circ} 50' N$. Long. $110^{\circ} 30' E$.

13 August 1945.

0527 Exchanged signals with U.S.S. COUCH, our escort.

0908 Moored port side to COUCH at VICTORI HARBOUR, BRUCE, BORNEO.

Subject: U.S.S. ALBATROSS - Report of J. L. ...

- 0910 Received official call from Commanding Officer U.S.S. BONAVENTURE.
- 1000 Paid official call on S.O.P.A. in U.S.S. DANES.
- 1500 Made arrangements with R.A.A.F. Headquarters for two Mosquitoes and one Beaufighter to give us air cover during a bombardment of Terapih garrison which we have planned for 1000, the 18th. Disembarked Australian commando party.

During the day we gave fuel to SC 982, CPCE 842, and an oil barge, a total of 25,000 gallons. The diesel fuel problem here is acute.

14 August 1945.
At Brunel Bay.

15 August 1945.
The enemy has surrendered. At Brunel Bay awaiting orders.

16 August 1945.
0800 Departed Brunel for Subic Bay.

Noon Posit. Lat. $5^{\circ} 25' N.$ Long. $114^{\circ} 23' E.$

17 August 1945.
Enroute Subic Bay.

1630 Exchanged calls with FB411.

Noon Posit. Lat. $09^{\circ} 04' N.$ Long. $111^{\circ} 25' E.$

18 August 1945.
Enroute Subic Bay.

Noon Posit. Lat. $13^{\circ} 43' N.,$ Long. $115^{\circ} 15' E.$

19 August 1945.
0500 At rendezvous with U.S.S. CAIMAN, CARBONERO, RASHER, WOODSLEY, and ROLF, enroute Subic Bay.

0900 Arrived Subic Bay.

Subject: U.S.F. W. H. B. 101 - Report of 15 Day War Patrol.

(C) WEATHER

The weather enroute from Subic Bay to PULO TENGGOL area and during period 16 - 21 July was for the most part overcast with frequent rain squalls.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

A set of north drift one to one and a half knots was noted south of PULO TENGGOL.

- 21 -

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

No lighted navigational aids were observed during the patrol.

Loran was used effectively along the northwest coast of Borneo enroute to and from BRUNELI DAY.

- 21 -

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
 P) SHIP CONTACTS

No.	Time Date	Latitude Longitude	Type	Initial Range	Course Speed	How Contacted	Remarks
1	7-18-45	06-37.0 N 103-33.4 E	SS	12000 Yards	3000 T 12 kts	SJ Radar	Rendezvous with U.S.S. BRILL (SS330)
2	7-17-45	05-01.5 N 103-02.1 E	SS	9000 Yards	0300 T 11 kts	SJ Radar	Rendezvous with U.S.S. HULL (SS364)
3	7-18-45	04-40.5 N 103-30.5 E	Convoy (Seven Ships)	14000 Yards	1900 T	SJ Radar Periscope (Submerged)	Made approach missed with 9 torpedoes. Depth charged us. 0016 lost contact with target
4	7-19-45	06-14.0 N 103-15.0 E	Convoy (Seven Ships)	11000 Yards	2480 T	Periscope (Submerged)	Made several approaches (Submerged) or Convoy. Did not fire.
5	7-20-45	04-29.0 N 103-29.0 E	Submarine Charlie	2000 Yards	V.R.	SJ Radar	Sunk same with 40 m.m.
6	7-21-45	04-50.0 N 103-45.0 E	SS	10000 Yards	1500 T 10 kts	SJ Radar	Rendezvous with U.S.S. COP (SS224)

Subject: U.S.S. HULL, Report of Patrol War School

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

No friendly search planes were seen during this brief run, much to our disappointment, as we had made considerable plans for working with them. Numerous enemy aircraft contacts were made in the vicinity of PULO TENGGOL, especially as air cover and advance scouts for the convoy contacted on 18 July. Most of these appeared to be RUMBLE. Almost daily contacts were made with search planes off FOURMIE. We were quite astonished to find these planes using the general submarine voice call which went out of effect about six weeks before. On 2 August we were driven down by two HULLS, apparently from HULL. On 12 August we were driven down by 3 Singapore based HULLS in the Anambas Islands.

Subject: U.S.S. HARBILL - Report of Torpedo War Patrol.

(H) ATTACK DATA

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HARBILL Torpedo Attack No. 1 Patrol number Five
TIME: 1902(I) DATE: 18 July 1945 LAT: 04° 41.5' N.
LONG: 103° 30.5' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

DESCRIPTION: One KAMINAME class DD in company with three KPG type escorts, two small tankers, and a small AK. The target selected was the destroyer. Contact was made by periscope in daylight. The weather was clear, the sea a slight chop, force one, visibility good.

TARGET DRAFT: 9' course 190° speed 13.5 Range 2200 yards

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED: 4 knots COURSE: 272° DEPTH: 66' ANGLE: 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Periscope Submerged.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Tubes	1	2	3	4	5	6
Track Angle	106P	110P	109P	111P	117P	120P
Gyro Angle	332	330	334	331	332	332
Depth Set	4'	4'	4'	4'	4'	4'
Power	28.7	28.7	28.7	28.7	28.7	28.7
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No	No
MK Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1
Serial No.	55984	55511	54789	55025	55497	54778
MK Exploder	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7	8-7	4-7
Serial No.	16743	16146	16765	16815	16776	16486
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Actuation Actual	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -	- - -
MK Warhead	18-1	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18
Serial No.	1882	5363	6024	6071	6059	47
Explosive	TFM-2	TFM-2	TFM-2	TFM-2	TFM-2	TFM-2
Firing Interval	- - -	12"	7"	7"	8"	6"
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
	1 R	1 L	3 R	2 R	2 L	3 L
Sea Conditions:	Slight chop, force one					
Run in Yds.	2210	2220	2220	2240	2250	2270

REMARKS: Target zigged away to 180° angle on the bow one minute after firing first torpedo.

OVERHAUL ACTIVITY: U.S.S. HARBILL.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

TORPEDO ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HAWKBILL Torpedo Attack No. 2 Patrol number Five

FILE: 2009(I) DATE: 18 July 1945 LAT: 04° 41.5' N.
LONG. 103° 30.5' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLICTED

DESCRIPTION: One KAMIKAZE class DD in company with three KPG type escorts, two small tankers, and a small AK. The target selected was the destroyer. Contact was made by periscope in daylight. The weather was clear, the sea, a slight chop, force one, visibility good.

TARGET DRAFT: 9' COURSE: 157° SPEED: 13.5 knots RANGE: 1000 yards

OWN SHIP DATA

SPEED: 4 knots COURSE: 186° DEPTH: 66' ANGLE: 0

FIRE CONTROL AND TORPEDO DATA

TYPE ATTACK: Periscope Submerged.

Tubes	7	8	9
Track Angle	145	135	125
Gyro Angle	166	164.5	164
Depth Set	3'	3'	3'
Power	High	High	High
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
MK. Torpedo	14-3A	14-3A	14-3A
Serial No.	66349	66523	64121
MK. Exploder	10-3	10-3	10-3
Serial No.	764	607	811
Actuation Set		Contact and Magnetic	
Actuation Actual	- - -	- - -	- - -
MK. Warhead	16-4	16-1	16-4
Serial No.	15587	14974	15595
Explosive	TPX-2	TPX-2	TPX-2
Firing Interval	- - -	3"	5"
Type Spread	Divergent 0	Divergent $\frac{1}{4}$ L	Divergent $\frac{1}{4}$ R
Sea Conditions:	Slight chop, force one.		
Overhaul Activity:	U.S.S. ANTHELION		
Run in Yds.	690	670	650

REMARKS: Between the time the first and last torpedoes were fired the target zigged to a zero angle on the bow which would reduce the track angles shown here. The hasty range taken before firing was later found to be 400 yards in excess of actual range. Because of this the torpedoes were probably not armed and may have been running deep when they passed the target.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of Gun Attack on Patrol.

GUN ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HAWKBILL Gun Attack No. 1 Patrol number Five

TIME: 2251(I) DATE: 20 July 1945 LAT: 04° 30' N.
LONG: 103° 20' E.

TARGET DATA - DAMAGE INFLECTED

DESTROYED: One coastal AK (SC) estimated 600 ton.

Damage determined by seeing the target burn to the waterline and beach.

DETAILS OF ACTION

Fire was opened with the 40 m.m. at a range of 1500 yards. At a range of 1000 yards fire was opened with the forward 5 inch gun. The 40 m.m. fire was most effective, and within 10 minutes the target was burning fiercely from stern to stern. The 5 inch fire was not effective. Sixteen common rounds were fired with no hits. The sights of the 5 inch gun are now known to have been misalignment by the depth charging on the 15th. Sixty-four rounds of 40 m.m. ammunition were expended. Target was still burning four hours later. Once again the 5 inch telescopes were practically worthless even in bright moonlight. This gun will not be an effective weapon until it has improved night sights.

Subject: U.S.S. HIRIBILL - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

GUN ATTACK REPORT

U.S.S. HIRIBILL Gun Attack No. 2 Patrol number Five

TIME: 1500(I) DATE: 9 August 1945 LAT: 01° 00' N.
LONG: 107° 32' E.

TARGET DATA

DESTROYED: Radio tower and building on Tambelan Island,
South China Sea.

Damage determined by observation.

DETAILS OF ACTION

The radio tower and installation was situated on top of Thumb Hill Peak on Tambelan Island. The height of the peak was 953 feet. Fire was opened from seaward with forward five inch gun at a range of 3,000 yards. The ship was stopped during the action. Thirty-seven rounds of A.A. common and two rounds of V.T. ammunition were fired by the forward gun. Nine rounds were fired by the after gun. The fire was effective, completely demolishing the target. No casualties were experienced.

Subject: U.S.S. ELK BELL, Gun Attack No. 3, Patrol number Five

GUN ACTION REPORT

U.S.S. ELK BELL Gun Attack No. 3 Patrol number Five

TIME: 1330(I) DATE: 10 August 1945 LAT: 02° 55' N.
LONG: 105° 40' E.

TARGET DATA

DESTROYED: Radio tower and building on Jenaja Island,
Anambas Islands, South China Sea.

Damage determined by observation.

DETAILS OF ACTION

The radio tower and installation was situated on the summit of a 1460 foot mountain, Gunung Dato, on the western side of Jenaja Island. Fire was opened from seaward with the forward 5 inch gun at a range of 1300 yards. The ship was stopped during the action. The fire from both 5 inch guns was effective. The tower and buildings were destroyed. Nineteen rounds of A.A. common were expended by the forward gun and 21 rounds by the after gun. No casualties were experienced.

Subject: U.S.S. MINERAL - Report of Third War Patrol.

(I) MINES

No mines were seen until 13 August, when a floating mine was sighted and destroyed by gunfire in position $03^{\circ} 55' N.$, $110^{\circ} 44' E.$

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

All anti-submarine measures encountered were directly connected with the convoy contacted on 15 July. Several planes preceded the convoy by a couple of hours, and as far as we were concerned, served only to alert us that something must be coming. There were at least five aircraft providing anti-submarine cover for this convoy. The surface escort consisted of a MINERAL class destroyer and three KIG class escorts. The tactics of the destroyer were very effective, not so much in the capacity as protector of his charges as in caring for his own skin. He was often five or six thousand yards away from the convoy, but he was never on a constant heading for one continuous minute. He moved in and out, now ahead of the convoy, now astern. He appeared to stand an anti-torpedo sound watch. Aircraft held us down seven hours after the convoy passed, neatly preventing us from ending around.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

(1) Hull and Machinery

(a) Hull

Due to shock of depth charging number two periscope head prism became unusable in low power magnification position, head window and prism became spotted reducing the clarity of the scope. Impossible to see in low power.

(b) Main engines

No defects or damage.

(c) Reduction Gears

Subsequent to shock of depth charging it was discovered that a foreign noise had developed in the starboard reduction gear or shafting.

The noise -- a metallic knock -- seems to occur two times per shaft revolution and is most prominent at approximately 120 turns. This frequency possibly indicates a misalignment of a tooth or teeth on the bull gear that results in the knock when it strikes each pinion. This noise was not present before the depth charging and still does not exist in the port shaft.

When power is taken off the shaft, the noise gradually diminishes. But when the motors are backed to stop

Subject: U.S.S. Report of Fifth War Patrol.

the shaft, a loud knock occurs.

With continued operation the noise in the gears has been observed to increase in intensity. The increase is prevalent at all speeds but particularly noticeable in the range between 80 and 120 shaft R.M.

(d) Gyro Compasses

The shock of depth charging resulted in the following damage to the gyro compasses:

Auxiliary - Loss of mercury. Replaced with no difficulty.

Mark VII - Most of the mercury had splashed out of the mercury tank and some particles were clinging to the sensitive element. The shock was so great that the spring-suspended bowl was driven down upon the terminal block and binnacle base. The lead weight on the bowl was consequently shifted aft, causing the spider to list 30° on the inner gimbals ring. The terminal block on starboard side was shattered and the follow-up motor field DC supply leads were severed at the block between terminal block and control panel. In addition, the collar at the top of the float ball was broken.

Repairs were effected as follows: Mercury float tank refilled. Weights added forward on inner gimbal ring to correct unbalanced condition of spider. Spliced broken leads at terminal block. Float ball collar still usable. Follow-up mechanism binding was partly due to follow-up arm rubbing against sensitive element. Corrected when compass was re-assembled, but still excessively noisy.

Damage sustained by the compass during depth charge attack as described above was repaired by Submarine Division 261 during the four day stop at Subic Bay for repairs.

Shortly after resuming patrol the compass again showed considerable error. Upon examination it was found that the centering stalk mechanism was frozen and the centering pin bent. In this condition a large roll or pitch of the ship would cause a force to be exerted on the sensitive element in such a manner as to cause the compass to precess from the meridian. This defect is believed to be caused by the extreme tilting of the sensitive element necessary to replace the illumination light

Subject:

U.S.S. - Report of Patrol

bulbs at the bottom of the compass. In this case a bulb was replaced by the relief crew activity just prior to sailing. Repairs were effected by ship's force.

(e) Main Storage battery

Depth charges cracked the jar of cell 39A. Although the crack cannot be located, electrolyte loss was sufficiently great (from 0 to -13 in five hours) to necessitate jumping out the cell. The remaining electrolyte was then pumped out to prevent excessive contamination of the battery well sump.

In order to balance the load of batteries in parallel, cell 39F was also jumped out immediately after a normal charge and left on open circuit.

(2) Ordnance and Gunnery

The only ordnance defect during the patrol was the failure of the 20 m.m. gun to fire during an attempt to set fire to a junk July 17. The cause is believed to be weak barrel springs. Replacement of the springs remedied the defect.

Damage resulting from the depth charging on the 18 of July was: misalignment of sights on both 5 inch guns, and bending of the binocular holding yoke on the forward F.B.T. The elevating pinion on the after 5 inch gun is believed to have been knocked out of alignment.

(L) RADIO

NFTI baker schedules were copied throughout the patrol. No serials were missed. Reception was entirely on 9250 kcs and 4370 kcs. No difficulties were encountered with the schedules. Difficulty was encountered in raising NFT; for transmission of our serials # 2 and # 3. We feel that the trouble was not due to our transmitter or operational methods for VIKO, NFT and NFO all answered our calls to NFTI.

Topaco communications were satisfactory. No guarded safplan frequencies on the hour while submerged, using the 3D antenna. These hourly five minute guard periods, designed for air-sub contact report reception brought no results.

VHF communications with other boats were satisfactory. VHF communication during life guard duties was satisfactory. During this operation a plane was heard using superseded voice calls for both submarine and aircraft. Several times during the patrol superseded CI calls for submarines were heard.

The following messages were sent on the following frequencies:

- Serial One Originated 191211. First call 1215 on 8470 kcs. Answered by NPTI at 1215. Received for by NPTI at 1243. Resent as number 183 on schedule at 1341.
- Serial Two Originated at 210202. First call 0515 on 8470 kcs. Answered by NPTI on schedule at 0546 with a "q" signal to test. At 0600 on schedule told to shift to 12705 kcs. First call on 12705 kcs at 0605. Answered by unknown station at 0615. Answered by NFW at 0620. Answered by NPTI at 0630. Received for by NPTI at 0630. Received for on schedule at 0642. Resent as number 224 on schedule.
- Serial Three Originated at 221211. First call on 8470 kcs at 1213. Second call on 8470 kcs at 1216. Third call on 8470 kcs at 1219. Answered by NFW at 1221 with a "j" signal giving a signal strength of two and offering to re-transmit. Answered by NFO at 1223 with "j" signal giving signal strength three and offering to re-transmit. Sent to NFO at 1227. After transmission of message, VIKO asked for repeat of one group. asked NFO for his receipt. Got a negative receipt from NFO. Resent to NFO. Received for by NPTI at 1300 on baker schedule. Resent on baker schedule as number 239.
- Serial Four Originated 021152. (Aug). First call on 8470 kcs at 1155. Answered by NVB at 1156. Received for by NVB at 1202. Received for on baker schedule at 1217. Resent as NR 502 on baker schedule.
- Serial Five Originated 050011 (Aug). First call on 8470 kcs at 0014. A total of five calls were made between 0014 and 0036. We were told to wait at 0037. At 0048 received K from NVB. Received for at 0055. Received for on schedule at 0100. Resent as number 568 on baker schedule.
- Serial Six Originated 111017 (Aug). First call at 1018 on 8470 kcs. Second call at 1020. Third call at 1022. Fourth call at 1024. Received K from NVB at 1025. NVB asked for a repeat of several groups at 1031. At 1033 NVB asked for the same repeat, saying that he was being interfered with. Received for at 1038. Resent as number 657 on baker schedule.
- Serial Seven Originated 170115. Unable to pass on 4235 or 8470 kcs. Four calls were made between 0710 and 0720. Sent at 0722 to NVB on 8470 kcs. Received for 0727. Received for on schedule 0730. Resent on Baker schedule as number 765.

Subject: U.S.S. HANBILI -- Report of First War Patrol.

Radio Materiel Failures

The forward insulator on the starboard antenna was crushed and the antenna itself parted during the depth charge attack. The after stanchion was torn loose at the same time.

The RBS, in use on the boat for the first time, developed a minor ground as a result of the depth charging. Until then it had fully justified its reputation as an excellent receiving set. On several occasions, both before and after the charge, it was used when interference made reception on the other sets (RBH, R.L) extremely difficult.

The stand off insulators on the starboard antenna were snapped off when a falling signal gun struck the antenna lead-in. Emergency repairs were effected, permitting the use of the antenna for receiving, but not for transmitting.

(H) R.I.D.R

SJ-1 The operation of the SJ-1 has been satisfactory. The high voltage rectifier tube 2x2/879 in the range indicator failed. This seems to be a common failure, occurring on an average of once every three weeks.

As a result of a depth charge there was a power failure (120 V and 250 Volt D.C.) to the training motor. This was remedied upon replacing the line fuses. The lobe switching assembly in the antenna head was put out of commission by the shock. After a day and a half of inoperation, the lobe switching returned to normal operation. Apparently the assembly was stuck and later became free because of the motion of the submarine.

Landfall ranges were obtained out to the end of the main sweep. Ranges on a DE were obtained out to 20,000 yards and on a submarine out to 12,500 yards.

A 1500 yard false echo was corrected by replacing the modulation network (pulse box).

Replaced R()39, evidently broken during the depth charge attack.

Replaced two IF amplifiers on the IF strip range indicator.

Trouble was experienced with the control unit fuzes. We modified the main control unit by replacing 6 ampere fuzes F-9 and F-10 with 10 ampere fuzes.

Subject: U.S.S. Report of Patrol

ST The operation of the ST was very satisfactory especially since there was very little frequency drift. There were no failures. Landfall ranges were obtained out to 100,000 yards surfaced and to 70,000 yards submerged. While surfaced ranges on an ARS out to 25,000 yards.

SD-4 Until the depth charging the operation of the SD-4 was very satisfactory. After the depth charge the transmitter tube 8014A had to be replaced. R.F. output was noted up to the antenna leadin but there was no antenna output. The antenna leads registered 2 1/2 megs and infinity to ground and infinity between the two. The antenna upper limit switch contactors were stuck so that the mast couldn't be raised. The contactors were freed by manually operation the upper limit switch a number of times. All the shorting bars in the transmitter were shaken loose and had to be reset. As a result of the mast failure the SD-4 was out of commission.

Plane contacts out to 30 miles were obtained. The average contact range was 23 miles.

Marked low sensitivity was remedied by resoldering a broken fitting on the duplex unit.

BW The operation of the BW was satisfactory. After the depth charge a 15E tube had to be replaced and the system retuned.

ABK7 Operation was satisfactory with no materiel failures.

AFR- Operation was satisfactory with no materiel failures.

SF1 Interference covering the complete bands of TM-3 and TM-2 units was experienced for a period of forty-five minutes and then disappeared. During this period of time corona discharges were noted on the AIR antennas.

Only one contact was made at 155 mcs. prf 400 and pulse width of seven microseconds. This was identified as a British submarine.

D.S3 Operation was satisfactory. Only one materiel failure was experienced with the failure of the cathode follower (6SN7) in the pedestal generator circuit.

(N) SONAR GEAR AND SOUND CONDITIONS

JP sound gear operation was satisfactory throughout the patrol. JP first detected the DD at 5200 yards. A turn count of 126 was obtained at that range.

SB sound gear operation was satisfactory. A listening watch

Subject: U.S.S. AGASSIZ, Report of Tenth Cruise
Was maintained during normal submerged operations.

MC - JK sound gear performed satisfactorily until severe depth charging damaged the motor controller.

The fathometer gave the best results to date. Clear dependable readings as low as four fathoms were obtained.

Material Failures:

The starting resistance and overload relay motor controller of MC - JK sound gear was put out of commission by severe depth charging.

During voyage repair period at Subic Bay, both sound training motors were flooded out. They were replaced by repair force with two rebuilt motors. Operation has been satisfactory, although the JB motor has been noisy due to misalignment.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

As the bathythermograph was put out of commission by the severe depth charging of 16 July, no data on density layers is submitted prior to 31 July. Off TOURANE, Indo-China, a sharp 10 - 12 degree layer was found in the vicinity of 100 feet. It took a 12,000 pound increase in ballast to get to 150 feet depth from 65 feet.

(F) HEALTH, FOOD, AND HABITABILITY

Health was good; no sickness or injuries.

Food was adequate and well prepared.

Habitability remains excellent. Oxygen was bled into the ship at two hour intervals during our depth charging; we didn't need it at the time particularly, but we thought we might be on the bottom for a long time.

Subject: DD-21

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a) Number of men detached after previous patrol	18
(b) Number of men on board during patrol	79
(c) Number of men qualified at start of patrol	63
(d) Number of men qualified at end of patrol	5
(e) Number of unqualified men making their first patrol	7

(R) MILES STEERED - FUEL USED

Subic Bay to Area	380 miles	5500 gallons
In Area	2500 miles	31900 gallons
Area to Subic Bay	380 miles	5000 gallons
Subic Bay to Area*	380 miles	5500 gallons
In Area*	4600 miles	40900 gallons
Area to Subic Bay*	380 miles	5200 gallons

*Second part of patrol.

(S) DURATION

Days enroute area	4
Days in Area	31
Days enroute base	4
Days submerged	0

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE RELATING

<u>TORPEDOES</u>	<u>FUEL</u>	<u>PROVISIONS</u>	<u>PERSONNEL FACTOR</u>
18	41900 gallons	30 days	30 days

(U) COMMUNICATION, R.A.D.R., AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURE SURVIVAL.

Communications: There were no countermeasures.

Radar: No enemy radar or enemy jamming was encountered.

Sonar: Shortly after the DD passed over the submarine for the second time, a steady loud noise was heard. The first assumption was that it was escaping air. A complete check eliminated this possibility. Later Later checks proved that there were no air leaks.

It was noted that immediately preceding the detonation of a depth charge, this noise, easily heard through the hull, was blanked out completely. Observations on JY listening gear substantiate the above statements. On the listening gear the noise sounded like "bubbles of air streaming from a small pipe".

It is believed that the source of the noise was a countermeasure device, dropped by the DD, designed for use against acoustic weapons.

The noise was heard for about one hour.

Subject: U.S.S. MINIBIRD - Report of Fifth Air Patrol.

(V) REMARKS.

Consub 7th Fleet letter Serial 0243 of 2 February 1945 has been complied with.

The Commanding Officer would like to state here for the record his pride in the courage and fortitude of his officers and crew. During our ordeal of the 18th not a man failed or lost his sense of humor for a moment; every one stuck to his job of keeping the ship tight and under control without any need for orders. Appreciation is also expressed for the splendid construction of this ship. She's as solid as rock.

Below is a copy of the instructions given to the wolf pack of which BARRELL was the leader:

Subject: Coordinate Attack and Reconnaissance of Wolf pack in FULO TENGCOL area.

1. The Area

The area assigned to this pack includes those

subject: U.S. Navy Report of ...

portions of D-1, D-2, and D-3 south of 40° North latitude. This allows us to extend our search as far up the coast of Malaya as PANTANI ROADS, and as far south as 40° North.

2. Assumptions

These instructions are based on the assumption that all enemy shipping, either north bound or south bound, hugs the coast of MALAYA between Singapore and PANTANI ROADS. Experience has shown that this shipping generally follows the ten fathom curve, and always passes between TULO TEGOL and the coast. Convoys will have air cover during daylight, and the presence of aircraft flying along the coast is a good indication of an approaching convoy. Convoys will usually be well escorted, and may or may not hole-up at night in anchorages along the coast. The principal anchorages used for this purpose in our area are KORA BARU, the mouth of SIBURI RIVER, and PANTANI ROADS. The coast both north and south of TULO TEGOL is covered by search planes from F-10 at Palawan. These planes are FB4Y1 and FB4Y2. Information on approaching convoys may be expected from these planes or from other boats patrolling area D-1 to the north of us. It is assumed that submerged daylight attacks in this shallow water are usually impossible, and undoubtedly extremely risky, and that the area more readily adapts itself to night surface attacks.

Information on Coordination with friendly aircraft

A call was made by C.O. Hawkbill on the pilots at F-10 Palawan in order to bring the coordination between submarines and aircraft more closely together. The pilots were most enthusiastic. They, and their A.C.I. officers, are aware of the location of the boats of this area, and the following arrangements have been made with them:

- (1) They will broadcast blind on S.FILAN frequency for 5 minutes after every hour, if any contact is made or if they are in trouble and need help from us.
- (2) They will use the pro-sign "O" for any message involving contact and/or life-guard, and will use a "routine" heading if they only wish to establish communications for practice purposes.
- (3) They will use VHF channel Baker at all times when over our areas.
- (4) They will, in addition to using life-guard frequency, broadcast the regular distress messages on S.FILAN frequencies so as to insure attracting our attention.

Subject:

U.S.S. ~~MINERAL~~ - Report of ~~Patrol~~ ~~Patrol~~

PULO TENGCOL is a regularly assigned lifeguard Reference Point and has the following assigned Code Words: (1) Bailiwick (2) Drunken Shambles (3) Stella Dallas (4) Awful Eager (5) Vacation Land (6) Stomach Ulcer. They will indicate their ditching point in accordance with SOP-2... - example "25 Bailiwick 320", meaning "Plane down 25 miles bearing 320 degrees true from PULO TENGCOL LIGHT".

Directives:

1. During daylight Hawkbill will patrol in vicinity of Lat. $04^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $103^{\circ} 35' E.$, and during darkness along the coast as far north as PULO TENGCOL.
2. During daylight COD will patrol in vicinity of Lat. $05^{\circ} 00' N.$, Long. $103^{\circ} 35' E.$, and during darkness between PULO TENGCOL and PULO MILLS.
3. During daylight HIGHLAND will patrol in vicinity of Lat. $5^{\circ} 30' N.$, Long. $103^{\circ} 10' E.$, and during darkness between PULO MILLS and PULO REDDING.
4. Patrol submerged during daylight.
5. In case of daylight contact, attack if feasible, otherwise allow the contact to go past, then surface and broadcast the contact report on S.M.L.W. on the hour. Remember that communication by radio is very unsatisfactory between two boats submerged, but quite satisfactory if one is submerged and the other surfaced. In case of contact at night, notify the other boats of the pack, then attack. Keep in mind that three submarines making a coordinated attack are better than one, and it might be more profitable to hold off your attack until the other boats arrive.
6. Man your VHF channel Baker whenever within 5,000 yards of the other submarine, either during coordinated attacks or rendezvous.
7. Rendezvous point, whenever desired will be at a point 5 miles due east of PULO TENGCOL, and will be at 2400 ITM unless otherwise specified. The two letter Topaco code word meaning "Rendezvous" will mean to this pack:

"Rendezvous at posit 5 miles due east of PULO TENGCOL LIGHT at midnight tonight".
8. Use SD radar at discretion.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL - Report of visit to Pulo

9. Investigate large junks or fleets of junks at discretion. U.S.S. Selene recently encountered obviously organized junk traffic in this area, one of which carried a 3-pounder gun under camouflage. Junks which upon inspection are found to be carrying contraband for the enemy may be attacked. C.O. Hawkbill assumes the responsibility for this action.

10. Because of Allied mine field west of Pulo Tenggara, do not pass between this island and the Mainland unless absolutely necessary.

11. The following special meanings are assigned to Morse signs, Section 4, List 1:

1. Engaged in defensive gun action.
2. Require assistance.
3. Aircraft in trouble _____ miles bearing _____ degrees true from Pulo Tenggara reference point.
4. Killer group.
5. Hoerise.
6. Moonset.
7. Drifting mine.
8. Join me for coordinate gun attack. My position _____ miles bearing _____ degrees true from Pulo Tenggara Light.
9. Run VLF channel Baker.
10. Run VLF channel Dog.

12. HAWKBILL - WOLF 1
HAWKFIELD - WOLF 2
COD - WOLF 3.

Serial (0345)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 August 1945C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of Fifth War Patrol.From: Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX,
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Submarines Southwest Pacific .
(2) Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. The Fifth war patrol of the U.S.S. HAWKBILL, under the command of Comdr. F.W. SCANLAND, was performed in the Gulf of Siam, Tonkin Gulf, and South China Sea area, and was of 38 days duration, of which 31 days were spent in the area.

2. The patrol was broken off on 21 July because of severe damage received from depth charging on 18 July. The period 21 July to 28 July was spent enroute to and at Subic Bay where the damage to periscopes, compasses, radars and radios was repaired. No serious hull or machinery defects were discovered, and patrol was resumed on 28 July.

3. This patrol was an extremely active one. On the 17th of July, one junk with 50,000 pounds of rice on board was destroyed. On the 18th of July, off the east coast of the Malay Penninsula, several planes were sighted during the day's submerged patrol. Finally at about 1830 a KAMIKAZE destroyer was seen to be escorting a northbound convoy of 2 small tankers, a small cargo ship and 3 other escorts of the XPG class. The destroyer was chosen as the target, and in spite of a most radical constant-helm zig plan and barely 4 fathoms under the keel, six mark 18-1 torpedoes were fired forward at a range of 2200 yards on a 110 port track with about 330° gyro angles. Depth set was 4 feet in calm water. The destroyer immediately turned away showing a 180° angle on the bow, and all torpedoes missed. This particular destroyer is known to be very clever in evading torpedoes, no doubt hearing them running on his sound gear. It is possible that he has the equivalent of our TDM.

4. After the misses, HAWKBILL presented her stern and opened to seaward, watching the destroyer circling aimlessly at about 3000 yards. This he did for about an hour, at which time he suddenly headed straight for HAWKBILL. At 2009 HAWKBILL fired 3 mark 14 torpedoes aft. These were fitted with mark 10 influence exploder. The angle on the bow was zero and the TDC torpedo run was 700 yards. The gyro angles were near 180° and a 1/4° spread was used. The torpedoes were set at 3 feet. This was a brilliant shot, and there was full expectation

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX

Fry

FC5-26/A16-3

Serial. (0345)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of Fifth War Patrol.Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

of it being successful. The periscope was left up and the people on the destroy were clearly seen pointing at it. Apparently the torpedoes did not have sufficient run to arm, as the destroyer stood on at full speed and roared past overhead. A pattern of depth charges were dropped that shook HAWKBILL to her foundations. All power was lost and the boat, out of control, surfaced with a 20° up-angle revealing about 60 feet of the forecastle. The Commanding Officer, and all hands, were convinced that this moment was their last, and while the Commanding Officer ordered the destruction of all classified material, the Executive Officer, Lieut. Comdr. F.B. TUCKER, ordered "all back full" over the telephones while negative was being flooded. The boat bottomed heavily at 110 feet. It was noted that the TDC torpedo run was about 400 yards at the time the destroyer passed overhead, indicating that the torpedo run at firing was only about 300 yards, insufficient for arming.

5. There followed then a gruelling four hours, during which the KAMIKAZE made three deliberate attacks passing directly overhead each time. For some reason, he dropped no charges. On the third pass he appeared to stream or drop a noise maker, as a loud noise like escaping air was heard throughout the boat for over an hour.

6. On the fourth pass, the hour now being about 2200, he passed astern, this time dropping four charges which did no major damage. At 2248 two more charges were dropped at some distance, and at midnight HAWKBILL was able to surface and pull clear. KAMIKAZE no doubt chalked this one up as a sure kill.

7. Much damage to electrical equipment was suffered, but HAWKBILL promptly began repairs while opening the coast. At 0730 that morning, 19 July, she took her position in the scouting line with HAMMERHEAD and COD, with only the gyro-angle regulators, SD, SJ, and one antenna out of commission.

8. At about 1030, the efforts of this 3-boat wolf pack under the command of HAWKBILL was rewarded by sighting the KAMIKAZE weaving ahead of his convoy. Efforts to close were unsuccessful, and the chase had to be abandoned in the early afternoon. The convoy was heavily protected by aircraft, as many as five being in sight at one time. In spite of the air cover, HAWKBILL surfaced at 1525 to end-around on the convoy, but at 1533 she was forced down by 2 planes at 6 miles closing. Thereafter planes were continuously in sight through the periscope, and HAWKBILL was unable to surface until 2100, at which time the convoy was too far ahead to regain contact.

Serial: 345

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 August 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of FIFTH War Patrol.Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of FIFTH War Patrol.

9. The next day, 20 July, one JUNK of 25 tons, with 25,000 pounds of rice on board, was destroyed by fire, and an additional 62,500 pounds of rice was jettisoned from another JUNK. The crews were not molested, and in fact were aided in reaching safety. In addition, a small AK of 600 tons was destroyed by 40 mm fire.
10. On 21 July, three JUNKS were boarded and a total of 110,000 pounds of rice was destroyed, two of the JUNKS sunk, and the third, empty, used as refuge for all JUNK crews. These JUNKS were Singapore bound, and the loss of this rice was no doubt keenly felt in Singapore.
11. The period 30 July to 3 August was spent in a blockade of TOURANE to prevent any evacuation. Nothing was sighted, but on 1 August HAWKBILL performed lifeguard duty there. No planes ditched. Communications with the planes were excellent.
12. On 6 August, HAWKBILL entered BRUNEI BAY, BORNEO, for a special mission as directed by Admiral FIFE, then present in BRUNEI BAY in the HMS BONL-VENTURE. Several Australians were embarked with their rubber canoes, the leader being Major JINKINS, AIF.
13. On 9 August, at 1500, the radio station on TAMBELAN Island, which is about 200 miles due south of Great NATOENA Island, was completely destroyed by 40 rounds of 5 inch from a position 2000 yards off shore. The station is located on a 950 foot peak.
14. On 10 August another radio and lookout station, this time on a 1460 foot peak on the island of JEMAJA in the ANAMBAS group, was completely and effectively destroyed with 40 rounds of 5 inch at a gun range of 4200 yards. This was followed by a landing party reconnaissance of the village of KULLA where all hands enjoyed swimming call.
15. The highlight of the patrol was reached on 11 August, when a well-organized landing party of Australians and ship's force landed at the dock in the harbor of TERAMPLH TOWN, the capital of the ANAMBAS group. The landing was made with two rubber canoes and a captured row-boat fitted with an outboard motor. Questioning of natives revealed that the Jap garrison of about 70 naval officers and ratings had fled to the hills upon getting word from JEMAJA that an American Warship was bombarding them. It was apparently quite clear to both the Japs and the natives

Serial 0345

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 August 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LFIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of FIFTH War Patrol.Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

that a major task force was in the process of occupying these islands preparatory to a major push on Singapore.

16. At 1500 that afternoon, after burning 300 drums of gasoline, and confiscating much equipment, souvenirs, and documents, the HAWKBILL raised the U. S. Colors over the Jap compound, to the accompaniment of much cheering and grinding of cameras. This footage should be extremely interesting.

17. At 1600, the good fortune of HAWKBILL was again evident when the Commanding Officer, acting upon a hunch, recalled all hands, ceased swimming call, and got underway clear of harbor. Twenty minutes later, 3 JAKES were sighted over the harbor that HAWKBILL had just vacated. These planes headed for HAWKBILL who promptly dived.

18. On 12 August an RAAF Mosquito sighted HAWKBILL from high altitude and reported her as a destroyer making 25 knots.

19. On 13 August, HAWKBILL returned to BRUNEI BAY to conjure up further destruction to the enemy. This was to consist of a bombardment of TERAMPAN garrison on the 18th of August. HAWKBILL was able to deliver 25000 gallons of diesel to small craft in sore need of it in BRUNEI HARBOR.

20. HAWKBILL'S plan for future forays against the enemy were frustrated by the capitulation of Japan on August 15th. She therefore departed BRUNEI BAY on 16 August and arrived SUBIC on 19 August, having completed a most colorful and active patrol.

21. It is recommended that HAWKBILL be credited with having accomplished the following damage to the enemy:

S-U-N-KD-E-S-T-R-O-Y-E-D

1 - SCS (EC)	600 Tons	2 - Radio Stations
4 - JUNKS (EC)	100 Tons	1 - Jap Compound
RICE	247,500 Pounds	

22. The HAWKBILL is to be congratulated on her efficient remedy of damage caused by the severe depth charging on 18 July, particularly to the gyro-compass.

FC5-26/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX

Serial: 0345

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
23 August 1945.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) -
Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of FIFTH war Patrol.

23. The directive to the wolf pack of which HAWKBILL was leader was complete, well-prepared and thorough. Liaison with planes of Fleet Air Wing TEN was excellent.

24. HAWKBILL was in an excellent state of cleanliness and repair upon her arrival at SUBIC and will be refitted in ten days by Division 261 Relief Crew and U.S.S. ANTHEDON, with the exception of the cracked cell in the after battery, which will be delayed until the forthcoming Navy Yard overhaul.

25. The Squadron Commander takes great pride in welcoming HAWKBILL back from her fifth and final war patrol. HAWKBILL may well be proud of the part she has played in bringing defeat to our enemies. Few submarines have had a more auspicious record. It is not too fantastic to believe that the decision of the Japanese to capitulate may have been somewhat hastened, if only by a few hours, by their impression that an offensive against SINGAPORE, as reported by the local commanders based on this one-ship task force, was in the making.

26. HAWKBILL has had many close calls. Her good luck is based primarily on capable, sound and aggressive submarine combat principles. May her luck continue forever.

B. E. Bacon, Jr.
B. E. BACON, Jr.

Serial 0483-AC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


1 September 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
 USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3, Serial 001, dated
 19 August 1945. Report
 of Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarines SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
 To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
 Via: The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fifth War Patrol-
 Comment on.

1. The HAWKBILL Fifth War Patrol under the command of Commander F. W. SCANLAND, Jr., U.S. Navy, was conducted in the GULF of SIAM, TONKIN GULF and South CHINA SEA. HAWKBILL coordinated her patrol with HAMMERHEAD and COD.
2. On 18 July HAWKBILL missed a KAMIKAZE Class destroyer escorting a convoy with nine torpedoes fired from excellent attack positions. Depth control was lost in shallow water immediately after the first depth charge attack and the quick action by the Executive Officer, Lieut. Comdr. F. B. TUCKER, U.S.N., undoubtedly saved the HAWKBILL from destruction. Damage was considerable and return to SUBIC was necessary for repairs. In the interim, however, ships force repaired enough of the damage to enable an end around on the convoy. Further attack was frustrated by radical maneuvers by the enemy. The patrol was resumed on 28 July and the period from 30 July to 3 August was spent performing blockade duty off TOURANE. On 9 and 10 August two radio stations on TAMBELAN ISLAND and JEMAJA ISLAND were destroyed by gunfire. A landing party of Australians and ships force landed at TERAMPAH TOWN on 11 August and destroyed the enemy compound and gasoline dump, the defenders having fled to the hills. One small AK and 4 junks were sunk by gunfire and 250,000 pounds of rice was jettisoned.
3. The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.
4. The Force Commander heartily congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the HAWKBILL on this aggressive and particularly well conducted patrol. The HAWKBILL has an excellent war record and has contributed materially towards the defeat of the enemy. The following damage to the enemy is



Serial 0483-AC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

1 September 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
 A16-3, Serial 001 dated
 19 August 1945. Report
 of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Fifth War Patrol-
 Comment on.

SUNK

1 - AK (EC)

600 Tons.

4 - Junks

100 Tons.

700 Tons.

DESTROYED

Two Radio Stations

One enemy compound and gasoline dump

250,000 pounds of rice

All damage was inflicted by gunfire.

James Fife
 JAMES FIFE.
ORIGINAL COPY

DISTRIBUTION:

Cominch	(3)	Direct	ComSubRon-22	(2)
Opnav	(2)	Direct	ComSubRon-26	(2)
Opnav Op-23c	(1)		ComSubRon-30	(2)
Com1stFlt	(1)		DivComSubRon-22	(1 ea)
Com2ndFlt	(1)		DivComSubRon-26	(1 ea)
Com7thFlt	(2)		DivComSubRon-30	(1 ea)
ComSubPac Adcomd	(1)	(air mail)	S/M School, N.-L. Conn.	(2)
ComSubslstFlt	(30)		Comdt. NYD, Puget Sound	(1)
ComSubs2ndFlt	(4)		SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
CTF-71	(7)		S/MS 7th Flt	(1)
CTG-71.5	(2)			

J. B. Miller
 J. B. MILLER,
 Flag Secretary.

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

A16-3(F-3-2/egw)

Serial: 0358

0640


REG. SHEET NO 110

CONFIDENTIAL

10 OCT 1945

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to:
CO USS HAWKBILL (SS366) conf.
ltr. serial 011 of 19 August
1945.

From: Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: USS HAWKBILL (SS 366) - Report of FIFTH War
Patrol.
1. Forwarded.


J. H. LONG
By direction

R.P.

10 OCT 1945

10 01326

PHILIPPINE SEA FRONTIER

Phil/F3/kd
A4-3(1)(8)

Serial:

CONFIDENTIAL

19 OCT 1945

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
USS HAWKBILL Conf. Ltr.
A16-3, Serial 011, dated
19 August 1945.

From: Commander Philippine Sea Frontier.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL; Report of Fifth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded.

2. Routing has been changed to substitute Commander Philippine Sea Frontier for Commander Seventh Fleet, as Commander Submarines Seventh Fleet is now Commander Submarines Philippine Sea Frontier.

RECEIVED S-C FILES

Room 2055

ROUTE TO: 0.3

5 NOV 1945

N. C. Gillette
N. C. GILLETTE
Chief of Staff

Copy to:

ComSubsPSF

File No. (SC)

A16-3(23)

SS 366

Doc. No.

190025

Copy No.

1 of 2

Reg. No.


P-2333

Finished.....*File*

0291

END OF REEL

JOB NO. H-108
AR-181-76




**THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT**



**MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION**

START OF REEL

JOB NO. AR-52-81 E-108



OPERATOR h. Frye

DATE 5-6-81

**THIS MICROFILM IS
THE PROPERTY OF
THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT**



**MICROFILMED BY
NPPSO-NAVAL DISTRICT WASHINGTON
MICROFILM SECTION**

REEL TARGET - START AND END
NDW-NPPSO-5210/1 (6-78)

NRS 1975-41

HAWKBILL (SS-366)

WWII REPORT FILE

ALL MATERIAL ON THIS REEL IS DECLASSIFIED

35MM

DATE 13 Sep-9 Oct 44 NAME HAWKBILL
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD SERIAL none
DATE 24 October 1944
SUBJECT Coordinated Attack Group Operations
Chronological report of operations of BAYA, BECUNA, HAWKBILL under CDR A.H.Holtz USN. 13-23 Sep supported PALAU Islands landings; 24 Sep-9 Oct operated in SOUTH CHINA SEA. 57,000 tons sunk or damaged by this Coordinated Attack Group.
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL under USS BAYA
as PHOTOSTAT(O) under USS BAYA
MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3880-13 (11-55) 2-28002

DATE 13-25 September 1944 NAME HAWKBILL
FROM CROSS INDEX CARD SERIAL
DATE
SUBJECT STALEMATE II, Operations in
Operated in CATS group of Capt. C.W. Wilkins' ZOO to warn of approach of enemy fleet during landing phase of PALAU operations.
FILED: War Diary
Separately under TASK GROUP 17.18 no ser of no date
MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3880-13 (10-55) 2-21013

DECLASSIFIED A
DATE 10-16 February 1945 NAME HAWKBILL
FROM CO - USS HAWKBILL(SS-366) SERIAL 010
DATE 7 April 1945
SUBJECT Special Mission, Report of
Chronological report of attack and destruction of enemy vessels in LOMBOK Strait NEI during THIRD WAR PARTOL. Five craft of various designations sunk.
(SOWESPAC: US SUB OPS)
FILED: War Diary
Separately as ORIGINAL **CARBON COPY**
MICROSERIAL NO. ACTION REPORT OPNAV FORM 3880-13 (11-55) 2-28002

DATE 10-16 February 1945 NAME HAWKBILL

FROM C.O. USS HAWKBILL. (SS-366)

SERIAL 0001

DATE 5 March 1945

SUBJECT TORPEDO FIRING Report.

Forwards report of firing of Mark 27 Torpedoes on THIRD
WAR PATROL with chronological report of circumstances.
Three hits, and three misses.

(SOWESPAC: SUB OPS)

FILED: War Diary

Separately

as Enc. to SUBS 7th Flt ser 00026 of 20 Mar 45

MICROSERIAL NO.

ACTION REPORT OPHAV FORM 3480-13 (11-55) D-220002

Original (2)

U.S.S. BAYA.

Care Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
24 October 1944.

~~C~~ **DECLASSIFIED** I A L

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAYA.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : Official Channels.
Subject: Coordinated Attack Group Consisting of
BAYA, BECUNA, HAWKBILL - report of.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A), covering the subject war patrols is herewith forwarded. This group operated on a scouting line east of the Phillipines and south of the Nansei Shoto Islands as part of the fleet operations in the Phillipines. Later the group operated in Luzon Straits and then north of Dangerous Ground.

A. H. Holtz
A. H. HOLTZ

101477

FILMED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

(A) PROLOGUE.

Prior to departure the group held coordinated search and attack training at sea as a group and conducted training at sea with other submarines at Pearl Harbor.

(B) NARRATIVE.

The BAYA, HAWKBILL, and BECUNA were to operate in conjunction with two other groups as an offensive reconnaissance group in conjunction with fleet operations off Palau and the east coast of the Phillipines.

13 September to 23 September.

On the scouting line - no contacts other than aircraft contacts.

23 September 1944.

Group ordered to area DETECT by ComSubPac. Sent directions to HAWKBILL and BECUNA dividing area DETECT.

25 September 1944.

BECUNA made contact with 4 AK and possibly 3 DD in 21-28.5 N. and 118-57 E. BECUNA fired six torpedoes at DD and overlapping AK. One hit heard. Results not observed.

26 September 1944.

Received orders from ComSubPac to leave area DETECT so as to arrive in TaskFor 71 South China Sea area by 0900 I, 27 September. Also received routing to Perth.

27 September 1944.

Sent area assignment to BECUNA and HAWKBILL. No contacts in area. Rendezvoused with HAWKBILL on 4 October 1944, to straighten out communication difficulties.

6 October 1944.

Intercepted contact report from WHALE up in Convoy College - several ships speed 14 headed through our area. Sent scouting assignments to HAWKBILL and BECUNA based on WHALE report.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

7 October 1944.

- 1900 I BECUNA made radar contact with northbound
convoy 95 miles to south of our position.
- 1906 I HAWKBILL made sight contact with convoy we
were searching for about 25 miles northeast
of our position.
- 2149 I HAWKBILL fired six torpedoes at large AK -
missed.
- 2224 I HAWKBILL attacked same large ammunition
loaded AK which sank three minutes later.
- 2230 I BAYA attacked large unidentified AK.
- 2258 to Target broke up and sank.
2315 I It is believed that after the WHALE attack
up north yesterday the convoy of several
large ships reported split up into indivi-
dual groups.

8 October 1944.

- 0032 I HAWKBILL contacted escort carrier and two
DD escorts.
- 0125 I BAYA decided to close carrier instead of work
with BECUNA on her northbound convoy. BAYA
headed north at full power, but never made
contact. HAWKBILL was driven down and depth
charged.
- 0210 I BECUNA attacked convoy of two large ships and
four real small ships. Obtained two hits in
tanker - results not observed.

During daytime escort carrier departed to south,
as seen by HAWKBILL. It is believed that this
carrier was covering the two groups in this
general vicinity and departed to the south to
cover any ships remaining out of the original
WHALE contact.

9 October 1944.

- 1802 I BECUNA attacked ten ship convoy with ten
torpedoes. Sank two tankers and damaged one
AP and one AK.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

9 October 1944.

1812 I HAWKBILL attacked same convoy. Sank one AK and damaged one AK.

2308 I HAWKBILL made second attack on same convoy and damaged one AK.

REMARKS.

On the basis of the patrol endorsement it is believed the following damage was inflicted on the enemy by this group:

SUNK:

BAYA	1 AK	7500 tons.
BECUNA	1 AO (med)	5000 tons.
	1 AO (med)	5000 tons.
HAWKBILL	1 AK (large)	7500 tons.
	1 AK (med)	4000 tons.

Total Sunk.....29000 tons.

DAMAGED:

HAWKBILL	1 AK (med)	4000 tons.
	1 AK (large)	7500 tons.
BECUNA	1 AO (med)	5000 tons.
	1 AP (med)	7500 tons.
	1 AK (med)	4000 tons.

Total Damaged.....28000 tons.

Total sunk and damaged.....57000 tons.

FC5-26/A16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY SIX

Serial 02

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
17 November 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CC USS BAYA ltr.
dated 24 October 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY SIX.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
(2) The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
consisting of BAYA, BECUNA and HAWKBILL - Comments
on.

1. The coordinated search and attack group consisting of BAYA, BECUNA and HAWKBILL, with Commander A. E. Holtz, U.S.N., in BAYA as Task Group Commander departed Pearl Harbor on 23 August 1944. From 13-23 September the group was employed on a reconnaissance mission in the Palau-Philippines Area. The remainder of the patrol was devoted to search and attack on enemy shipping in the Philippines-South China Sea Area. BAYA, the last of the group to return to port from patrol, reached Fremantle, W.A. on 22 October 1944. This was the first war patrol for each ship of the group.

2. Area coverage was good, and the dissemination and intelligent use of information enabled all ships of the group to consummate attacks and inflict considerable damage on the enemy.

3. The Commanding Officer, BAYA, Commander A. E. Holtz, is congratulated on the leadership and judgment displayed in handling this group and for the results obtained.

L. J. Hoffman
L. J. HOFFMAN.

12 04421

F-4254

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES N.VY

12a/ar

Serial 01519

12 December 1944.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Reviews
1-16-45

class 45
LAT

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USC BAYA Conf. Ltr. dated
24 October 1944.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. BAYA, U.S.S. BECUNA, and
U.S.S. HAWKBILL from 13 September 1944 to 9 October
1944, comments on.

1. The Coordinated Search and Attack Group consisting of BAYA, BECUNA and HAWKBILL, under the direction of Commander A. H. HOLTZ, U.S.N., Commanding Officer BAYA, patrolled from 13 to 23 September on a scouting line east of the PHILIPPINES and south of the MARSHI SEPO ISLANDS in connection with the landings on PALAU and MOROTAI. After passing to the operational control of this force on 27 September, the Group patrolled in the SOUTH CHINA SEA north of DANGEROUS GROUND.

2. During the early evening of October 7, BAYA and HAWKBILL made three attacks on the remnants of a convoy previously reported by WALLE, and succeeded in sinking two large AKs. At 0032 HAWKBILL made contact on an escort carrier and two DD escorts, and during the remainder of the night both HAWKBILL and BAYA attempted unsuccessfully to close the carrier for attack. BECUNA was able to make an attack on a remnant of the original group at 0110 and damaged one medium AO.

3. BECUNA attacked a convoy on October 9th at 1802, and HAWKBILL followed with two more attacks at 1812 and at 2308. These three attacks sank two medium AOs and one medium AK and damaged two medium AKs, one medium AP and one large AK.

4. The Group Commander, and BAYA, HAWKBILL and BECUNA are congratulated upon inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

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EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. MICRO
PHOTO-LAB OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

6

FE24-71/416-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

12a/ar

Serial Q1519

12 December 1944.

- I -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BYA Conf. Ltr. dated
24 October 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. BAYA, U.S.S. BECUNA, and
U.S.S. HAWKBILL from 13 September 1944 to 9 October
1944, report of.

SUNK

1 - AK (Large) (BAYA)	7,500 Tons
1 - AO (Medium) (BECUNA)	5,000 Tons
1 - AO (Medium) (BECUNA)	5,000 Tons
1 - AK (Large) (HAWKBILL)	7,500 Tons
1 - AK (Medium) (HAWKBILL)	<u>4,000 Tons</u>
Total	29,000 Tons

DAMAGED

1 - AK (Medium) (HAWKBILL)	4,000 Tons
1 - AK (Large) (HAWKBILL)	7,500 Tons
1 - AO (Medium) (BECUNA)	5,000 Tons
1 - AP (Medium) (BECUNA)	7,500 Tons
1 - AK (Medium) (BECUNA) - I -	<u>4,000 Tons</u>
Total	28,000 Tons
Grand Total	57,000 Tons

R. W. CHRISTIE.

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

12a/ar

Serial: 01519

12 December 1944

C-C-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to:
USS BAYA Conf. Ltr. dated
24 October 1944.

Subject: War Patrol of Coordinated Search and Attack Group
Consisting of U.S.S. BAYA, USS BECUNA, and
U.S.S. HAWKBILL from 13 September 1944 to 9 October
1944, report of.

Distribution:

Cominch	(3)	- Direct	CTG-71.5	(2)
Vice Opnav	(2)	- Direct	CTG-71.8	(2)
Vice Opnav Op-23c	(1)		CTG-71.9	(2)
Com1st Flt.	(1)		ComSubRon-12	(2)
Com2nd Flt	(1)		DivComsSubRon-12	(1 each)
Com7th Flt	(2)		DivComsSubRon-18	(1 each)
ComSub1st Flt	(30)		DivComsSubRon-26	(1 each)
ComSubs2nd Flt	(4)		ComSubDiv-162	(1)
CTF-71	(7)		S/M School, N.L. Conn	(2)
CTG-71.3	(2)		SubAd, Mare Island	(2)
CTG-71.4	(2)		S/Ms 7th Flt	(1)

THIS REPORT WILL BE DESTROYED PRIOR
TO ENTRY INTO ENEMY CONTROLLED WATERS

J. B. Miller
J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED

Amiral 1003

From: The Commander Task Group 17.18 (ZOO).
(ComSubDiv 242).
To : The Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.
Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group
17.18 (ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September
1944.

References: (a) ComTaskFor 17 Oplan 3-44.
(b) War Patrol Report #6, U.S.S. SEAHORSE (SS304).
(c) War Patrol Report #9, U.S.S. WHALE (SS239).
(d) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. SEGUNDO (SS398).
(e) War Patrol Report #10, U.S.S. GROUPER (SS214).
(f) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394).
(g) War Patrol Report #2, U.S.S. PIRANHA (SS389).
(h) War Patrol Report #2, U.S.S. CAVALLA (SS244).
(i) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. BAYA (SS318).
(j) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. BLCUNA (SS319).
(k) War Patrol Report #1, U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366).

Enclosures: (A) Subject Patrol Report (and Track Chart to Com
SubsPac only). - 2
* (B) Coordinated Attack Code for Inter-Zoo Use.
* (C) Special Instructions for Zoo.
To ComSubsPac and ComSubsTrainPac only.

1. Enclosure (A) covering the subject war patrol is
submitted herewith. This Task Group was formed to conduct an
offensive reconnaissance in support of the attacks upon and
occupation of Palau. The Task Group was designated by the
special name Zoo and was comprised of three combined submarine
wolf packs, the Bears, the Dogs and the Cats. The individual
pack compositions were as follows:

BEARS: U.S.S. SEAHORSE (SS304) (Zoo Flagship)
U.S.S. WHALE (SS239)
U.S.S. SEGUNDO (SS398)
U.S.S. GROUPER (SS214)

DOGS : U.S.S. RAZORBACK (SS394) (Pack Flagship)
U.S.S. PIRANHA (SS389)
U.S.S. CAVALLA (SS244)

CATS : U.S.S. BAYA (SS318) (Pack Flagship)
U.S.S. BLCUNA (SS319)
U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366)

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2. The mission of the Zoo was to maintain an offensive
reconnaissance line across enemy fleet's most probable line of
approach in order to warn friendly forces of early approach of
enemy and to intercept and destroy enemy forces approaching or
retiring from the assault area.


CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group 17.18
(ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September 1944

and to intercept and destroy enemy forces approaching or retiring from the assault area.

3. The Zoo operated in support of the THIRD FLEET and not as a unit of the THIRD FLEET. Operational control remained with Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN who was, therefore, the immediate superior of the Zoo Commander for tactical purposes.

4. The Zoo was formed on D-2 day (13 September 1944) in initial position and disposition ordered by Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN as shown in sketch below:



5. The individual packs proceeded independently from refitting bases. Each pack stopped at Saipan to top off with fuel and then patrolled own assigned waiting area until the Zoo was formed at dawn on D-2 day.

6. Enclosure (A) covers operations of the Zoo commencing at dawn on D-2 day. References (b) to (k) cover the detailed activities of the individual submarines. Enclosure (B) is the Coordinated Attack Code prepared for inter-Zoo use when the mission shifted from reconnaissance to attack. Its purpose was to provide the Zoo and Pack Commanders with a code especially designed to facilitate coordinating submarine attacks. Enclosure (C) is the Zoo Commander's special instructions issued to amplify the Operation Plan reference (a).

C. W. WILKINS.

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Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group 17.18
(ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September 1944

(A) NARRATIVE

13 September 1944

East Longitude Date. All times herein will be Zone -9 (Item) times unless otherwise specified.

0500 Zoo was formed in position directed by CTF 17 dispatch of 11 September with Bear Pit in Lat. 14-25 N, Long. 127-19 E, axis of scouting line 055° - 235° T, and commenced patrolling in accordance with Zoo Commander's instructions.

1030 Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from CAVALLA reporting contact with ten unidentified planes.

1330 Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from SEGUNDO reporting strafing by low flying aircraft resembling Hellcats.

2030 Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from WHALE reporting unidentified plane.

14 September 1944

0730 Rendezvous made with U.S.S. GROUPER and information pertinent to her assignment in Zoo and BEAR Pack was passed over in water tight container.

0900 Transmitted SEAHORSE serial Four to ComSubsPac reporting rendezvous with U.S.S. GROUPER and that GROUPER had been assigned position between RAZORBACK and SEAHORSE on the second line of Zoo formation.

1215 Received a test message from Commander Third Fleet.

Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from PIRANHA reporting a single unidentified plane.

15 September 1944

0303 Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from BECUNA reporting enemy planes over BECUNA in assigned position on scouting line.

2009 Received message relayed through ComSubsPac from Admiral Halsey "well done" with the Admiral's intentions to soon book the company before the best audiences on the Asiatic Station.

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Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group 17.18
(ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September 1944

16 September 1944

2058

Received message from ComSubsPac regarding friendly forces which might enter our area on D plus 5 day.

17 September 1944

1007

Received message from ComSubsPac ordering a change in Bear Pit position to position Lat. 24-10 N, Long. 126-10 E, axis 070° - 250° T, move and new scouting line to be completed by dawn September 21, 1944.

1730

Transmitted to Zoo via ComSubsPac detailed orders to accomplish move to new stations.

18 September 1944

1200

All units of Zoo commenced move to newly assigned Zoo position. Bear Pit moved at 10.5 knots on course 354° T, with units of Zoo orienting to new axis and maintaining scouting lines while enroute. Thus continuous coverage of probable routes of enemy fleet approach was maintained while enroute to new Zoo position.

19 September 1944

1200

Position of Bear Pit: Lat. 18-37 N, Long. 126-50 E.

20 September 1944

1200

Position of Bear Pit: Lat. 22-43 N, Long. 126-17 E.

2200

Bear Pit arrived at new position.

21 September 1944

0500

Zoo formed in new position directed by ComSubsPac and commenced patrolling on surface in accordance with Zookeeper's scouting and general instructions (Revised) dated 20 August 1944.

22 September 1944

This day was uneventful. It was a surprise to the Zookeeper that the submarines of the forward scouting line of the Zoo were able to maintain surface patrol so close to the SAKISHIMA GUNTO. The nearest submarine was only forty miles from MIYAKO JIMA. The Japanese are obviously not maintaining an effective patrol of this sea area.

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Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group 17.18
(ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September 1944

The nearest submarine was only forty miles from MIYAKO JIMA. The Japanese are obviously not maintaining an effective patrol of this sea area.

23 September 1944

0930 Received message from ComSubsPac detaching Cats from Zoo and directing them to proceed to new station.

1030 Zookeeper directed SEAHORSE and GROUPER to fill positions on first line vacated by HAWKBILL and BECUNA respectively. This move was ordered to maintain the scouting front directed by ComSubsPac OPlan 3-44. The RAZORBACK was still left in original position on second line. Reported this shift to ComSubsPac.

24 September 1944

2010 Received message from ComSubsPac ordering dissolution of Zoo at 0900 25 September 1944, and directing Dogs and Bears to proceed to newly assigned individual pack patrol areas.

2145 Transmitted message to Commander Dogs dividing newly assigned patrol area.

25 September 1944

0900 In compliance with orders from ComSubsPac dissolved Zoo and all submarines comprising the Zoo proceeded as directed by pack Commanders to newly assigned patrol areas.

REMARKS

It is recommended that in future operations of this nature, the command of the Zoo be retained by ComSubsPac and exercised either from a shore base or a surface vessel located in a position clear of combatant operations where radio silence need not be observed. The base or surface flagship would be the clearing house for all contact reports and orders to the Zoo. Information and orders could be broadcast repeatedly without requiring submarines to acknowledge. Repetition should insure receipt by all submarines. In this operation where the Zoo Commander was the senior pack commander it was necessary for him to require receipts for each transmission from each submarine in order to be sure that messages were received. He was not in a position to repeat transmissions

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: War Patrol of Offensive Reconnaissance Group 17.18
(ZOO) from September 13, 1944 to 25 September 1944

via the broadcast method.

In this operation the OPlan was worded to give the Zookeeper wide latitude of action in disposing the Zoo units but in effect this latitude was conferred only during an attack phase since the Zoo position, axis of scouting lines, length of front and distance between submarines for the reconnaissance phase was prescribed with iron bound precision by the OPlan and could not be changed by the Zookeeper. With this set up, during the reconnaissance phase any orders to the Zoo from ComSubPac via the Zookeeper merely resulted in excess radio transmissions by the submarines on station and such orders had much better been given by ComSubPac direct by broadcast method transmissions.

The above recommendation is based upon actual experience during the reconnaissance phase of this operation. Since the enemy force did not sortie, no actual experience was gained in exercise of tactical command by the Zookeeper during an attack phase. However, it is believed that tactical command exercised by ComSubPac as recommended above would be much more practicable. He would have a continuous flow of information upon which to base orders to pack commanders or individual units, whereas, the Zookeeper in a submarine might be submerged and miss information of vital changes in the situation. The Zookeeper would then be totally unequipped to order necessary dispositions of submarines to get them into attack positions.

ENCLOSURE (A)

6

F4254

SUBMARINE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET . . . hch

FF12-10/A16-3(15)

Serial 02485

R-USA
11-20-44

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
8 November 1944.

11 02719

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Patrol Report of First
Offensive Reconnaissance Group.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: War Patrol Report of Offensive Reconnaissance Group
17.18 (ZOO) from September 13, 1944, to 25 September
1944.

1. Forwarded. This group of ten submarines, under the tactical command of Captain C.W. Wilkins, U.S. Navy, who was also temporary commanding officer of the U.S.S. SEAHORSE (SS304) during the patrol, acted as an offensive reconnaissance support group for the attacks upon and occupation of Palau. While no opportunities to inflict direct damage upon the enemy were presented during this phase of the group's operations, the supply of negative information and potential submarine striking power contributed greatly to the operations as a whole. When operations in support of the surface and air forces were no longer required these submarines were shifted to enemy traffic lanes and inflicted severe damage upon the enemy.

2. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the reconnaissance Group Commander, Coordinated Attack Group Commanders, Commanding Officers, Officers and crews for the successful accomplishment of this very important task.

DISTRIBUTION:
(Complete Reports)

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CNO (5)
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Comservpac (1)
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C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Substrainpac (3)
All Submarines, Pacific (1)
ComFlectAirWing TWO (1)
O-in-C,ASWTU,FltAirWingTWO (1)
E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

E. L. Hynes
EXTRA - ORIGINAL
SORG. _____ MICRO ✓
PHOTO-LAB _____ OP-16
RETURN TO F-4253

7

CLASSIFICATION REDUCED TO
UNCLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF
OPNAV INTR. INST. 5510.11
DATED 156 JUN 53

10-16 FEB 45
U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

George Owen - 11/4/56

By: *Johnson* *11/4/56*
SS366/AL2-1
Serial (010-)

c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.,
7 April 1945.

DECLASSIFIED

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander Task Force SEVENTY-ONE.

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

Reference: (a) Report of War Patrol Number Three, U.S.S. HAWKBILL.

1. One phase of the third war patrol of the U.S.S. HAWKBILL was a special mission to attack and destroy enemy anti-submarine vessels in LOMBOK STRAIT, using the MK. XXVII torpedo as the primary weapon. The following is a chronological account of the period 10 February 1945 to 16 February 1945 during which time HAWKBILL was in Lombok Strait.

All times are HOW (Zone -8)
10 February 1945.

2310 Entered LOMBOK STRAIT from the south, hugging the east coast of NOESA BESAR to give the shore battery on LOMBOK a wide berth. A 200 mcs. radar steadied on us from time to time, but never seemed quite sure we were there.

2351 SJ radar contact on aircraft at range 7.5 miles. He tracked right up the middle of the STRAIT.

11 February 1945.

0006 SJ radar contact, range 6,000 yards. We tracked this fellow for about an hour. He was alternately stopping and going ahead at about 3 knots, so we let him go for the time being and proceeded on up into the STRAIT for a thorough sweep. Covered the STRAIT from end to end and along both coast, but made no further contacts.

0527 Submerged.

0610 Sighted 3 sea trucks or small steamers hugging the east coast of BALI.

1951 HAWKBILL surfaced from the first all day dive she has ever made.

2330 Exchanged recognition by SJ radar with U.S.S. BECUNA, who is making north bound transit of STRAIT.

12 February 1945.

0155 SJ radar contact, range 7,600 yards. Commenced tracking and approach from ahead.

U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

SS366/A12-1
Serial (010)

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

- 0245 At range 5,000 yards turned towards target, bow to bow and slowed. With range 4,500 yards submerged to 40 feet and continued tracking with radar. With range 3,000 yards went to 150 feet, rigged for silent running and continued tracking with JP and JK sound bearings and JP ranges.
- 0300 JP sound operator reported "firing noise level".
- 0303 Commenced hearing target screws through the hull as he is passing overhead.
- 0304 Fired one MK. XXVII torpedo from forward.
- 0305 Torpedo hit with what seemed a terrific explosion, due no doubt to our proximity to the target.
- 0330 Surfaced and closed the scene of attack. Discovered a mass of wreckage, a large oil slick, and two LCV. As we were under the LOMBOK shore battery we decided to let the current carry the LCV out of the strait to sea before tackling them with gunfire. Threw four hand grenades into one LCV, a couple into the other, and stood off.
- 0519 Submerged. Followed LCV south and out of the Strait.
- 0927 Observed one LCV sinking, apparently from the effects of the hand grenades. The two landing craft are each loaded with a brand new motor truck.
- 0945 Surfaced and came alongside remaining LCV. One hand grenade produced one prisoner of war, an uninjured Japanese soldier. Sent him below. There were three other soldiers, but they refused to come aboard, so stood off and destroyed the LCV with 110 rounds of 20 m.m. took pictures, and at
- 0958 Submerged.
Interrogated prisoner without much success, but we gather that our target of last night was some sort of small steamer towing the LCV.
- 1945 Surfaced 15 miles south of the strait and set course to re-enter.
- 2157 Entered strait, keeping 4,000 yards off NOESA BESAR. No aircraft out tonight.
- 2320 SJ radar contact, range 11,000 yards. Commenced tracking and end-around for position ahead of target.

13 February 1945.

We tracked this fellow and made approaches on him all night, but each time we submerged to close in, he would change course and go around us. He was running close in to the east coast of BALL. At

U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

SS366/A12-1
Serial (010)

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

- 0510 with dawn breaking, commenced our third and final attempt. It is believed the target saw us at radar depth, 40 feet, at a range of 3,000 yards, for he veered away and then came in faster for what appeared to be an attack.
- 0532 JP sound operator reports a "firing noise level", so from 200 feet depth fired one MK. XXVII torpedo, without results. There are now two sets of screws in the neighborhood; maybe he has been joined by another patrol boat or was escorting something when he came towards us the last time. They hung around for an hour, then departed. At
- 0700 we surfaced four miles off BAILI, but there was nothing in sight.
- 0708 Submerged for the day.
- 1957 Surfaced in the center of the southern entrance and headed north.
- 2012 SJ radar contact on plane at 7,000 yards. This fellow buzzed around us for an hour or so, but apparently could not locate us for sure. His radar pulse width indicated a minimum effective range of 1,500 yards, so whenever he started in on us, we slowed to 5 knots or stopped, to cut down the visible wake, and the plane would go right on past
- Found an 8 knot southerly current in the strait tonight!
- 2154 SJ radar contact, range 9,750 yards. Commenced tracking and end-around for position ahead. This looks like the same fellow we had the trouble with last night, as he is headed right for the same patrol location, so we speeded up to get to him before he got inside the 100 fathom curve. These patrol boats don't appear to be very aggressive.
- 2330 Commenced attack, using same tactics as with the successful attack night before last. Things looked very disheartening for awhile, as the target turned about 30 degrees off his base course after we went deep for the final phase of the attack. As he went by us we kept the bow pointed at him. We were just about to return to the surface for a new start when sound reported that the target's screws were getting closer. He had apparently gone north and turned around. We are right in position for him, luckily. Sound reports he hears more than one set of screws.

14 February 1945.

- 0019 When sound operator reported a good "firing noise level", fired one MK. XXVII torpedo from forward. The forward torpedo room said they did not think the torpedo had left the tube, so at
- 0020 Fired second MK. XXVII torpedo from aft. Just as this torpedo was fired the forward room reported that the first torpedo had left the tube, so now there are two of them making runs.

U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

SS366/A12-1
Serial (010)

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

- 0022 One hit.
- 0023 Another hit. Maybe the sound operator did hear two targets. All screws are now stopped, but there is a terrific racket coming from the target.
- 0056 Surfaced. Saw a target lying to at 3,000 yards range. It is too dark for gunfire, so we lay to also and waited for the current to carry us south, and some daylight to permit a gunshot.
- 0445 Target commenced sending up numerous red, gree, and white rockets, apparently distress signals.
- 0519 While working around to the westward of the target in order to silhouette him against the approaching dawn, rammed a lifeboat containing about ten men, rowing towards the BALL shore. This was a regrettable but unavoidable incident. We could discover no survivors until we found one man hiding amongst four oil drums fixed to two-by-fours in a sort of raft. This man would not come aboard. The patrol boat target is still on an even keel and apparently in no trouble other than that she cannot get underway, which makes the lifeboat full of survivors appear to have come from somewhere else. There must have been two targets, one of which has sunk.
- 0534 Submerged and headed for target. As daylight increased we could see that although the target, a PC boat, was badly wounded with a hole under his stern, he was in every way salvagable. We took a series of periscope photographs from various ranges into 480 yards. There were 20 men aboard target, and they put up a vigorous but unsuccessful fire at out periscope with a machine gun and what looked like a 40 m.m. gun. At
- 0640 saw a signalman sending semaphore from the target and discovered a motor sampan standing over towards him. Fearing we would lose our target to a tow line, went to battle stations; and at
- 0647 Fired one MK. XVIII torpedo from aft, range 1200 yards, zero gyro angle, depth set at zero feet.
- 0648 Torpedo hit the target under leading bulkhead of his bridge, and fairly lifted him from the water. He came down in several large and many small pieces.
- 0650 Received one aircraft depth bomb, fairly close.
- 0651 Received second depth bomb, also close.
- 0653 Received third depth bomb, not so close, Headed for security at 250 feet and headed south out of the strait.
- 1224 Surfaced to ventilate the boat.
- 1256 Submerged.

U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

SS/366/A12-1
Serial (010)

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

1951 Surfaced and headed up into the strait.

2012 SJ radar contact on plane, range 7,000 yards. He buzzed around but could not find us.

2046 SJ radar contact on plane, range 12000 yards. This plane closed to 3,000 yards, and then opened out.

2331 SJ radar contact on plane, range 12,000 yards. Plane closed to 3,000 yards and then opened out.

15 February 1945.

0055 SJ radar contact on plane, range 18,000 yards. Tracked him down the strait and lost him.

0220 Came alongside large native sailing lugger for investigation. He was in the center of the strait, and from 3,000 yards could readily be mistaken for a patrol boat. He tracked at 0 - 3 knots speed, and was picked up on the SJ at 6,000 yards, so it looks like this was also our contact of the night of the 10th. We could find nothing suspicious about him, so let him go. Patrolled the strait from end to end for the remainder of the night without seeing a thing.

0543 Submerged. Decided to try lying on the bottom today and give all hands a good rest, so headed in close under the shore of BALI. Took numerous cuts and found negligible current at periscope depth, so at

0715 bottomed at 315 feet 600 yards off BALI. Chart shows sand bottom, but the Dutchman who surveyed it was just guessing, because we landed on numerous coral heads. Luckily there was no way on the boat, but a sub-surface current started bouncing us along, so at

0718 left the bottom and opened out from the shore at 100 feet depth.

1700 Surfaced in rain squall and aired the boat.

1710 Submerged.

1958 Surfaced and commenced complete sweep of the strait.

2205 APR radar detector reported approaching aircraft.

2210 SJ radar contact on plane, range 16,000 yards. Plane closed to 8,000 yards and then went on down the strait. We continued our sweep of the strait when he had cleared.

2347 SJ radar contact, range 2,200 yards. Commenced tracking and end-around for approach from ahead. The night is extremely dark with intermittent rain squalls.


U.S.S. HAWKBILL(SS366)

SS366/A12-1
Serial (010)

Subject: Report of Special Mission.

16 February 1945.

- 0040 Made unsuccessful attack with MK. XXVIII torpedo.
- 0100 Surfaced and commenced another end-around.
- 0119 Commenced second approach from ahead. Target is crossing the strait from east to west at a speed of 7.5 knots.
- 0220 Made second unsuccessful attack with MK. XXVII torpedo. On both of these attacks our conditions were exact duplications of our previous successful attacks. Might be the rain that's causing the duds.
- 0240 Surfaced.
- 0251 Closed target for a gun attack, but it is much too dark. In a brilliant lighting flash identified our target as a small sea truck. This was an awful waste of time, but we thought for awhile we had another patrol boat.
- 0300 Set course north and departed LOMBOK STRAIT after six very interesting days and nights. Sent despatch report of activities to Force Commander.


F.W. SCANLAND, Jr.

CLASSIFICATION REDUCED TO
UNCLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF
OPNAV INT. INST. 5510.1
DATED 15 JUN 53

By JOHNSTON Date 1/4/52

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

14/dn

Serial 00030

~~TOP SECRET~~

20 APR 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Top Secret
Ltr. A12-1 Serial 010,
dated 7 April, 1945.

From: The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: The Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Special Mission
performed during Third War Patrol - Comments on.

1. The Third War Patrol of the HAWKBILL, under the command of Commander F. W. SCANLAND, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in the South CHINA and JAVA SEAS. Enroute, from 10 to 16 February, in LOMBOK STRAIT, HAWKBILL conducted an anti-escort patrol using Mark 27 torpedoes. This supplemental report covers this period.


2. Attack data for this part of the patrol was submitted in a Special Report of Mark 27 torpedo attacks, Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET secret serial 00026 of 20 March, 1945. The two hits in attack No. 3 now appear to have been one hit in each of two distinct targets instead of only one target as originally presumed.

3. The Force Commander congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and Crew of the HAWKBILL on their effective conduct of this Special Mission, and on inflicting the following damage to the enemy during this period:

S-U-N-K

1 - MIS (EU)	350 Tons (Att. No.1)
2 - MIS (Landing Craft)	100 Tons*
1 - MIS (EU)	350 Tons (Att. No.3)
1 - Patrol Craft (EU)	300 Tons (Att. No.3)
	Total 1,100 Tons

* Sunk by gunfire.


JAMES FIFE.

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVY

14/dn

Serial 00030

20 APR 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to:
USS HAWKBILL Top Secret
Ltr. A12-1 Serial 010,
dated 7 April, 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Special Mission
performed during Third War Patrol - Comments on.

DISTRIBUTION

Vice CNO	(1)
Com7thFlt	(1)
ComSubPac	(1)
CO USS HAWKBILL	(1)
File	(1) - INTELLIGENCE SECTION FILE.

J. B. Miller
J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Com 06861
A.S. No. 6 173

A16-3(2)(F-3-4/ekb)

Serial: 000178

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

26 MAY 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on:
USS HAWKBILL Top Secret
ltr., serial 010 dated
7 April 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366) - Report of Special
Mission performed during Third War Patrol -
Comments on.

1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the
HAWKBILL for the successful and aggressive use of their new
weapon.

J.M. Counts

Copy to:
ComSubs7thFlt
CO, USS HAWKBILL (SS366)

1945 JUN 4 11 17
COMMANDEER-IN-CHIEF
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6 173

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FE24-71/A16-3/S75

UNITED STATES NAVY

90/1e

Serial 00026

20 March 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~
DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - OPNAV INST 5500.30
BY: [Signature] DATE 4-14-60

From: Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.
To: Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via: Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject: Special Report of Mark 27 Torpedo Attacks -
Third War Patrol U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366).

Enclosure: (A) C.O. U.S.S. HAWKBILL Top Secret Ltr. SS366/
A16-3 Serial 0001 of 5 March, 1945 with
attack data.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.

2. The first part of the Third War Patrol of the HAWKBILL, under the command of Commander F. W. SCANLAND, Jr., U.S. Navy, from 10 February 1945 to 16 February 1945, was conducted in LOMBOK STRAIT with the express mission of seeking out and attacking with Mark 27 Torpedoes, enemy patrol craft.

3. Five attacks were made on three targets. One target sank, one was damaged with two hits (later destroyed with a Mark XVIII torpedo) and one, a small sea truck, escaped. Fifty percent of the torpedoes fired resulted in hits. All three misses encountered are considered control errors. None are considered to be torpedo failures. The results obtained by the HAWKBILL further portend the possibilities of employing this weapon offensively instead of only in a defensive manner as originally contemplated.

4. ATTACK NO. 1

Contact was made on the surface. At 3500 yards HAWKBILL submerged to radar depth. At 2500 yards HAWKBILL went to 200 feet and completed the attack, obtaining one hit. This target, never identified, sank.

ATTACK NO. 2

This contact, a PC boat, was developed in the same manner as above. One torpedo fired from 300 feet missed. The Commanding Officer believes he was sighted at radar depth. Target course and speed were not determined, and the movements of target subsequent to deep submergence are uncertain. In view of the foregoing this miss is attributed to a control error.

FE24-71/A16-3/S75

UNITED STATES NAVY

Om 4873
No. 4 721 90/16

Serial 00026

20 March 1945.

SECRET

Subject: Special Report of Mark 27 Torpedo Attacks -
Third War Patrol U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366).

ATTACK NO. 3

The target in this attack was the same PC boat as in attack #2. Two Mark 27 Torpedoes were fired from 200 feet for two hits. The target damaged by these two hits and unable to maneuver was sunk six hours later with a Mark 18 torpedo.

ATTACKS NO. 4 and NO. 5

One Mark 27 Torpedo was fired in each of these attacks against what was later determined to be a small sea truck. Both torpedoes missed. The first attack was made from 275 feet and the second from 230 feet. Both attacks were delivered during a severe electrical and rain storm against a high background noise on the JP. Commanding Officers are cautioned that a high background noise may attract this weapon, and, unless it passes close aboard, may cause failure of the unit to "home" on the target. The offensive employment of this weapon under these circumstances is questionable.

5. The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers, and Crew of HAWKBILL for their aggressiveness and successful employment of this weapon.

JAMES FIFE.

Copy to:
COMSUBSPAC
COMINCH ←
CNO
CINCPAC
COMSUBSTRINPAC
BUORD
BUSHIPS
COMSUBSLANT
All Squadron Commanders
CO, HAWKBILL (less encl.(A)).

J. B. Miller
J. B. MILLER,
Flag Secretary.

SECRET

4 721

721

A16-3(16) 1945

1945 APR 13 13 57
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COMINCH OFFICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

SS366/A16-3

Serial 0001

U.S.S. HAWKBILL (SS366)
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
5 March 1945.

~~T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T~~
TOP SECRET

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEET.
Subject: Special Report of Mark 27 Torpedo Attacks.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.

1. Enclosure (A) is a report of HAWKBILLS' five attacks using Mark 27 torpedoes while on her Third War Patrol.

/s/ F. W. SCANLAND, Jr.,

4 721

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ENCLOSURE (A)

TOP SECRET

ATTACK NO. 1

The target of this attack remains unidentified. The JC sound operator, a man of considerable war experience, reported the target as pinging, using hand key. Our approach was made as follows:

Tracked target from ahead at range 6,000 yards until his course and speed were established. We then reversed course, putting the target dead ahead, and when the range had closed to 3,500 yards we submerged to radar depth. When the range was 2,500 yards, we went deep to 200 feet, rigging ship for silent running as we went down. Left the TDC running to give range checks against the JP sound operator, who was by this time supplying the conning tower with continuous ranges and bearings. At range 900 yards JP reported target had a "firing noise level". With range zero and target screws audible through the hull, fired one Mk XXVII from tube #3. Torpedo hit after 1 minute 45 second run. We waited for 20 minutes, then surfaced. The target had sunk.

ATTACK NO. 2

The target of this attack was a PC boat on A/S patrol. Three approaches were attempted; using technique similar to Attack No. 1, but on each one the target turned off his previous course before passing close to us. On the third attempt, when it was believed the target had seen our shears during the radar depth phase, we fired one Mk XXVII torpedo from tube #4 from a depth of 300 feet, having obtained a "firing noise level" report from the JP operator. There were no results of this attack.

ATTACK NO. 3

This target was the same target as Attack No. 2. After the customary approach, and while at 200 feet depth, found the target had zigged around us from a range of about 1,500 yards. As he went past us, we kept our bow pointed towards him by turning hard so that when we were astern of him we were also pointed at him. After passing briefly from sound range, the target reversed course and commenced closing, and we found ourselves right on his track. When he passed overhead we fired on MK XXVII from tube #4. The torpedo room reported that they did not believe the torpedo had left the tube, so we fired tube #10. The F.T.R. then reported that the torpedo had left the tube. 56 seconds after firing tube #4, one torpedo hit, followed by a second and similar explosion 1 minute 45 seconds after firing tube #4. The second explosion is believed to have been the second torpedo, since, though the target's screws stopped immediately after the initial explosion, there was still considerable noise from the target for several minutes. This target did not sink, although his screws and fan tail were wrecked, and had

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- 1 -

ENCLOSURE (A)

TOP SECRET

4 721

TOP SECRET

to be destroyed with a Mk XVIII torpedo six hours later.

ATTACKS NO. 4 AND 5

These two attacks were made on what was later discovered to be a small sea truck. Both attacks were conducted in exactly the same manner as Attack No. 1, except that stern tubes were used and the keel depth at time of firing was a little in excess of that successfully used in attacks No. 1 and 3. The attacks were conducted during a heavy electrical and rain storm, giving high background noise on the JP, although "firing noise level" of good intensity was obtained in both cases. The misses are not explained.

CONCLUSIONS

We believe the Mk XXVII torpedo to be a highly efficient and effective weapon for offensive use against anti-submarine craft, although conditions for the attack must be reasonably good. Its value as a weapon of defense is not thought to be too high because of its low speed. This ship would be happy to undertake a similar mission at any time.

Mk XXVII Attack Number	1	2	3	4	5
Torpedo Serial (Mk 27-0)	340	424	353-376	211	291
Date	2/12/45	2/13	2/14	2/16	2/16/45
Time (HOW)	0304	0532	0019	0040	0220
Place	LOMBOK STRAIT				
Target	Unident	PC	PC	Sea Truck	Sea Truck
Target Course	090		046	325	330
Target Speed	4		6	7	8
Own Course	281		267	133	204
Own Speed	2		2	2	2
Firing Range	Target Overhead or Very Close Aboard				
Bearing true	281		177	144	348
Angle on Bow	6S		46S	10P	55S
Depth	200'	300'	200'	275'	230'
Explosion (time after firing)	1m 45S	Miss	1m 45s	Miss	Miss
Tube Number	3	4	4-10	10	10

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- 2 -


ENCLOSURE (A)

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